

**COLLECTION LATOMUS**  
**VOLUME C**

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**M. J. McGANN**

**Studies in Horace's First Book  
of Epistles**



**LATOMUS**  
**REVUE D'ÉTUDES LATINES**  
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COLLECTION LATOMUS  
VOL. C

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STUDIES IN HORACE'S FIRST BOOK OF EPISTLES

# LATOMUS

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## PREFACE

The present work consists of three chapters. Chapter I is an attempt to show that one tradition in ancient ethical thought played a major part in the formation of what may be called the philosophical climate of Horace's book of *Epistles*. The author is aware that *Quellenforschung* is not highly regarded nowadays. On behalf of the present exercise he would say that he has tried to avoid excessive dogmatism and that he does not claim that the results which he has reached have any bearing on the *Epistles* as poetry. It is hoped, however, that some light has been thrown on a poet's involvement with philosophy and on an aspect of the history of thought in the Augustan age.

The two remaining chapters are concerned with the poetry of the *Epistles*. Chapter II offers a "reading" of the epistles in sequence which it is hoped will prove to be a useful supplement to existing commentaries. In this chapter the epistolary form is for the most part treated uncritically: the epistles are taken for what they seem to be, letters from Horace to his friends. In Chapter III, however, the significance of the epistolary form and the status of some apparently autobiographical statements are examined more closely. In the light of the picture of the book which emerged from the detailed study in Chapter II, the conclusion is reached that the epistles belong essentially to the category of poetic discourse and should not be treated as personal documents capable of yielding detailed biographical information.

Although my view of the *Epistles* has come to differ from that of E. Fraenkel, my debt to him both as teacher and as author of *Horace* is very great. Both his learning and his sympathy in interpretation are exemplary. I have learned much from an unpublished dissertation by E. Garn, *Odenelemente im ersten Epistelbuch des Horaz* (Freiburg i. Breisgau, 1954), which I was able to consult through the kindness of the university library of Freiburg, and from C. Becker's book, *Das Spätwerk des Horaz* (Göttingen, 1963).

I should like to thank the Senate of Queen's University, Belfast, for granting me study leave which made the writing of the present

work possible and the Director of the British School of Archaeology in Athens, Mr. A. H. S. Megaw, for his kindness in making available to me the resources of the library there. Mr. R. G. M. Nisbet has read the work in typescript and has made some valuable suggestions. I have benefited from a discussion with Mr. D. Stockton about some points of Augustan history. For the faults in this work I alone am responsible.

It has not for the most part been possible to refer to literature published since 1966. Among relevant works which have appeared since then mention should be made of *Reading Horace* by David West (Edinburgh, 1967), an edition with commentary of the first book of *Epistles* by Jean Préaux (Paris, 1968) and *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* by Gordon Williams (Oxford, 1968).

*Belfast, April, 1969*

M. J. McG.



## ABBREVIATIONS

<i>A&amp;A</i>	<i>Antike und Abendland</i>
<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>ASNP</i>	<i>Annali della Scuola Normale di Pisa, Cl. di lettere, storia e filosofia</i>
<i>CPhil</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>FPL</i>	<i>Fragmenta poetarum Latinorum</i> , ed. W. Morel (Leipzig, 1927)
<i>GGA</i>	<i>Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeiger</i>
<i>HSPH</i>	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
<i>JRS</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>
<i>LF</i>	<i>Listy Filologické</i>
<i>Neue Jahrb.</i>	<i>Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum</i>
<i>NGG</i>	<i>Nachrichten der Gelehrten Gesellschaft zu Göttingen</i>
<i>R.E.</i>	<i>Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft:</i> <i>Neue Bearbeitung</i>
<i>REA</i>	<i>Revue des études anciennes</i>
<i>RFIC</i>	<i>Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica</i>
<i>RhM</i>	<i>Rheinisches Museum</i>
<i>SIFC</i>	<i>Studi italiani di filologia classica</i>
<i>SVF</i>	<i>Stoicorum veterum fragmenta</i> , ed. H. von Arnim (Leipzig, 1903-24)
<i>TAPA</i>	<i>Transactions ... of the American Philological Association</i>
<i>Vorsokr.</i>	<i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> <sup>6</sup> , ed. H. Diels- W. Kranz (Berlin, 1935)
<i>YCLS</i>	<i>Yale Classical Studies</i>

## CITATION OF FRAGMENTS

- Appius Claudius Caccus : *Fragmenta poetarum Latinorum*, ed. W. Morel (Leipzig, 1927)
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*Carmina cum fragmentis*, ii<sup>a</sup>, ed. B. Snell (Leipzig, 1964)
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- Stoici veteres : *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, i-iv, ed. H. von Arnim (iv : indices by M. Adler) (Leipzig, 1903-24)

## Horace, Panaetius and Athenodorus Calvus

Near the beginning of *Epi.* 1, Horace denies that he has bound himself to swear in accordance with the formula of any teacher of philosophy (14). Sometimes, he says, he plunges into civic affairs, living a *βλός πρακτικός* (*agilis fio*, 16), and is then the guardian and unbending henchman of true virtue (17). In other words he is, or is trying to be, a Stoic *sapiens* in the Roman style, such as the younger Cato sought to be. At other times, however, he relapses into the hedonism of Aristippus (18 f.). Whatever may be the biographical truth of these statements, they are part of the introduction to the whole book of *Epistles* and serve to establish its predominantly ethical concern.

The expectations which they arouse are both fulfilled and disappointed. The book clearly cannot be read as a statement of the views of a man who has made his submission to one of the schools and rejects completely all that lies outside its teachings, but at the same time it does little to encourage the belief that it expresses the opinions of one who is subject to extreme changes in his philosophic outlook. While both the Stoicism of the *sapiens* and extreme hedonism are represented (the latter not very seriously) <sup>(1)</sup>, neither plays an important part, and the book as a whole displays a substantially coherent, though by no means monolithic, outlook lying between these extremes. Although in details Horace draws on the teachings of a number of rival philosophies <sup>(2)</sup>, it will be argued in this chapter

(1) Stoic *sapientia*: below, p. 74 f.; extreme hedonism: below, pp. 44; 71 f.

(2) Scholars have emphasized various aspects of Horace's debt to the schools: E. Courbaud his Stoicism, *Horace ... à l'époque des Épîtres* (Paris, 1914), *passim*; N. W. DeWitt, *CPhil.*, xxxiv (1939), 127 ff., and M. N. Porter Packer, *TAPA*, lxxii (1941), xxxix f., his Epicureanism; W. S. Maguinness points to a special debt to the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon amid a general eclecticism, *Hermathena*, lii (1938), 27 ff. A. La Penna has drawn attention to the variety of possible philosophic sources for certain details, *ASNP*, xviii (1949), 25 ff. See also the general discussion in V. Pöschl, *Fondation Hardt, Entretiens ii, L'influence grecque sur la poésie latine de Catulle à Ovide* (Geneva, 1956), pp. 106 ff. and the

that the collection as a whole has been especially influenced by one philosophic tradition, and it will be suggested that the coherence of its ethical outlook is largely to be attributed to this influence.

### I. — PANAETIUS AND THE EPISTLES

When for the first time in the book Horace announces his absorption in ethics and thereby indicates that the collection will have this as its dominant concern, he is likely to have chosen his words in full awareness of their philosophic implications. The object of his present enquiry, he tells Maecenas, is *quid verum atque decens* (11). While *verum* does not here suggest any particular philosophic tradition, *decens*, if it is something more than a general term meaning 'proper', 'right', can in Rome at this time, less than a quarter of a century after the publication of the *de Officiis*, point in one direction only, to the ethics of Panaetius. In the *de Officiis*, the first two books of which were based on the *περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος* of Panaetius <sup>(1)</sup>, Cicero had chosen *decorum* to be his rendering of the important Panaetian term *πρέπον* <sup>(2)</sup>; if Horace's *decens* also represents *πρέπον*, it stands, by virtue of its participial form, closer to the Greek. Its appearance in the present passage may be an indication that Horace's ethical ideas are centred largely round the teaching of Panaetius or that they have been greatly influenced by a tradition to which Panaetius made an important contribution. An examination of the book for evidence of Panaetian influence seems justified.

Panaetius was less concerned with the *σοφός* of traditional Stoic teaching and his superhuman *ἀρετή* than with the *προκόπτων*, who tries to carry out his duties and improve himself <sup>(3)</sup>. In *Epi.*

contributions to the discussion (pp. 116 ff.) of J. Bayet, P. Boyancé, L. P. Wilkinson and Pöschl himself.

(1) Cf. M. Testard's discussion in the introduction to the Budé edition of *de Officiis I* (Paris, 1965), pp. 25-49. The basically Panaetian inspiration of Books I and II remains unchallenged (cf. Testard, p. 43, n. 5). None of the quotations adduced in the present work as Panaetian comes from a passage in Cicero where a source other than Panaetius seems possible.

(2) For its history see M. Pohlenz, 'Τὸ πρέπον', *NGG* (1933), 53 ff. and especially 76 ff.; *Antikes Führertum* (Leipzig, 1934), pp. 58 f.

(3) M. Pohlenz, *R.E.* xviii-2, 435; A. Grilli, *Il problema della vita contemplativa nel mondo greco-romano* (Milan, 1953), p. 112; I. G. Kidd, *CQ*, n.s. v (1955), 193. For a different view see M. van Straaten, *Panētiūs* (Amsterdam, 1946), pp. 195 ff. On the problem of *προκοπή* in the early Stoa see O. Luschkat, *Philologus*, cii (1958), 178 ff.

1 Horace holds that any improvement in morals is worth while (28-35) <sup>(1)</sup> and speaks of virtue as something less than the sublime entity which traditional Stoicism made of it (41) <sup>(2)</sup>. At the end of *Epi.* 2 he himself appears as a *προκόπτων*, making his way forward at his own speed.

nec tardum opperor nec praecedentibus insto. (71)

Panaetius had taught that men should know themselves and act in accordance with that knowledge, using their own nature as a yardstick by which to measure the appropriateness of a contemplated pursuit: *ut etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur* (fr. 97 [= Cic. *Off.* i, 110]). Behind the fundamentally tolerant attitude to the variety of men's worldly pursuits shown in *Epi.* 6 lies the same awareness of the importance of the individual human nature <sup>(3)</sup>. This becomes explicit at the end of *Epi.* 7, where Horace's words echo Cicero's:

metiri se quemque suo modulo ac pede verum est. (98)

The Panaetian origin of this statement is confirmed by the fact that *metiri* refers back to the statement about smallness in 44, *parvum parva decent*, in which the concept of *πέπον* is present.

References to what appears to be Panaetian *πέπον* occur elsewhere in the book. In *Epi.* 6 it is perhaps not accidental that *quid deceat, quid non, obliti* (62) should occur in the treatment of the *βλος φιλήδονος*, for *decorum* is formally introduced in the *de Officiis* at the beginning of the section devoted to the virtue of temperance (i, 93) <sup>(4)</sup>.

(1) This tells against R. Heinze's view that Aristo of Chios was the main source of *Epi.* 1, *RhM*, xlv (1890), 497 ff. Aristo's denial that *propria cuique personae praecepta* had any value (*SVF*, i, no. 358) probably means that he was not interested in the *προκόπτων* (Kidd, *op. cit.*, 192). It is in general unlikely that the piece which introduces the tolerant wisdom of the book of *Epistles* should have been inspired by the strict moralist who regarded virtue as the only good and rejected Zeno's category of *προηγμένα*. See also below, p. 22, n. 2.

(2) *virtus est vitium fugere* (1, 41) is in the spirit of Cic. *Off.* i, 114, *nec tam est existendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur quam ut vitia fugiamus*. As a contrast to Horace's definition of *virtus* may be cited *SVF*, iii, no. 245, *iam vero virtus eadem in homine ac deo est, neque alio ullo in genere praeterea. est autem virtus nihil aliud nisi perfecta et ad summum perducta natura*.

(3) Cf. also 17, 6-12 and W. S. Maguinness, *Hermathena*, lii (1938), 40 f.

(4) Cf. M. Pohlenz, *NGG* (1933), 73 f.; *Antikes Führertum*, pp. 60 ff.

The *decorum* of age and its relevance to dress appears at 14, 32 <sup>(1)</sup> and of dress alone at 18, 30 <sup>(2)</sup>. *decere* occurs three times in *Epi.* 17, once with reference to a social relationship <sup>(2)</sup> and twice with reference to a style of life (23 and 26). In *Epi.* 5, 9 and 13 it is not difficult to see an implicit recommendation of *decorum* <sup>(3)</sup>.

Panaetius held that in deliberation about a course of action three questions arise. Two of these only, whether the proposed action is honourable or dishonourable and whether it is expedient or inexpedient, were treated in his *περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος* <sup>(4)</sup>. The same questions are set forth in the passage which introduces the moral themes of *Epi.* 2 by praising Homer for showing *quid sit pulcrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non* <sup>(5)</sup>. Cicero, preceded by Lucilius (1329) <sup>(6)</sup>, had translated Panaetius' *καλόν* by *honestum* <sup>(7)</sup>; Horace's *pulcrum* brings out the aesthetic aspect of the Greek term. As in his choice of *decens* and not *decorum*, he shows himself independent of Cicero's terminology and closer to the Greek.

There was nothing in Panaetius' view of which *πρόπον* could more properly be predicated than consistency, *aequabilitas universae vitae, tum singularum actionum* (fr. 97 [= *Off.* i, 111]). Although a concern with this quality is not new in Horace <sup>(7)</sup>, it has acquired in the book of *Epistles* an importance which it did not before possess. In some of the epistles there are passages which deal explicitly with the theme of consistency and inconsistency: 1, 16 ff. and 82 ff.;

(1) Cf. *Off.* i, 122 f. The *decorum* of age is involved at 7, 44 also: *parvum parva decent: mihi iam ...* This connects with the description of lost youth in 25 ff., where the words *videre decorum* foreshadow the part which *πρόπον* will play in Horace's argument. Cf. also S. Commager, *The Odes of Horace* (Yale, 1962), chapter 5, especially pp. 244 ff.

(2) Cf. *Off.* i, 130.

(3) For *Epi.* 13 see below, p. 66.

(4) Fr. 99 (= *Off.* i, 9); 35 (= *Off.* iii, 7-10).

(5) M. Puelma Piwonka, *Lucilius und Kallimachos* (Frankfurt a. M., 1949), p. 40; I. Mariotti, *Studi Luciliani* (Florence, 1960), p. 10, n. 5. Horace here appears to be offering a more concise version of Lucil. 1329-30: *virtus, scire, homini rectum, utile quid sit, honestum, quae bona, quae mala item, quid inutile, turpe, inhonestum*. For Lucilius and Panaetius cf. A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa* (Berlin, 1892), pp. 444 f.; Marx ad Lucil. 738; 742; 1337-1338; C. Cichorius, *Unters. zu Lucilius* (Berlin, 1908), pp. 47, n. 2; 351; G. C. Fiske, *Lucilius and Horace* (University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature N° 7) (Madison, 1920), p. 72.

(6) Pohlenz, *Antikes Führertum*, p. 16. *pulcrum* occasionally represents *καλόν* in Cicero, e.g. *Off.* i, 18.

(7) *Sat.* i, 1, 15 ff.; 3, 1 ff.; ii, 7, 7 ff.

8, 12 ; 14, 14 ff. ; 15, 26 ff. Other epistles have an implicit connection with it : *Epi.* 7 ; 12 ; 20 <sup>(1)</sup>. In *Epi.* 15 there is a passage which illustrates a point made in the *de Officiis* and probably deriving from Panaetius. At lines 42 ff. Horace tells how a piece of good luck makes him unfaithful to the *tuta et parvula* which he had said in *Epi.* 7 accorded with his true nature (7, 44), but which he here confesses have his approval only when things are not going well for him. When, however, he is enjoying good fortune, his outlook is very different : he admires the rich with their smart country houses and, it may be assumed, tries to live as they do. It is behaviour of this kind which Panaetius seems to have singled out as inimical to consistency : *quam* (sc. *aequabilitatem*) *conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam* (fr. 97 [= *Off.* i, 111]).

E. Fraenkel has already connected the discussion of gifts and gratitude in the *de Officiis* with *Epi.* 7, without, however, deriving Horace's views from anything more precise than 'the current doctrines of Hellenistic ethics' <sup>(2)</sup>. To the points which he has made may be added the parallel between the phrase *dilectus dignitatis*, 'a choice based on worth' (*Off.* i, 45) and Horace's use of *dignus* at 7, 22 and 24. At *Off.* i, 48 the question is asked what is to be done if an unsought favour is received, and the answer is suggested : *an imitari agros fertiles, qui multo plus efferunt quam acceperunt* ? The same image occurs in the epistle, where the gift of something of which the donor thinks little is a sowing that will result in a harvest of ingratitude : *haec seges ingratos tulit et feret omnibus annis* (21) <sup>(3)</sup>.

The pursuit of the mean enjoyed the approval of Panaetius no less than it did of the Peripatetics. In the *de Officiis* there is a reference to *mediocritatem* ... *quae est inter nimium et parum, quae placet Peripateticis et recte placet* (i, 89). It is recommended in matters of neatness, cleanliness and dress at i, 130, and at i, 29 the related idea occurs of a pair of opposed vicious extremes (*qui altero genere iniustitiae vacant, in alterum incurrunt*) <sup>(4)</sup>. The clearest example of the presence of these

(1) In *Epi.* 7 Horace's wish is consistently to live in harmony with his own nature. For *Epi.* 12 see below, p. 63, and for *Epi.* 20 below, p. 86 and n. 1.

(2) *Horace* (Oxford, 1957), p. 330.

(3) The image is found in Epicurus also, *Vita* 120 b. This fact does not justify the belief of N. W. deWitt, *AJP* lvi (1937), 325, that the epistle is "a Latin sermon based on Epicurus' essay *On gifts and gratitude*".

(4) Cf. *Sat.* i, 2, 24.

ideas in the book of *Epistles* is at the beginning of *Epi.* 18, where, having spoken of the *scurra*, Horace remarks *est huic diversum vitio vitium prope maius* (5) and later *virtus est medium vitiorum et utrimque reductum* (9). The idea of the mean is present also in *Epi.* 10 (*cui non conveniet sua res, ut calceus olim, / si pede maior erit, subvertet, si minor, uret*, 42 f.), *Epi.* 2 (*nec tardum opperior nec praecedentibus insto*, 71) and *Epi.* 6 (*insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui, / ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam*, 15 f.). And there is reason to believe that it is implicit in the closing lines of *Epi.* 1 (1). Horace did not of course need to have Panaetian ideas in mind in order to refer to the mean. What is significant for the present argument is that the importance of the mean in the book chimes very well with other, more distinctively Panaetian, elements.

So far the only work cited as representing Panaetian thought has been the first book of the *de Officiis*. The evidence thus appears to point to the influence either of Cicero's work or of its source, the *περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος* of Panaetius. Yet between these and the *Epistles* there is a fundamental difference. Panaetius' work was written for the guidance of statesmen (2), and Cicero's is similarly concerned with the needs of men in public life. Horace's concerns, however, are largely private, and he is less interested in duties than in the achievement of happiness. There is in particular his turning away from city to country and references in what appear to be Epicurean terms to the value of the hidden life (3). If the hypothesis that Panaetian thought was the major element, and a unifying one, in the philosophical background of the *Epistles* is correct, it seems necessary to look either to a more personal and private aspect of his ethics and one less at odds with Epicureanism than that embodied in the *περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος* or to a development of his thought in this direction by a later philosopher or to both these possibilities.

At this point the concept of *εὐθυμία* comes to mind. Panaetius

(1) See below, p. 37.

(2) G. Siefert, 'Plutarchs Schrift ΠΕΡΙ ΕΥΘΥΜΙΑΣ', Beilage zum Jahresbericht der königlichen Landesschule Pforta 1908 (Naumburg a. S., 1908), pp. 44 f.; Pohlenz, *Antikes Führertum*, p. 143; A. T. Cole Jr., *HSPh*, lxx (1961), 136 ff.

(3) 17, 10; 18, 103. See also 4, 4 ff.; 7, *passim* (implicitly); 10, *passim*; 14, 32 ff.; 16, 1 ff. (implicitly).



wrote a treatise about it <sup>(1)</sup>, and the persistence of interest in it is attested by Seneca's *de tranquillitate animi* and Plutarch's *περὶ εὐθυμίας*.

## 2. ΕΥΘΥΜΙΑ

The history of *εὐθυμία* as an ethical term begins with Democritus, for whom it denotes the happy state of those who by following his ethical teachings achieve a way of life in which reason, self-control and moderation are dominant. It could be enjoyed only if a man did not engage in a great deal of activity, either as a private person or as a member of the community <sup>(2)</sup>. This is a warning against excess and not a call to quietism <sup>(3)</sup>. A man's choice of activity must have regard for his own powers and nature <sup>(4)</sup>. Since both deficiency and excess disturb the soul, moderation must be observed in the acquisition of possessions <sup>(5)</sup>. A man should consider those less fortunate than himself; he should regard no one with the admiration which breeds discontent, and he should be satisfied with what he has <sup>(6)</sup>. Pleasures are good, but must be subject to self-control and moderation <sup>(7)</sup>: a man's life should exhibit a harmonious proportion <sup>(8)</sup>. It is clear that the approach to Democritean *εὐθυμία* is along the road of traditional Greek wisdom <sup>(9)</sup>.

After Democritus, the term *εὐθυμία* seems for some time to have played no significant part in the history of ethics. Part of a pseudepigraphic Pythagorean treatise with the heading, *Ἰνπάρχον Πυθα-*

(1) Fr. 45.

(2) B 3.

(3) For Democritus as a political thinker see E. A. Havelock, *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics* (London, 1957), chapter 6.

(4) B 3.

(5) B 191; 285; 286.

(6) B 191. In the Augustan period the doctrine of *μηδὲν θανμάζειν* could be connected particularly with Democritus (Strabo, i, 3, 21); below, p. 46, n. 4.

(7) B 4; 191.

(8) B. 191; cf. A 167.

(9) The above summary has been written in the belief that in spite of the considerable doubt surrounding the authenticity of many of the ethical teachings attributed to Democritus and 'Democrates' it is unlikely to provoke the disagreement even of the most sceptical. For an indication of an approach to the problem see Z. Stewart, *HSPh*, lxxiii (1958), 191, n. 44.

γορείου ἐκ τοῦ περὶ εὐθυμίας, has been preserved in Stobaeus <sup>(1)</sup> and is perhaps to be dated to the third century B.C. <sup>(2)</sup>. Since it appears to belong to a group of writings characterized by 'a dogmatic presentation of (early) Academic teaching' <sup>(3)</sup>, it is possible that εὐθυμία played some part in the ethical teaching of Plato's followers. Crantor's recommendation of μετριοπάθεια was in accordance with the spirit of Democritus <sup>(4)</sup>, and it seems not unlikely that his περὶ πένθους should have owed something to Democritus' teaching about εὐθυμία. It may be significant that Panaetius, who wrote περὶ εὐθυμίας, should have thought highly of this work of Crantor's: *ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit ad verbum ediscendus libellus* (fr. 137 [= Cic. *Luc.* 135]) <sup>(5)</sup>.

Although only one fragment of Panaetius' work περὶ εὐθυμίας survives (fr. 45), it is legitimate to infer from the title that in it Panaetius showed general sympathy with the teachings of Democritus. This conclusion is supported by the fact that there are many points of similarity between the ethical fragments of Democritus and the first two books of the *de Officiis* <sup>(6)</sup>. In view of the Epicurean

(1) *Flor.* iv, 44, 81 (Wachsmuth and Hense, v, p. 980 ff.). The text has been printed by Diels as an 'imitation' of Democritus, *Vorsokr.* ii, pp. 228 ff.

(2) H. Thesleff, *Acta Academiae Aboensis Humaniora*, xxiv, 3 (1961), p. 115. The pseudographic letter of Lysis to Hipparchus, which shows connections with pseudo-Hipparchus περὶ εὐθυμίας (A. Delatte, *Études sur la littérature pythagoricienne* [Paris, 1915], pp. 89 f. and 90, n. 2), has been dated to the third century B.C. by W. Burkert, *Philologus*, cv (1961), 16 ff.

(3) Thesleff, *op. cit.*, p. 101. He regards southern Italy as the place of origin of these writings, pp. 96 ff. On this point see also Burkert's reservations, *Gnomon*, xxxiv (1962), 765 ff.

(4) For praise of moderation in Democritus see B 102; 210 f.; 219; 235; 286.

(5) A. Barigazzi has recently suggested that Panaetius' treatise on εὐθυμία was influenced by Crantor, *RFIC* n.s. xi (1962), 124 ff. Cf. also R. Kassel, *Untersuchungen zur gr. u. röm. Konsollationsliteratur* (*Zetemata* xviii) (Munich, 1958), pp. 25 f.

In view of the Pythagorean, early Academic, and possibly Italian context to which pseudo-Hipparchus seems to belong, it is striking that Panaetius in a letter to Tuberus, possibly the work which contained the praise of Crantor cited above, should have expressed his strong approval also of a *carmen* by Appius Claudius, which to Cicero seemed 'Pythagorean' (fr. 139 = Cic. *Tusc.* iv, 4), and that of the three poetic fragments of Appius which survive two can readily be connected with εὐθυμία. Fr. 2, 1 (Morel, *FPL*), *amicum cum vides, obliuiscere miseriae*, is concerned with cheerfulness, and fr. 1, as restored by Baehrens, <ae> *qui animi compotem esse | ne quid fraudis stuprique ferocia pariat*, perhaps contains even a rendering of εὐθυμία in *aequus animus* (see also below, pp. 19 f.).

(6) Cf. G. Siefert, *op. cit.*, pp. 46 ff.

debt in ethics to Democritus, it is not unlikely that at times Panaetius' treatise stood close to Epicurus<sup>(1)</sup>. Whether Panaetius, whose tolerance is attested not only by his turning to Democritus, but also by the description *ισχυρῶς φιλοπλάτων καὶ φιλοαριστοτέλης* (fr. 57 [= *Stoicorum Index Herculanensis*, col. lxi]), went so far in the *περὶ εὐθυμίας* as to borrow an apt dictum or illustration or even some doctrine from Epicurus is uncertain, but the possibility cannot be excluded<sup>(2)</sup>.

The history of the concept during the next two hundred years is obscure. It has been claimed that the seventeenth pseudo-Hippocratic letter, which describes a meeting between Democritus and Hippocrates and was probably written towards the end of the Roman republic or during the early principate<sup>(3)</sup>, forms part of a tradition of writing about *εὐθυμία*<sup>(4)</sup>. There are points of contact with the teachings of Democritus<sup>(5)</sup>, but as the word *εὐθυμία* does not occur in the letter, it does not seem advisable to use it in tracing the history of the term<sup>(6)</sup>. It is possible that Athenodorus Calvus, the Stoic

(1) The term *εὐθυμία*, however, seems not to have been used by the Epicureans; cf. Siefert, *op. cit.*, pp. 7 f. as against H. Broecker, *Animadversiones ad Plutarchi libellum περὶ εὐθυμίας* (Bonn, 1954), pp. 47 f. and A. J. Festugière, *Epicurus, and his Gods* (Oxford, 1955), p. 44, n. 31.

(2) Cf. Pohlenz's introductory note to his Teubner text of Plutarch's *Περὶ εὐθυμίας*, *Moralia*, iii (Leipzig, 1929), p. 187, 'περὶ εὐθυμίας egerunt inprimis Democritus et Panaetius Stoicus Democritea et Epicurea non aspernatus'.

(3) The letter belongs to a collection forming a kind of epistolary novel. R. Heinze suggested a date in the first century A.D., *de Horatio Bionis imitatore* (Diss. Bonn, 1889), p. 15, n. 1; Pohlenz placed it in the Augustan period, *Hermes*, lii (1917), 353; H. Diels in the first century A.D., *Hermes* liii (1918), 81 ff.; R. Philippson between 62 and 44 B.C., *RhM* lxxvii (1928), 293 ff.; K. Svoboda shortly before the fall of the Roman republic, *LF*, n.s. i (1953), 55 ff. In his discussion of Horace, *Sat.* i, 1, Fraenkel calls the seventeenth letter, without argument, a 'late piece', *op. cit.*, p. 93.

(4) Siefert, *op. cit.*, p. 40 and n. 2; Philippson, *op. cit.*, 293.

(5) Diels, *Vorsokr.* ii, p. 226 and Svoboda, *op. cit.*

(6) An important element in the letter is the laughter of Democritus, which may be a Cynic trait; cf. R. Heinze, *RhM* xlv (1890), 504, n. 1; Z. Stewart, *HSPH* lxiii (1958), 186. Apart from the letter, the first references to the laughing Democritus are Cic. *De Or.* ii, 235, Hor. *Epi.* ii, 1, 194, and Sotion, the teacher of Seneca, apud Stob. *Flor.* iii, 20, 53 (Wachsmuth and Hense, iii, p. 550) (see Diels, *Vorsokr.* Demokritos, A 21; on the basis of inadequate arguments R. Reitzenstein has attributed a knowledge of the laughing Democritus to Lucilius also, *Hermes*, lix [1924], 5). Horace's reference to the laughter as well as to Democritus' neglect of his farm (*Epi.* 12, 12) (a trait also first occurring about this time; cf. Cic. *Fin.* v, 87; Philo, *de vita contempl.* 14 [= Demokritos,

philosopher and friend of Augustus, composed a treatise on *εὐθυμία* <sup>(1)</sup>. He seems to have recounted a meeting between Democritus and Hippocrates, and this may point to some connection between Athenodorus and the pseudo-Hippocratic letters <sup>(2)</sup>.

The only extant treatises on *εὐθυμία*, apart from pseudo-Hipparchus, are the *de tranquillitate animi* of Seneca and the *περὶ εὐθυμίας* of Plutarch. To claim, as some scholars have done <sup>(3)</sup>, that one or both of these depends directly on Panaetius is to go beyond the evidence. Nevertheless they have so much in common with each other, with Democritus, and with the first two books of the *de Officiis* <sup>(4)</sup> that it seems proper to regard them as representatives of a tradition of discussion *περὶ εὐθυμίας* which was founded by Panaetius on the basis of the teaching of Democritus. How far Seneca and Plutarch went in adding elements which seemed relevant to them, but had not previously formed part of the tradition is a question which admits of no answer. Nevertheless if the hypothesis is advanced that the book of *Epistles* in large measure draws on the same tradition as the treatises, it seems proper to test it, firstly by looking in the book for a rendering of the term *εὐθυμία* into Latin, preferably in one or more prominent places, and secondly by instituting a comparison between the *Epistles* and the treatises. If a rendering of *εὐθυμία* can be found, if there is a considerable measure of agreement between Horace and the treatises in choice of topic, advice, and illustration, if some of these points of contact can be paralleled

A 15]) points to his acquaintance with fanciful tales about the philosopher. It is possible that the relation between the seventeenth pseudo-Hippocratic letter and Hor. *Sat.* i, 1 is closer than Fraenkel, *loc. cit.*, has allowed.

(1) Below, p. 28.

(2) D. L. ix, 42 (= Demokritos, A 1, § 42). Cf. Philippson, *op. cit.*, 321 ff. There is no basis for his belief that Athenodorus' reference to Democritus and Hippocrates must be earlier than the letters.

(3) R. Hirzel, *Hermes*, xiv (1879), 354 ff.; G. Siefert, *op. cit.*, *passim*; M. Pohlenz, *Plutarchus Moralia*, iii (Leipzig, 1929), p. 187 (contrast *Hermes*, xl [1905], 275 ff.); *Antikes Führertum* (Leipzig, 1934), p. 45, n. 4; *Die Stoa*, ii<sup>a</sup> (Göttingen, 1964), p. 102; *R.E.* xviii-2, 438; *Gnomon*, xxi (1949), 115; *Stoa u. Stoiker* (Zurich, 1950), p. 376; H. Broecker, *op. cit.*, *passim*; A. Grilli, *SIFC*, xxix (1957), 81 ff.; A. Barigazzi, *RFIC*, n.s. xl (1962), 113 ff.

(4) Siefert, *op. cit.*, pp. 9 ff.; 46 ff.; 49 ff. Q. Cataudella has raised the possibility that the *de Officiis* may draw on the *περὶ εὐθυμίας* of Panaetius as well as on his *περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος*, *Atti del I Congresso Internazionale di Studi Ciceroniani* (Rome, 1961), 479 ff.

in Democritus or the first two books of the *de Officiis* or in both places, the hypothesis can with reasonable confidence be regarded as proven.

### 3. ΕΥΘΥΜΙΑ IN THE BOOK OF EPISTLES

In Cicero and Seneca εὐθυμία is translated by *tranquillitas* or *animi tranquillitas* <sup>(1)</sup>. It is an unsatisfactory rendering, failing to bring out that element of joy which was present in the Democritean concept and suggesting a quietism foreign to Democritus and, as will appear <sup>(2)</sup>, to Panaetius also. *Tranquillitas* can translate as well the Epicurean term γαλήνη <sup>(3)</sup>, and it is not impossible that the use of *tranquillitas* as a translation of εὐθυμία is to be connected with a quietist, post-Panaetian interpretation of the term <sup>(4)</sup>. The prosody of *tranquillitas* prevents its occurrence in hexameters. In the book of *Epistles*, however, *quid pure tranqillet* is found at 18, 102. This might be compared with the transitive use of εὐθυμεῖν, but the context shows Epicurean influence: line 103 refers to the maxim λάθε βιώσας, and *pure* is suggestive of clear weather and hence of γαλήνη. It therefore seems inadvisable to connect *tranqillet* with εὐθυμία.

If Horace had wished to refer in nominal form to εὐθυμία, he would have had to find a substitute for the presumably current, but unmetrical, *tranquillitas*. Although Cicero had at least once used *bonus animus* in a rendering of the concept of εὐθυμία <sup>(5)</sup>, the phrase perhaps had, through its frequent use in expressions like *bonum habere animum* <sup>(6)</sup>, a certain banality which made it unsuitable for a context of serious moral discussion. But there was another adjective which could be attached to *animus* to give a phrase close in meaning to *tranquillitas*, but expressing as well the ideas of balance and consistency, if not of joy, which are essential to the concept of εὐθυμία. The adjective is *aequus*.

(1) Cic. *Fin.* v, 23; at *Off.* i, 69 he refers to *tranquillitas animi et securitas* and in the next sentence underlines the fact that *tranquillitas* is a technical term by writing *eam quam dico tranquillitatem expetentes*. For Seneca see *Tranq.* 2, 3; *De Ira* iii, 6, 3.

(2) See below, pp. 24 f.

(3) Cic. *Fin.* i, 43; ii, 118.

(4) If Sen. *Tranq.* 3, 1 ff. could be regarded as deriving from a treatise on εὐθυμία, it would prove the existence of such an interpretation. See, however, below, p. 28.

(5) *bono ut esset animo*, *Fin.* v, 87.

(6) Cf. *TLL* ii, 2097, 36 ff.

The concluding lines of *Epi.* 11 show points of contact with the concept of *εὐθυμία*. The attack on restless travel (27 ff.) is paralleled in Sen. *Tranq.* 2, 13 ff., and the reference to *ratio et prudentia* (25), i.e. *λόγος καὶ φρόνησις*, is completely at home in a passage inspired by the concept <sup>(1)</sup>. The last words of the epistle are:

quod petis, hic est,  
est Ulubris, animus si te non deficit aequus. (29 f.)

It seems not unreasonable to regard this as a proclamation of *εὐθυμία*, prominently placed at the beginning of the second half of the book and thus corresponding to the proclamation of *πρέπον* at the beginning of the whole work. *aequus animus* occurs at only one other place in the book, but it is a place of extreme importance. The ethical discussion which opened in *Epi.* 1 concludes in *Epi.* 18, of which the closing words are *aequum mi animum ipse parabo* (112).

#### 4. — THE BOOK OF *EPISTLES* AND THE EXTANT TREATISES ON *EYΘYMLIA*

A comparison between the *Epistles* and the treatises of Seneca and Plutarch may begin with some points of general similarity. Fundamental to all three is the idea that happiness and unhappiness proceed from within <sup>(2)</sup>, and that happiness is the fruit of reason and prudence <sup>(3)</sup>. They all discuss the importance of acting in harmony with one's own nature and of being both consistent and adaptable <sup>(4)</sup>, the need to be defiant towards Fortune, careless about one's possess-

(1) Cf. Plut. *π. εὐθ.* 465 b; 466 d and f; 474 d; and Broecker, *op. cit.* (see above, p. 18, n. 3) pp. 67 f.; 71 ff.; 180 ff.; 202; 207. See also Grilli, *SIFC* xxix (1957), 81 ff., especially 85 ff. For *ratio* and *prudentia* in Panaetius see in particular fr. 107 *ad fin.* (= *Off.* i, 101), in *ratione, quae docet et explanat, quid faciendum fugiendumque sit* (note the reference to *constantia* and *moderatio* at § 102), and *Off.* i, 153, *prudentiam enim, quam Graeci φρόνησιν dicunt, aliam quandam intellegimus, quae est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia*.

(2) Hor. 2, 48-54; 11, 25 ff.; Sen. 9, 2; Plut. 467 a; 473 b; 477 a-b. Cf. Democr. B 149.

(3) Above, n. 1.

(4) Individual nature: Hor., 7, 44 and 98; Sen. 6, 2 f.; 7, 2 (= 6, 4 Waltz); Plut. 472 c; 473 a. Cf. Democr. B 3 and *Off.* i, 110. Consistency: for Horace see above, pp. 12 f.; Sen. 2, 6; Plut. 466 b-c. Cf. *Off.* i, 111. Adaptability: Hor. 15, 33 ff.; 42 ff.; 17, 23 ff.; Sen. 14, 1; Plut. 467 a-c; 474 c and d. Siefert has argued that *ἡ τοῦ ἡθους εὐτροπία* (Democr. B 57) refers to adaptability, *op. cit.*, pp. 26 ff.

ions and fearless in face of death <sup>(1)</sup>, and the spritual disturbance caused by unexpected events <sup>(2)</sup>. Horace and Seneca are concerned with the mean <sup>(3)</sup>, hypocrisy <sup>(4)</sup>, the moral life as a military campaign <sup>(5)</sup>, the folly of travel <sup>(6)</sup>, and the uses of occasional *ebrietas* <sup>(7)</sup>; Horace and Plutarch with the conscience <sup>(8)</sup>, the folly of trying to combine great philosophic ambitions with materialistic concerns <sup>(9)</sup>, and the fact that the good things of this world give most pleasure to those who are least afraid of losing them <sup>(10)</sup>.

All the points of contact in matters of detail which will be considered are between Plutarch and Horace. The first is concerned with the subject of inconsistency. Plutarch offers a comparison: men who vainly seek relief from the ills of the soul by exchanging one kind of life for another (*αἱ τῶν βίων ἀντιμεταλήψεις*) are like sea-sick cowards who think they will be better off if they change from a small boat to a large merchantman and again from that to a trireme, but in fact carry their nausea and cowardice with them (466 b-c). In *Epi.* 1, 83-90 Horace discusses the inconsistencies of the rich, turning at 91 to those of the poor. In lines 92 f. he brings rich and poor together in a final example of inconsistency, their shared passion for travel:

conducto navigio aequē  
nauseat (sc. pauper) ac locuples, quem ducit priva triremis. (92 f.)

(1) Hor. 1, 68 f.; 16, 73 ff.; Sen. 11, 1 ff. (of the *sapiens*, not the *imperfectus*); Plut. 474 d; 475 c-c; 476 a-e. Pan. fr. 116 (= Gell. *NA* xiii, 28) and *Off.* i, 112. For the history of the theme of *Fortunae resistere* see G. Busch, *A&A* x (1961), 131 ff.

(2) Hor. 6, 10 f. (cf. *Odes* ii, 10, 13 f.); Sen. 11, 6 ff.; Plut. 474 e (cf. *πρόδηματα καρδίας καὶ σπυγμοῖς* with *pavor molestus*); cf. *Off.* i, 81. On *praemeditatio malorum*, a practice to which Epicureanism was opposed (Cic. *Tusc.* ii, 32, and see the whole context there), see Siefert, *op. cit.*, pp. 61 ff.; Pohlenz, *Hermes* xl (1905), 289 f.; Broecker, *op. cit.*, pp. 164 f.

(3) Horace: above, pp. 13 f.; Sen. 9, 6; 10, 6; 17, 2; 17, 6; 17, 9; The mean plays no significant part in Plutarch's discussion; see, however, 474 c. For Democritus see above, p. 15, and add B 70; 102; 284. For Cicero see above, p. 13, and add *Off.* i, 102.

(4) Hor. 16, 17 ff.; Sen. 17, 1; cf. *Off.* i, 41.

(5) Hor. 16, 67 ff.; Sen. 4, 1 (cf. 3, 5 in his citation of Athenodorus).

(6) Above, p. 20, and add Hor. 1, 92 f. Seneca's phrase *inquietam inertiam* (12, 3), which does not apply to travel, is probably a reminiscence of Horace's *strenua inertia* (11, 28).

(7) Hor. 5, 16 ff.; Sen. 17, 8.

(8) Hor. 1, 61; Plut. 476 c-477 a. Cf. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* ii<sup>3</sup>, 102 ad fin.; Grilli, *op. cit.* (above, p. 10, n. 3), pp. 162 and 238.

(9) Hor. 12, *passim*; Plut. 472 d.

(10) Hor. 6, 9; 10, 31 f.; Plut. 469 f-470 a; 474 c-d.

Both passages are about inconsistency. Horace's, however, is not a comparison, but a statement about one kind of inconsistent behaviour. Commentators on Horace seem to have overlooked one peculiarity, the fact that there is no other evidence for the use of triremes as yachts (<sup>1</sup>). The inference to be drawn from the absence of parallels is that there is likely to have been some special reason for Horace's choosing to refer to a yacht in this unusual way. It may be suggested that wishing to show the prevalence of the mania for travel among both rich and poor, he took seasickness and trireme from a comparison like that in Plutarch. In Horace's source the trireme would, as in Plutarch, be a warship as opposed to other kinds of ship. In the epistle he has made of it the rich man's yacht (<sup>2</sup>).

At 469 a Plutarch recommends a willingness to remember one's blessings amid adversity, citing Aristippus as an example in this respect (469 c-d). Later he remarks that a man of sense looks to a betterment of his condition, but that at the same time he can deal with the contrary also, which will not come unexpectedly upon him: *εὐχεται μὲν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων τὰ βελτίονα προσδοκᾷ δὲ καὶ θάτερα. χρήται δ' ἀμφοτέροις τὸ ἄγαν ἀφαιρῶν* (474 c). Unafraid of Fortune, he makes the most pleasant use of circumstances, *ἥδιστα ... χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι* (474 d) (<sup>3</sup>). It is clear that the ability to remember his blessings which Aristippus showed is part of a general adaptability to circumstances (<sup>4</sup>). In *Epi.* 17 Aristippus appears first as a representative of the courtier's way of life and then more generally as a man of outstanding adaptability.

omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res,  
temptantem maiora, fere praesentibus aequum. (23 f.)

(1) V. Pöschl, *Hermes*, lxxiv (1956), 76, rightly rejects the widely held view that the *aerata triremi* of *Odes*, iii, 1, 39, is a yacht. The *φάσηλοι τριηρετικοί* of Appian, *BC*, v, 95 cannot be cited as a parallel to the trireme yacht of *Epi.* 1, 93. They were something between merchantmen (*φορτίδες νῆες*) and warships (*μαχαρά*); cf. C. Torr, *Ancient Ships* (Cambridge, 1895), pp. 119 and 120.

(2) R. Heinze, *RhM*, xlv (1890), 518, wished to connect the passage in Horace with Aristo of Chios (*SVF*, i, no. 396): *κυβερνήτης μὲν οὔτε ἐν μεγάλῳ πλοίῳ οὔτε ἐν μικρῷ ναυτιάσει, οἱ δὲ ἄπειροι ἐν ἀμφοῖν. οὕτως ὁ μὲν πεπαιδευμένος καὶ ἐν πλούτῳ καὶ ἐν πενίᾳ οὐ ταράττεται, ὁ ἀπαιδευτός ἐν ἀμφοῖν*. But Aristo's point is that philosophy enables a man to cope with all kinds of circumstances; he is not concerned with inconsistency. It is this theme and the presence of a trireme which connect Horace with Plutarch rather than with Aristo. Cf. A. La Penna, *SIFC*, xxvii-xxviii (1956), 195. See also H. von Arnim, *R.E.* ii, 958.

(3) On *ἥδιστα* cf. Broecker, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

(4) Cf. Sen. *Tranq.* 14, 1.



An ultimately Panaetian background to the passage is strongly suggested by *deciuit* (1). Each part of line 24 is closely paralleled in Plutarch, *temptantem maiora* by *εὔχεται ... τὰ βελτίονα* (474 c) and *praesentibus aequum* by *ἡδιστα ... χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι* (474 d).

Immediately after *εὔχεται ... τὰ βελτίονα κτλ.* Plutarch cites a dictum of Epicurus, *ὁ τῆς αὔριον ἡκιστα δεόμενος ἡδιστα πρόσσεισι πρὸς τὴν αὔριον* (fr. 490 Us., 215 Arr.). Horace has used this as the basis for the advice in which *Epi.* 4 culminates :

omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum :  
grata superveniet quae non sperabitur hora. (13-4)

Whether this uncontroversial saying of Epicurus found a place in the *περὶ εὐθυμίας* of Panaetius or not (2), there is no reason to suppose that it could not have formed part of the material about *εὐθυμία* which was available to Horace (3).

In spite of his exhortations to adaptability and making the best of circumstances, Plutarch recommends suicide when 'alien and unnatural forces prevail' (*τῶν δ' ἀλλοτρίων καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ὑπερβαλλόντων*, 476 b) (4). The man who is able fearlessly to depart from life, quoting Euripides, *λύσει μ' ὁ δαίμων αὐτός, όταν ἐγὼ θέλω* (*Bacch.* 498), will suffer no distress or trouble (476 b-c). The same line, understood in the same way, occurs in the scene from the *Bacchae* which concludes *Epi.* 16 (5) :

'ipse deus simulatque volam me solvet'. opinor,  
hoc sentit 'moriar'. (78 f.)

It does not seem possible to connect the book of *Epistles* by a similar cluster of links, both general and detailed, with any other ethical work or group of works. Horace, Seneca, and Plutarch did not merely happen to light upon the same items in the repertory

(1) For the Panaetian flavour of *persona* (29) cf. *Off.* i, 107 ; 115 ; 124.

(2) Above, p. 17 and n. 2.

(3) It should be noted that the passage in Plutarch which immediately follows the dictum of Epicurus can be paralleled in *Epi.* 6 (above, p. 21, n. 10).

(4) Cf. *Off.* i, 112 f. There is no reason for believing with Siefert, *De aliquot Plutarchi scriptorum moralium compositione atque indole* (Diss. Leipzig, 1896), p. 66 and *op. cit.* (above, p. 14, n. 2), pp. 57 f., that the reference to suicide in Plutarch is foreign to the theme of *εὐθυμία*. Cf. Broecker, *op. cit.*, pp. 177 f.

(5) Cf. also Sen. 11, 2 f., which may, however, have been influenced by the end of *Epi.* 16.

of Hellenistic ethics <sup>(1)</sup>. The similarities are to be explained by the fact that all three are drawing on the same tradition.

#### 5. — *FALLENTIS SEMITA VITAE* AND ATHENODORUS CALVUS

One aspect of the predominantly private ethical concern of the *Epistles* which led us to look away from the *περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος* and the *de Officiis* was the importance given by Horace to the living of a hidden life in the country. It is time now to consider the role of this idea in the tradition of discussion about *εὐθυμία*.

The recommendation of a hidden life does not appear originally to have formed part of the precepts about *εὐθυμία*. The ethical teachings of Democritus were intended to procure *εὐθυμία* for the citizen playing his proper part in the affairs of his community <sup>(2)</sup>. There can be no doubt that Panaetius, applying to those for whom he wrote the dictum of Chrysippus that the *σοφός* will take part in political life *ἀν μὴ τι κωλύῃ* <sup>(3)</sup>, gave his support in the *περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος* to an active life <sup>(4)</sup>. There are references in the *de Officiis* to *tranquillitas*, and these may be regarded as evidence for the view taken in the *περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος* of *εὐθυμία*. At i, 69 f. it is recognised that a desire for *tranquillitas* leads many men into retirement, some of them withdrawing to the country. Their aim is said to be the same as that of kings, *sic vivere ut velis* — a not altogether complimentary comparison. Their method of achieving it admittedly causes less trouble to others, but compared with men who embrace public life, these *otiosi* lack distinction, consequence, and usefulness to mankind <sup>(5)</sup>. This is a judgement on the pursuit

(1) The links in detail do not involve well-worn commonplaces. Aristo is the only other author who comes close to Plutarch's nautical comparison, but there are significant differences there; above, p. 22, n. 2. Aristippus is admittedly a popular subject for anecdote, but the verbal links between Horace's description of him and Plutarch 474 c-d are very striking. The dictum of Epicurus is quoted only in Plutarch's *περὶ εὐθυμίας*. Eur. *Bacch.* 498 is understood to refer to suicide only in *Epi.* 16 and Plutarch's *περὶ εὐθυμίας*; cf. Broecker, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

(2) Above, p. 15.

(3) *SVF*, iii, no. 697.

(4) See especially *Off.* i, 71 f.

(5) Pohlenz, *Antikes Führertum*, p. 46 f.; Grilli, *La vita contemplativa ...*, p. 121, n. 3, criticizes Pohlenz's interpretation of the references to kings, but agrees that the *otiosi*, like the *reges*, represent an erroneous extreme. Cf. also H. Schwaborn, *De otio, Interpretationsbeiträge zum viii. Dialog des L. Annaeus Seneca* (Diss. Bonn, 1951), pp. 4 ff.; 70, nn. 26 f.

of εὐθυμία to the exclusion of other goods. A later passage shows it holding a place among other qualities required of the practising politician : *capessentibus autem rem publicam nihilo minus quam philosophis, haud scio an magis etiam, et magnificentia et despicientia adhibenda est rerum humanarum, quam saepe dico, et tranquillitas animi atque securitas, si quidem nec anxii futuri sunt et cum gravitate constantiaque victuri* (i, 72). There is no direct evidence concerning the role played in the περί εὐθυμίας by withdrawal, but it seems unlikely that on this fundamental point Panaetius could have moved far from Democritus or from what was surely his own basic conviction of the superior value of the active life <sup>(1)</sup>.

The treatises of Seneca and Plutarch differ in their attitude to withdrawal. There is nothing in Plutarch to suggest a close link between εὐθυμία and the hidden life <sup>(2)</sup>, and in the comments which he offers on the dictum of Democritus that to enjoy εὐθυμία a man must not πολλὰ πράσσειν μήτε ἰδίῃ μήτε ξυνῇ (B 3), he attacks it fiercely and unfairly on the ground that it leads to ἀπραξία (465c-466a). The situation in Seneca is less simple. At 14, 2 great stress is laid on the mind's withdrawal upon itself, but nothing is said of physical withdrawal from the world : *utique animus ab omnibus externis in se revocandus est : sibi confidat, se gaudeat, sua suspiciat, recedat quantum potest ab alienis, et se sibi adplicet*. At 7, 2 <sup>(3)</sup> the choice between an active life and one of leisure and study is to be determined by the criterion of *propria natura : considerandum est, utrum natura tua agendis rebus an otioso studio contemplationique aptior sit, et eo inclinandum, quo te vis ingenii feret*. Yet perhaps what is to be chosen is the kind of life which is to prevail while not excluding its opposite, for a balanced way of life is recommended at 17, 3 : *multum et in se recedendum est : conversatio enim dissimilium bene composita disturbat et renovat affectus et quicquid imbecillum in animo nec percuratum est exulcerat. miscenda tamen ista et alternanda sunt, solitudo et frequentia : illa nobis faciet hominum desiderium, haec nostri, et erit altera alterius remedium. odium turbae sanabit solitudo, taedium solitudinis turba* <sup>(4)</sup>. That this statement is re-

(1) Grilli, *op. cit.*, p. 123, thinks otherwise.

(2) Neither 467 d nor 470 f-471 a, cited by Grilli, *op. cit.*, p. 156, proves the contrary.

(3) The reference is to the Loeb text. The passage is placed at 6, 4 in Waltz's Budé text.

(4) Cf. 4, 7 f., where a mixture of *otium* and *res* is recommended whenever chance or political conditions prevent an *actuosa vita*, and 5, 5.

presentative of the general attitude of the treatise is strongly suggested by Seneca's comments on the same dictum of Democritus which Plutarch attacks so passionately : *hoc* (sc. a prying inquisitiveness) *secutum puto Democritum ita coepisse* : ' *Qui tranquille volet vivere, nec privatim agat multa nec publice*', *ad supervacua scilicet referentem. nam si necessaria sunt, et privatim et publice non tantum multa, sed innumerabilia agenda sunt : ubi vero nullum officium sollemne nos citat, inhibendae actiones* (13, 1) (1).

It is clear that there is no reason to believe that a call to the hidden life played a dominant part either in the *περὶ εὐθυμίας* of Panaetius or in those teachings about *εὐθυμία* upon which Seneca and Plutarch drew. In the book of *Epistles*, however, withdrawal and the hidden life are important. Although they are never recommended unconditionally, the whole book is coloured by the many references to these ideals (2). It would be possible to regard this as merely an instance of Epicurean influence, but the theme of withdrawal seems to be so integral to the book as a whole that it seems preferable, in view of the connections with Middle Stoicism which have been demonstrated, to point to an aspect of Stoic thought attested from Horace's own day.

In the *de tranquillitate animi* Seneca quotes at length the views on the best life which were held by a certain Athenodorus. The starting point of the discussion is how tedium may be avoided (3, 1). In theory (3), Athenodorus agreed, the best cure for it is to engage in public life, but in practice *quia in hac, inquit, tam insana hominum ambitione, tot calumniatoribus in deterius recta torquentibus, parum tuta simplicitas est ... a foro quidem et publico recedendum est. sed habet ubi se etiam in privato laxo explicet magnus animus, nec, ut leonum animaliumque impetus caveis coerchetur, sic hominum, quorum maximae in seducto actiones sunt. ita tamen delituerit, ut, ubicumque otium suum absconderit, prodesse velit sin-*

(1) For recent speculation about the relative closeness of Seneca's and Plutarch's comments on Democritus to the comment which Panaetius is presumed to have made in his *περὶ εὐθυμίας* see Broecker, *op. cit.*, pp. 50 f.; Grilli, *SIFC*, xxix (1957), 81 ff. Cf. also A. Barigazzi, *RFIC*, n.s. xl (1962), 124 ff.

(2) Above, p. 14, n. 3.

(3) This is to understand *optimum erat* to mean "it would be best". W. H. Alexander, *University of California Publications in Classical Philology*, xiii, 3 (1945), 70, has argued that *erat* is a true past tense. The distinction between past and present is on this view so important that it is reasonable to expect to find the past tense reinforced by some temporal word or phrase; there is none.

*gulis universisque ingenio, voce, consilio. nec enim is solus reipublicae prodest, qui candidatos extrahit et tuetur reos et de pace belloque censet; sed qui iuventutem exhortatur, qui in tanta bonorum praeceptorum inopia virtutem instillat* <sup>(1)</sup> *animis, qui ad pecuniam luxuriamque cursu ruentis prensat ac retrahit et, si nihil aliud, certe moratur, in privato publicum negotium agit. an ille plus praestat, qui inter peregrinos et cives aut urbanus praetor adeuntibus adsectoris verba pronuntiat, quam qui quid sit iustitia, quid pietas, quid patientia, quid fortitudo, quid mortis contemptus, quid deorum intellectus, quantum gratuitorum hominum sit bona conscientia* <sup>(2)</sup> *? ergo si tempus in studia conferas, quod subduxeris officiis, non deserueris nec munus detrectaveris. ... si te ad studia revocaveris, omne vitae fastidium effugeris ... multos in amicitiam attrahes affluetque ad te optimus quisque. numquam enim quamvis obscura virtus latet, sed mittit sui signa: quisquis dignus fuerit, vestigiis illam colliget.* Athenodorus' advice is that men should turn their backs on the *officia* of a public career and live a withdrawn, philosophical life, which will nevertheless be socially useful. In the *Epistles* Horace depicts himself as having in large measure withdrawn from the *officia* which belonged to his station in life, those of poet, companion of Maecenas, and partaker in social life at Rome. The book itself is evidence that his withdrawal is not merely self-regarding. He is 'benefiting individuals and all men by his intellect, words and counsel' (3, 3), and, as Athenodorus recommends, he is concerning himself in particular with the young. The similarity is striking enough to raise the question whether the teachings of Athenodorus could have contributed not only to the *persona* which Horace presents in the book of *Epistles*, but also to its general philosophical standpoint.

Seneca's Athenodorus is generally, and rightly, identified with the most important philosopher of that name, the Stoic Athenodorus Calvus of Tarsus, son of Sandon and an older contemporary of Horace <sup>(3)</sup>. He was a teacher and friend of Augustus, and it is not unlikely that Horace and he were personally acquainted <sup>(4)</sup>. The

(1) instillat Haase: instituat A.

(2) I have followed Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 71, in retaining A's reading. He translates "how large a share of the gifts man freely possesses lies in a good conscience".

(3) The best account of him is by R. Philippson, *R.E. Supp.* v, 47 ff. See also P. Grimal, *REA*, xlvii (1945), 261 ff.; xlviii (1946), 62 ff.; Schwaborn, *op. cit.* (above, p. 24, n. 5), p. 77, n. 84; G. W. Bowersock, *Augustus and the Greek World* (Oxford, 1965), pp. 32; 34; 39 f.

(4) It is uncertain whether there is a cross-reference in either direction between *Odes*, iii, 2, 25 and the words of Augustus to Athenodorus quoted by Plutarch, *Reg. et imp. Apophth.* 207 c.

part which he played in the genesis of the *de Officiis* <sup>(1)</sup> may be taken to point to his being in a general way an upholder of the Panaetian approach to ethics. But in his recommendation of the hidden life he shows himself to be at variance with Panaetius on what must be regarded as a fundamental point of his predecessor's doctrine. It is not unlikely that Athenodorus was interested in the legend of Democritus <sup>(2)</sup>. The question must be raised whether he wrote a work on the Democritean concept of *εὐθυμία*. It would not be surprising if the account of Athenodorus' views given by Seneca in his treatise on *εὐθυμία* came from a work on the same subject by Athenodorus. Philippson's claim <sup>(3)</sup> that there is a connection between 3, 1, *communis privataque pro facultate administrans*, and Democr. B 3, which is cited in both extant treatises <sup>(4)</sup>, is attractive, but it falls short of proving that the passage in Seneca derives from a treatise on *εὐθυμία*. The question must be left open.

There is one point of detail in the *Epistles* where Athenodorus may with probability be identified as the source. He taught, according to Seneca <sup>(5)</sup>, that men should pray to God only for that for which they can pray openly: *tunc scito esse te omnibus cupiditatibus solutum, cum eo perveneris ut nihil deum roges nisi quod rogare possis palam. nunc enim quanta dementia est hominum! turpissima vota dis insusurrant; si quis admoverit aurem, conticiscent, et quod scire hominem nolunt, deo narrant* (*Epi. mor.* 10, 5). This pointing out of the implications of secretive prayer, which is not found in any earlier author <sup>(6)</sup>, probably forms the basis of the scene in *Epi.* 16 where the seemingly good man prays loudly to Janus and Apollo, but whispers a prayer to Laverna, protectress of thieves.

vir bonus, omne forum quem spectat et omne tribunal,  
quandocumque deos vel porco vel bove placat,

(1) The nature of the *κεφάλαια* which he sent Cicero for his discussion of the conflict of duties in the third book of the *de Officiis* (*Att.* xvi, 11, 4; 14, 4) is unfortunately not clear. Tyrrell and Purser (*ad locc.*) and Testard, *op. cit.* (above, p. 10, n. 1), p. 45 may be right in believing that it was a précis of Posidonius. Cf., however, Philippson, *op. cit.*, 53; Pohlenz, *NGG*, N.F. i, 1 (1934).

(2) Above, p. 18. Cf. Philippson, *op. cit.* (above, p. 27, n. 3), 53 f.

(3) *Op. cit.*, 52.

(4) Sen. 13, 1; Plut. 465 c.

(5) Seneca calls him simply Athenodorus. Again it is probable that he refers to the best known philosopher of that name.

(6) But cf. Sen. *Ben.* ii, 1, 4; Pers. 2, 9; Mart. i, 39, 6.

'Iane pater' clare, clare cum dixit 'Apollo',  
 labra movet metuens audiri: 'pulchra Laverna,  
 da mihi fallere, da iusto sanctoque videri,  
 noctem peccatis et fraudibus obice nubem' <sup>(1)</sup>. (57-62)

There are besides two less certain points of contact between Athenodorus and the book of *Epistles*. The striking passage in *Epi.* 18 about the strength and speed of Lollius, his skill with weapons and experience of war ends with a reminder of the amusements which he organizes on his father's farm with his brother and the slaves.

interdum nugaris rure paterno:  
 partitur lintres exercitus, Actia pugna  
 te duce per pueros hostili more refertur;  
 adversarius est frater, lacus Hadria, donec  
 alterutrum velox Victoria fronde coronet. (60-64)

To say that the passage has the ring of truth is perhaps not enough. It seems far from unlikely that Horace's choice of this trait in Lollius rather than others to illustrate his occasional turning to *nugae* was determined by the existence of a *τόπος* about men of serious cast of mind relaxing with their slaves. In Aelian there is a reference to Archytas playing with slaves (*VH* xii, 15) which has been shown to derive from Athenodorus' work *περὶ σπονδῆς καὶ παιδιᾶς* <sup>(2)</sup>. It seems possible that the passage in Horace also is to be connected with the same work <sup>(3)</sup>.

Lastly there is the evidence provided by a passage in the *de Otio* of Seneca. On the basis of a comparison between this fragmentary work and the citation of Athenodorus in the *de tranquillitate animi*, H. Schwaborn has argued convincingly that the thought of Athenodorus is a major influence in the *de Otio* <sup>(4)</sup>. At 1, 1 ff. in this work

(1) It is unfortunately not certain whether *nunc enim* ... in Seneca, which contains a reference to whispering (cf. line 60 in Horace), is part of Seneca's version of Athenodorus' words or a comment on them. Both the Teubner and the Oxford editors enclose only *tunc scito ... possis palam* in inverted commas. But even this contains enough to have generated the scene in Horace.

(2) C. Hense, *RhM*, lxii (1907), 313.

(3) Philippon has suggested a connection also between Sen. *Tranq.* 17, 4 (Socrates playing with *pueruli*) and this work of Athenodorus, *op. cit.*, 53. A related theme is that of great men relaxing together; Cic. *de Orat.* ii, 22; Hor. *Sat.* ii, 1, 71 ff.

(4) *Op. cit.* (above, p. 24, n. 5), pp. 13 ff. He compares *Tranq.* 3, 2 ff. with *de Otio*,

there is an account of inconsistency, in which the rôle of other men's judgements (*iudicia*) is emphasized and which concludes with a reference to the fable of the sick lion and the fox: *pendemus enim toti ex alienis iudiciis, et id optimum nobis videtur, quod petitores laudatoresque multos habet, non id quod laudandum petendumque est. nec viam bonam ac malam per se aestimamus, sed turba vestigiorum, in quibus nulla sunt redeuntium*. The same juxtaposition of the *iudicia* of the multitude with this fable occurs in *Epi.* 1.

quodsi me populus Romanus forte roget, cur  
non ut porticibus sic iudiciis fruar isdem,  
nec sequar aut fugiam quae diligit ipse vel odit,  
olim quod volpes aegroto cauta leoni  
respondit, referam: 'quia me vestigia terrent,  
omnia te adversum spectantia, nulla retrorsum'. (70-75)

This passage is immediately followed by the theme of the variety of men's interests, which leads (82) to a consideration of the inconsistency of individuals. The similarity is very striking. That Seneca has here been influenced by Horace is a possibility that cannot be excluded (1). Nevertheless in view of the other evidence connecting Horace and Athenodorus, this parallel may very well be yet another instance of both Horace and Seneca being influenced by Athenodorus.

#### 6. — CAELESTIS SAPIENTIA

It is not easy to define the nature of the part played in the *Epistles* by the influences which have been identified in this chapter. Panaetian doctrine, the originally Democritean concept of *εὐθυμία*, and the far from rigorous Stoicism of Athenodorus together form a fairly homogeneous mass of temperate and humane ethical teaching. But the temptation to infer from its homogeneity the existence of a single "principal source" for the book must be resisted. It is, for example, extremely unlikely that Horace wrote the book of *Epistles* under the impact of a work *περὶ εὐθυμίας* by Athenodorus, in

3, 3ff.; 6, 3 ff.; 8, 3. It does not follow from the objection at *de Otio* i, 4, *quid nobis Epicuri praecepta in ipsis Zenonis principiis loqueris?* as La Penna seems to believe, *SIFC*, xxviii (1956), 199, that Seneca has really been preaching Epicureanism.

(1) A further complication is that Lucilius also told the fable (980-989). There is nothing to indicate what point he made with it.



which Democritean, Panaetian and Epicurean elements appeared. The *Epistles* are on the contrary the fruit of an involvement with ethics which had extended over many years <sup>(1)</sup>, and behind them lies Horace's experience of life as well as his reading of philosophy and his acquaintance with living philosophers.

Around 23 B.C. he faced the literary problem of composing a unified work with a preponderantly ethical content. For this it was necessary to choose from among the many doctrines and *exempla* which Hellenistic ethics placed at his disposal. What was uncongenial even to his broad sympathies he rejected. But after that there was need for a principle of selection which would result in a work possessing a definite attitude, yet free from sectarian exclusiveness and acerbity. The principle which he followed was that his material should in general conform to the ideals of *decorum*, *εὐθymία*, and useful withdrawal. Furthermore he seems to have made considerable use of the literature in which these ideals had been set out. This is not to say that everything philosophical in the book derives from this area of thought. He is the heir to a great variety of teaching, and true to his claim, *nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri* (1, 14), he is able in a single passage both to recall the Socratic question "Can virtue be taught?" and to strike a firmly Epicurean note (18, 100; 102-103) <sup>(2)</sup> and a dozen lines later to conclude the epistle with a thought which was at home in more than one tradition (18, 111-112) <sup>(3)</sup> and which is at the same time a proclamation of the ideal of *εὐθymία* <sup>(4)</sup>.

None of the philosophical background with which this chapter has been concerned is likely to have been new to Horace at the time when he was at work upon the *Epistles*. His reading of the *de Officiis*, his knowledge of the literature of *εὐθymία*, and his probably personal acquaintance with Athenodorus were the factors which, together

(1) Below, p. 99.

(2) Above, p. 19. *quid te tibi reddat amicum* (101) has been attributed to Aristotelian influence by K. Gautar, *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, xli (1964), 129 ff. The occurrence, however, of the theme *amicus sibi* in Panaetius' pupil, Hecato (apud Sen., *Epi. mor.* 6, 7), may be a pointer to the tradition from which Horace here derives the idea.

(3) Below, p. 82, n. 1.

(4) Above, p. 20. For the possibility of Platonic influence on parts of *Epi.* I see J. L. Heller, *AJP*, lxxxv (1964), 301 ff.

with personal inclination and experience, mainly determined the philosophic standpoint of the book, but there is no reason to believe that the influence of these "sources" was then particularly strong. In spite of the picture of decisive change which the opening of *Epi.* I gives, the book of *Epistles* represents, in Horace's *œuvre*, not a revolution, but the culmination of one of his interests.

## The Texture of Argument

*Epi.* 1 and 2 establish the ethical preoccupation of the book, showing respectively its two aspects, self-improvement and the exhortation of others. Much of the material in both epistles is protreptic in character, but in the first the exhortations to a philosophic life form part of an *apologia*. The situation with which the epistle purports to deal is that Maecenas, contrary to Horace's wishes, would like him to return to the writing of poetry. The function of the protreptic material is to illustrate his present interest in philosophy. It is not aimed at Maecenas in the hope of converting him.

The epistle is in some respects like an overture in which several subsequently important themes receive their first, sometimes tentative, statement. At the beginning <sup>(1)</sup>, the conflict of wishes between Maecenas and himself, which recurs in a more muted form in *Epi.* 7, is compared to a situation where a retired gladiator is being pressed to return to the arena. There is an amusing pun on *ludus* here and a reminder of the fierce Samnite of *Sat.* ii, 1, 34 ff. But the comparison makes an important point: by ceasing to write poetry Horace has escaped from a dangerous situation <sup>(2)</sup>. The ideas of physical combat and danger recur in the description of an encounter with a critic at *Epi.* 19, 45 ff. <sup>(3)</sup>. Danger is, however, only im-

(1) Note how far the first line is from being a conventional epistolary greeting cast in metrical form. The participles in the vocative, which have their origin in hymnody (cf. *Odes*, i, 12, 23; iii, 21, 1), recall the openings of several odes (ii, 6; 7; iii, 10; iv, 5) and should above all be compared with *C.S.* 1 ff., *Phoebe ... Diana, o colendi semper et culti*. Horace here recalls his former celebration of Maecenas as a worshipper recalls former acts of piety; cf. Verg. *Aen.* xii, 778; Ov. *Met.* viii, 350. For the connection of Horace's address with undertakings by a poet to begin and end his song with mention of a god, hero, king or friend see Heinze *ad loc.*, adding Theog. 1 ff. See now P. Levi S.J., *Hermes*, xciv (1966), 76 ff.; 79 (addendum).

(2) Cf. Pseudo-Acro *ad loc.*, *ludum autem μεταφορικῶς vocavit, ut ostenderet periculosum opus esse scribendi ...*, and the story of *Luculli miles* (*Epi.* ii, 2, 26 ff.).

(3) *ludus* appears at 19, 48. Cf. too Horace's preference for *inbelle Tarentum* (7, 45).

plicit in Horace's account of the reluctant gladiator. The two aspects of his situation to which he explicitly directs attention are loss of freedom (*includere*, 3) and dependence on the whim of the public (*populum exoret*, 6). The first of these themes will recur in *Epi.* 7, where Horace tells of the little vixen trapped in the corn-bin and later speaks of his own *otia liberrima* (29 ff. and 36), and in *Epi.* 10, where there is another animal fable of lost freedom (34 ff.). To the gladiator who does not wish to have to seek the mercy of the crowd corresponds Horace himself at *Epi.* 19, 37, *non ego ventosae plebis suffragia venor*.

A further anticipation in the lines about the retired gladiator is provided by *latet abditus agro* (5), a first, unemphatic statement of a theme which is only gradually revealed to be of the greatest importance, withdrawal to the country. It does not appear elsewhere in this epistle: at 70 f. Horace, while set apart by his *iudicia* from his fellow-citizens, shares with them the colonnades of Rome (<sup>1</sup>). As in *Epi.* 11, which opens the second half of the book, the quality of a man's life matters more than where it is lived (<sup>2</sup>).

Horace's first comment on Maecenas' wish is a *non possum* rather than a *nolo*: *non eadem est aetas, non mens* (4) (<sup>3</sup>). The publication of the book, probably in 19 B.C. (<sup>4</sup>), when Horace was forty-six years old, is closely associated with his entry upon *senectus* (<sup>5</sup>). Several times later in the book he refers to the passing of youth and what it entails (7, 25 ff.; 14, 32 ff.; 15, 21), and his last word is a reminder that his forty-fourth birthday has already passed (20, 26 ff.).

A new element in Horace's attitude appears at line 7. Not merely is he unable to meet the wishes of Maecenas, but there is a voice which is actively dissuading him. He hears it clearly, for his ear is clean, a first hint that he has been taking steps to leave himself open to wise counsels (<sup>6</sup>). The lesson which the voice teaches is that if

(1) This is not to say that *Epi.* 1 was written in Rome. It is impossible to tell where it was written; contrast W. Wili, *Horaz* (Basel, 1948), p. 302, n. 2.

(2) Below, p. 60.

(3) In association with *aetas*, *mens* is more likely to mean 'present temperament' than 'purpose', 'will'.

(4) Below, p. 87, n. 2.

(5) Cf. *senescentem equum* (8). For the beginning of *senectus* see Cic. *Sen.* 60; Gell. x, 28; Censorinus, 14, 2.

(6) Cf. 8, 16, *praeceptum auriculis hoc instillare memento*; K. J. Reckford, *Hermes* xc (1962), 476 ff. For clean ears as an indication of acuteness see H. Lloyd-Jones, *JHS*, lxxxiii

Horace agrees to Maecenas' request, he will be a laughing-stock, like a stumbling and broken-winded horse which continues to race. This picture was hardly composed without an ironic glance at the grave nobility of the description given by Ennius of the retired race-horse which represents himself in old age <sup>(1)</sup>. An anticipation of the moral turn which the argument is soon to take is present in *sanus* (8) and *peccet* (9).

'Therefore', Horace continues, 'I am now laying aside *et versus et cetera ludicra*. I am totally absorbed in the enquiry *quid verum atque decens* and in laying up a store of wisdom' (10 ff.) <sup>(2)</sup>. The first part of this statement has sometimes been understood to signify the abandonment of lyrics only <sup>(3)</sup>, but *versus* is frequently used of satire in Horace <sup>(4)</sup>. *ludicra* (and *ludus* at 3) might be held to point towards poetry about topics like wine or love, but it is at least equally possible that *versus* are *ludicra* inasmuch as the writing of any verse is *ludus*, a less than serious occupation <sup>(5)</sup>. In the absence of an unmistakable indication that only lyrics are meant, 10 must be read as a farewell to all verse. It would, however, be incorrect to assign to these lines a primarily autobiographical significance. They are less a statement about Horace's present situation and future plans than an introduction to a book of which the main concern is ethical.

(1963), 81 f.; lxxxiv (1964), 157. There may also be a connection with ritual purification of the ears. For an ethical interpretation of this in Philo see E. Bréhier, *Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie* (Paris, 1950), pp. 243 f. (the reference should be to *De Cherub.* 48, not 54).

(1) Fr. 374 V.

(2) Note the amusing choice of verbs recalling his former poetic activity, *condo et compono* (12). For the ambiguity of *compono* see D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Propertiana* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 25 f. *depromere* refers to the use Horace will make of his philosophic studies in living a better life, not to an intention of writing again 'when he has set his philosophic house in order', L. P. Wilkinson, *Horace and his Lyric Poetry*<sup>2</sup> (Cambridge, 1951), p. 105.

(3) E.g. Orelli-Baiter-Mewes, *ad loc.*; E. Courbaud, *Mélanges Émile Chatelain* (Paris, 1910), p. 358; W. S. Maguinness, *Hermathena*, lii (1938), 38; H. Wagenvoort, *Studies in Roman Literature, Culture and Religion* (Leiden, 1956), p. 34; J. Perret, *Horace* (Paris, 1959), pp. 153 f.; O. A. W. Dilke, *Horace: Epistles Book I*<sup>2</sup> (London, 1961), *ad loc.*; C. O. Brink, *Horace on Poetry* (Cambridge, 1963), p. 182.

(4) *Sat.* i, 4, 8; 10; 40 ff.; 10, 1; 61; 70; ii, 1, 4; 6; 21.

(5) Cf. *Sat.* i, 4, 138 f. *ludere* can mean 'train oneself', 'practise', 'hold a sham fight'. This range of meanings, which is particularly relevant to *ludus* (3), has been emphasized by Wagenwoort, *op. cit.*, pp. 38 f.

Similarly the claim that he is bound to no *magister* (14) is primarily an announcement, Ciceronian in origin <sup>(1)</sup>, that the book is not a doctrinaire statement. His disarming confession of philosophic vacillation (16 ff.), as has been seen <sup>(2)</sup>, is not a reliable pointer even to the content of the book. It exaggerates in an ironic way the declaration of independence at line 14 and at the same time serves as a first statement of the major theme of inconsistency <sup>(3)</sup>.

The account of the *elementa* with which Horace must at present content himself <sup>(4)</sup> and the criticism of the *populus Romanus* for its varied pursuits (70 ff.) and of individuals for their inconsistency (82 ff.) make no reference to Maecenas. But the epistle is not one of those which end without a concluding confrontation of poet and addressee <sup>(5)</sup>. At 94 ff. Horace turns once more to Maecenas and, as at the beginning, the situation is not harmonious. Horace indeed now actually reproaches him. Maecenas laughs when Horace's haircut or dress is less than perfect, but he is indifferent to his friend's inconsistent behaviour <sup>(6)</sup>. A concern with clothes and the dressing of the hair will later appear as a characteristic of Horace's gay youth (14, 32). Maecenas attaches importance to matters which Horace will be seen to regard as no longer important: *non eadem est aetas, non mens* <sup>(7)</sup>. In *Sat.* i, 6 Maecenas had been closely associated with moral values <sup>(8)</sup>; here he has the interests only of a literary patron and a dandy. The office of *liber amicus* <sup>(9)</sup>, which he has failed to

(1) *Tusc.* iv, 7. Cf. L. Alfonsi, *Latomus*, xxi (1962), 616 f.

(2) Above, p. 9.

(3) Above, p. 12.

(4) This begins at line 28 and probably ends at line 69. The difficulties which G. Stégen, *Essai sur la composition de cinq épîtres d'Horace* (Namur, 1960), p. 10 ff., has found in 20-7 are illusory. Prevented at times by circumstances from engaging in assiduous study of philosophy, Horace makes do with *elementa*. Stégen's references to the sage and perfect wisdom are out of place here.

(5) *Epi.* 15; 16; 17; 19 end in this way.

(6) Cf. *Sat.* i, 3, 30 f. Note the foreshadowing of inconsistency in *inaequali* (94) and *impar* (96); cf. *Sat.* i, 3, 9 and 19; ii, 7, 10.

(7) Maecenas' style of dress is often remarked upon; cf. *Eleg. in Maec.* 1, 21 ff.; *Sen. Epi. mor.* 92, 35; 114, 4 and 6; *Mart.* x, 73, 4; *Iuv.* 12, 39. For his interest in hair-dressing see his fr. IV (Avallone). It is uncertain whether *de cultu suo* was the title of one of his works since it is attested only in an interpolation at *Sen. Epi. mor.* 114, 4.

(8) *magnum hoc ego duco, / quod placui tibi, qui turpi secernis honestum / non patre praeclaro, sed vita et pectore puro* (62 ff.).

(9) *Sat.* i, 4, 132. Cf. *Epo.* 11, 25 f.

carry out, will, at the end of the first half of the book, be offered to another old friend, Aristius Fuscus (10, 45 f.). The reproach is somewhat softened by Horace's last words to Maecenas, a concessive clause which warmly testifies to his dependence on him. But so far from retracting anything of what he had said earlier, he adds at the same time yet another detail to the picture of Maecenas' concern with Horace's appearance :

rerum tutela mearum  
cum sis et prave sectum stomacheris ob unguem  
de te pendentis, te respicientis amici. (103-105)

The coda to the epistle is formed by the statement of a Stoic paradox about the *sapiens* (106-8). Its brisk, confident enunciation raises the suspicion that Horace may be less than fully serious here. This is confirmed by the flippant last line, *praecipue sanus, nisi cum pituita molesta est* (1). At *Sat.* i, 3, 120 ff. Horace had, from an Epicurean standpoint (2), laughed at the Stoic *sapiens*. The function of the present passage is different. It is not sectarian polemic (3), but an implicit statement that moderation is to be observed in the pursuit of wisdom (4). At the same time by laughing at an extreme case of philosophic dedication, Horace is able, without withdrawing what he has said or undermining its validity, slightly to detach himself from it and so avoid ending on a note of full committal (5).

*Epi.* 2 is an exhortation to the philosophic life addressed to Lollius, which for the first time reveals Horace's rôle in the book as mentor of the young. After the flippant ending of *Epi.* 1 the basic seriousness of Horace's attitude to philosophy is confirmed (6).

His approach to the giving of advice is indirect. Lollius is asked to consider a literary judgement. Horace has re-read Homer and

(1) Stégen, *op. cit.*, pp. 23 ff., completely misses the tone of this line.

(2) Cf. lines 96 ff. of this satire.

(3) Contrast the views of A. La Penna, *ASNP*, xviii (1949), 25 ; 29.

(4) Cf. *Epi.* 6, 15 f.

(5) For a comparable gesture at the end of *Epi.* 2 see below, p. 39. Cf. also the much more extreme case of *Epo.* 2 and F. Solmsen's discussion of *Tib.* i, 4, *Hermes*, xc (1962), 320 ff.

(6) Cf. E. Garn, *Odenelemente im 1. Epistelbuch des Horaz* (Diss. Freiburg i. Br., 1954), p. 11. She over-estimates, however, the element of humorous exaggeration in *Epi.* 1, *op. cit.*, pp. 4 ff.

decided that he is a clearer and better teacher of ethics than Chrysippus, who was a voluminous writer, but a bad stylist, or Crantor, who had literary gifts <sup>(1)</sup>. An approach by way of Homer's literary qualities is well suited to Lollius, who, as a young man <sup>(2)</sup>, would still have a vivid recollection of his study of Homer at school and who, as a student of rhetoric <sup>(3)</sup>, would be interested in the qualities which Horace found to praise in the poet as teacher <sup>(4)</sup>. But this opening demand for Lollius' attention does not determine the course of the argument. In what follows there is no comparison between the poet and the philosophers and no remarks about Homeric style <sup>(5)</sup>. Horace is concerned only with the moral lessons to be drawn from Homer. In these he gradually involves Lollius and himself, first as human beings who can benefit from Homer's teaching (*nobis*, 18) and later as part of unregenerate mankind (*nos numerus sumus*, 27). From this it is only a short step to addressing Lollius in the second person and calling on him to awake to philosophy (33 ff.).

The opening judgement in favour of Homer's superiority to two professional philosophers serves also to supplement Horace's declaration in *Epi.* 1 that he is not bound to the doctrines of any *magister* and to show that his absorption in philosophy has not made him indifferent to literary values. The appearance later in the book of Homer as a source of ethical teaching <sup>(6)</sup> and the display by Horace of a critical interest in contemporary poetry are thus foreshadowed <sup>(7)</sup>. And in mentioning that he has re-read Homer in Praeneste, while Lollius has been in Rome, practising declamation, Horace anticipates the theme of the superiority of *rus* to *urbs*, of Tibur or Tarentum to Rome <sup>(8)</sup>. But country life is no more a theme of this epistle than it was of the first.

(1) The choice between *planus* and *plenus* <sup>(4)</sup> is not easy. Since there is a contrast between Chrysippus, who wrote so much, and Homer, *planus* seems preferable. For the style of Chrysippus see Cic. *Fin.* iv, 7; D. H. *De Compos.* 4 (p. 94 Roberts); Epict. *Ench.* 49. For Crantor see D. L. iv, 27, and cf. H. von Arnim, *R.E.* xi, 1586 f.

(2) Cf. lines 67-70. It should not be forgotten that he had already as *puer* in 26 and/or 25 B.C. seen service in Spain under Augustus (18, 54 ff.).

(3) *scriptorem* is of course the object of *relegi* alone.

(4) Cf. 14, 4 f. (below, pp. 66 f.)

(5) 6, 63 f.; 7, 40 ff.

(6) 3, 9 ff.; 19, 8 ff.

(7) Cf. CARN, *op. cit.*, p. 12.



The note of urgency on which began the call to wisdom addressed to Lollius (32 ff.) returns near the end. With emphatic repetition he is told that he must restrain his temper with bridle and chain — as if it were an animal : *hunc frenis, hunc tu conpesce catena* (63). Horse and hound duly appear, to illustrate, however, not the need for restraint, but a new point, that training is best imparted early, to the horse when it is *docilis* and has a pliant neck and to the hound as soon as it shows that it possesses the hunting instinct (64-7). Again there is anaphora as Horace points the lesson for Lollius : *nunc adhibe puro | pectore verba puer, nunc te melioribus offer* (67 f.). With the impersonal image of the vessel which long retains the perfume it has absorbed when new, the urgency of his appeal passes, and in the final sentence of the epistle he draws back :

quodsi cessas aut strenuus anteis,  
nec tardum opperior nec praecedentibus insto. (70-71)

Horace's interest in Lollius' well-being is very different from that which Lucretius displays in Memmius'. Concerned about the possibility that Memmius will slack (*quodsi pigris*), Lucretius tells him that if he does, he fears old age and death will overtake them both before he has discharged the full battery of his proofs (i, 410-7). For Horace self-improvement comes first, and just as the coda of the first epistle had suggested a lack of sympathy with the pursuit to excess of virtue, so here his progress is to be at a rate which he has himself chosen and which he describes as a mean. What suits him may not suit another. The tolerance which arises from the knowledge of this will be displayed in a wider field in *Epi.* 6.

The establishment in *Epi.* 1 and 2 of the ethical preoccupation of the book was achieved at the expense of their epistolary character. Although the opening of *Epi.* 1 implies a situation which could call for a letter, this is lost sight of as the epistle proceeds, and there is no return to it at the close. The only motivation given to *Epi.* 2 is Horace's feeling that Lollius should hear about his re-reading of Homer and the moral lessons to be drawn from him. He makes no enquiries of either Maecenas or Lollius and gives scarcely any information about himself which is not relevant to the argument of each epistle. Both pieces fail to represent the social aspect of letter-writing. The next three are very different in this respect. Although they too make a contribution to the ethical discussion, they are not

dominated by passages of sustained moralising, and they appear at least to have much in common with letters actually written to fulfil ordinary functions of social correspondence.

*Epi.* 3 shows Horace as the friend of young Florus and three other members of the *studiosa cohors* which in 21 B.C. Tiberius had taken with him on his expedition to the East. It is clear that Horace's friendships link him with the ambience of the Imperial family. Later Tiberius will appear as the addressee of an epistle (*Epi.* 9), and later still there will be another epistle which purports to be intended to come into the presence of the princeps himself (*Epi.* 13). Not surprisingly, loyal notes are struck, but not too loudly <sup>(1)</sup>, as is appropriate since Augustan glory is not a major theme of the book.

From enquiries about the progress of the expedition Horace turns to ask about the activities of other members of the *cohors* and then of Florus himself. The young men are interested in literature, and in asking his questions Horace appears to be commenting obliquely on two aspects of contemporary writing, imitativeness and the choice of overambitious subjects. One of the *cohors* may be taking it upon himself *res gestas Augusti scribere* (7). A prose history cannot be excluded, but as the rest of the literary discussion is about poetry, it is perhaps more likely that Horace is speaking of the supreme poetic task of the age. No comment on such boldness in a young man is called for <sup>(2)</sup>. Another youth, Titius, may be engaged in establishing in Latin the metres of Pindar, a task not less difficult than that which Horace undertook when he chose Alcaeus and Sappho as models for his *carmina*, or — another possibility, and here it becomes clear that he does not take Titius seriously — he may be writing tragedies in fury and bombast. Yet another, Celsus, is warned against plagiarism. The vice of imitativeness will be discussed at greater length in *Epi.* 19, where, however, as in the literary satires, Horace is a practising poet or at least a very recently practising one, engaged in defending himself against hostile criticism, whereas *Epi.* 3 is the utterance of a literary critic standing somewhat apart from the objects of his appraisal. Lastly (24) he makes a simple reference to an *amabile carmen* which Florus himself may be writing.

(1) 7 f. and 17, which recalls how Augustus had commemorated Actium.

(2) On *sibi sumere* see Stégen, *Essai sur la composition* ..., p. 51, n. 4.

Only here is his tone when speaking of the young men's *studia* free from irony and amused disapproval (1).

But poetry is not the only concern of this epistle. Near the end Horace appears to dismiss both poetry and the law as occupations inferior to the pursuit of 'heavenly wisdom' (25 ff.) (2). This is not escapist advice, unsuitable for a young man serving the state, for philosophy benefits a man's country as well as himself (28 f.). This is significantly the only occasion in the book when the pursuit of wisdom is recommended in terms of patriotism. Horace now appears to leave philosophy and turn to a matter of personal relations: is Florus making as much of Munatius as he should? But the enquiry is soon shown to have moral significance. There has been discord between the two, and perhaps it has returned, the fruit of anger or inexperience. This is a specific example of the consequences of *ira* against which he had in general terms so emphatically warned Lollius. The connection with the previous epistle is emphasized by the image in *indomita cervice feros*, which recalls the training of the young horse *tenera cervice* (2, 64 f.). And the remedy for *feritas* has already been revealed in *Epi.* 1:

nemo adeo feros est, ut non mitescere possit,  
si modo culturae patientem commodet aurem. (39-40)

Philosophy can effect a reconciliation between the two, and, by restoring harmony in the *cohors*, make them *patriae cari*.

Horace addresses them both in the final sentence, joining them together just as he had interceded for them both in the vow which he made for their safe return. He has called wisdom 'heavenly' (27), and it is appropriate that his wish that they be reconciled under its influence should be accompanied by mention of a religious act. There are several odes which end with a reference to a sacrificial

(1) There is no foundation for Stégen's belief that Horace is trying to make Florus ashamed of his (alleged) laziness and that *non tibi parvum* ... (21 f.) is almost a reproach, *op. cit.*, pp. 53 ff., 64.

(2) This is to understand *frigida curarum fomenta* as 'such ineffectual remedies for cares as I have just mentioned' (cf. Porphyryon, *ad loc.*, who confines the reference to *poetica*). For *frigida* cf. *Ov. Pont.* iv, 2, 45, and in general cf. *Epo.* 11, 16 f., *ut haec ingrata ventis dividat / fomenta vulnus nil malum levantia*. The introduction of philosophy at this point cannot, *pace* E. P. Morris, *YClS*, ii (1931), 99, be called 'abrupt', still less is it an 'intrusion'. Cf. Garn, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

victim<sup>(1)</sup>, but there is nothing like the present passage in the rest of the *Epistles*. Religion indeed plays almost no part in the book. Only one other passage shows Horace in a religious, or almost religious, posture, the rather self-sufficient prayer near the end of *Epi.* 18<sup>(2)</sup>.

Though *Epi.* 4 is like *Epi.* 3 in beginning with questions, mentioning poetry, offering moral advice, and ending with the thought of re-union<sup>(3)</sup>, the important differences between them must also be considered<sup>(4)</sup>. Florus is on the move and emphatically one of a group. Albius, who is the poet Tibullus<sup>(5)</sup>, is established at Pedum and seems to be completely solitary. *Epi.* 3 culminates in a general call to the study of philosophy, *Epi.* 4 in a single precept. Above all there is present in the epistle to Tibullus, but not in that to Florus, a deep perspective of time past. *Epi.* 4 begins with a reminder that seven or more years previously Tibullus had been a frank critic of Horace's *Satires* (1) and then turns to ask about his present activities (*nunc*, 2) in Pedum<sup>(6)</sup>:

scribere quod Cassi Parmensis opuscula vincat,  
an tacitum silvas inter reptare salubris  
curantem quidquid dignum sapiente bonoque est? (3-5)

The first possibility is, for the modern reader, obscurely expressed. Nevertheless two observations about it may be ventured. Firstly, Horace's thoughts have again turned to the past. Cassius of Parma had conspired against Caesar, fought for Brutus and Cassius Longinus,

(1) *Odes*, i, 19, 16; ii, 17, 32; iii, 22, 6 ff.; iv, 2, 53 ff. For a general discussion of the end of this epistle see Garn, *op. cit.*, pp. 18 f.

(2) Cf. Garn, *op. cit.*, pp. 63; 72; below, p. 81 f.

(3) Cf. Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, p. 323, n. 5; C. Becker, *Das Spätwerk des Horaz* (Göttingen, 1963), pp. 42 f.

(4) Cf. Heinze's introduction, p. 44.

(5) Attempts to deny this have not been successful. For the literature see A. Brouwers, *Horace et Albius in Études Horatiennes, Recueil publié en l'honneur du bimillénaire d'Horace* (Brussels, 1937), p. 53, nn. 1 and 2. See also M. Renard, *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, xxv (1946-47), 129 ff. and for the links between lines 4 and 5 of the epistle and [Tib.] iii, 19, 8 f. A. G. Lee, *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, n° 189 (n.s. n° 9) (1963), 10.

(6) For a different interpretation of the opening see H. Hommel, *Gnomon*, xxxvi (1964), 169; cf. L. Alfonsi, *Albio Tibullo e gli autori del "Corpus Tibullianum"* (Milan, 1946), p. 23.

for Sextus Pompeius, and for Antony, and had been put to death after Actium <sup>(1)</sup>. Secondly, it is unlikely to have been a great compliment to suggest that the poems which Tibullus may at present be writing will be superior to those of Cassius. There is piquancy in the contrast between this teasing line and those describing the ambitions of the young poetasters in *Epi.* 3. It is noteworthy that the second alternative, which Horace clearly considers preferable <sup>(2)</sup>, makes the first clear reference in the book to the living of a philosophic life in the country.

Horace's thoughts again turn to the past :

non tu corpus eras sine pectore : di tibi formam,  
di tibi divitias dederunt artemque fruendi. (6-7)

The second sentence enlarges on the first and helps towards its understanding. The gods gave the young Tibullus beauty and wealth. He might, by abusing these gifts, have been a sensualist, 'all body'. But he was preserved from that by a third gift, *artem fruendi*, the knowledge how to enjoy the advantages brought by the other two. This he owed to his *pectus*, a word denoting qualities of both heart and intellect. Clearly he has it in him to be *sapiens bonusque* <sup>(3)</sup>. There is again a glance towards the past as Horace speaks of a fond nurse thinking of her dear *alumnus* and praying for him. (The *alumnus* is probably to be thought of as a young man, but his nurse's devotion to him has its origins in his childhood.) If he has certain blessings, good sense, the ability to express himself, popularity, reputation, health and money enough, is there anything greater which she might desire for him? Horace, it may be assumed, is attributing

(1) F. Skutsch, *R.E.*, iii, 1743 f. It is doubtful if Skutsch is right in accepting the suggestion of F. Marx, *R.E.*, i, 1320, that the reference to Cassius is to be connected with Tibullus' political attitude. Marx's view has been followed by O. Immisch, *Philologus*, Supp. xxiv, 141 f., and by Brooks Otis, *TAPA*, lxxvi (1945), 187 f., and criticized by Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, p. 323, n. 6. (The relevant part appears on p. 324.)

(2) Garn strangely sees the epistle as a call to poetry with philosophy occupying the 'Erholungspausen', *op. cit.*, p. 21. Lines 4 and 5 must be taken closely together, not separated, as by B. L. Ullman, *AJP*, xxxiii (1912), 157, with 4 showing 'what is the matter with Tibullus' and 5 what he must do.

(3) Cf. Ullman, *loc. cit.* Stégen, *L'unité et la clarté des Épîtres d'Horace* (Namur, 1963), pp. 13 f., is right as against Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, p. 324, n. 3, in referring *eras* to the past (cf. Juv. 6, 28, *certe sanus eras*, which Mr. R. G. M. Nisbet has brought to my notice). But he completely misunderstands the sentence *non ... pectore* in supposing that it implies a criticism of Tibullus for at present leading too spiritual a life.

these advantages to Tibullus (1). What follows is the *aliquid maius*, the gift which would crown all. It is set forth as a precept:

inter spem curamque, timores inter et iras  
omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum:  
grata superveniet quae non sperabitur hora (2). (12-14)

This is the culmination of the epistle.

The concluding lines, in which Horace invites Tibullus to come and see him, make laughing acknowledgement of the fact that the advice in 13 f. derives from a dictum of Epicurus (3) and of the possibility of its being interpreted in a grossly hedonist fashion. Horace describes himself as living in the way in which Epicureans were popularly believed to live, *pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute*, .../ ... *Epicuri de grege porcum* (15 f.) (4). These words recall what he had written in *Epi.* 2 about the Phaeacians, who stand for unregenerate mankind, *in cute curanda plus aequo operata iuventus* (29). Later in the book (15, 24) the Phaeacian way of life will appear in a context very like the present one. The self-caricature here corresponds to the account of the *sapiens* at the end of *Epi.* 1. Each represents one of the extremes between which he has said that he vacillates (1, 16 ff.). It is appropriate that the way of life which he has suggested is more congenial (*furtim relabor*, 1, 18) should be represented by a self-portrait.

*Epi.* 5, in which Torquatus, a busy lawyer, is invited to dinner, shows that Horace is after all living a life very different from that of an Epicurean pig. The meal will not be luxurious — the only food mentioned is vegetables, to be served on modest plates (2), and though

(1) That 8-11 is not a mere expansion of 6 f. is clear from the contrast between *divitias* (7) and *mundus victus non deficiente crumina* (11). In the second passage Horace is concerned with money as a help to happiness, and in harmony with passages such as 2, 46 and 10, 42 speaks only of a sufficiency.

(2) Hommel, *loc. cit.*, has shown the long philosophic tradition lying behind line 12. It would be a mistake to regard *Epi.* 4 as springing primarily from an awareness in Horace of a spiritual malaise in Tibullus. For that approach see Ullman, *op. cit.*, 158 f.; Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, pp. 326 f.; Solmsen, *Hermes*, xc (1962), 325.

(3) Above, p. 23.

(4) Cf. P. DeLacy, *TAPA*, lxxii (1941), 50 f. Horace's language here is paralleled in the intimate correspondence of Augustus and Maecenas; cf. Wili, *op. cit.* (above, p. 34, n. 1), p. 297.

the wine will have a special association for Torquatus <sup>(1)</sup>, it will probably not be of the highest quality. Horace does not seem to have spent money lavishly, but he has taken pains. House and table will be spotless, and the other guests will have been chosen with care. One of them, Sabinus, may not come if a better meal and a girl whose company he prefers keep him away <sup>(2)</sup>. This detail serves to draw attention to the absence of any mention of girls at the meal. The Epicurean pig of *Epi.* 4 is clearly no voluptuary.

An apparent exception to this are the lines in praise of *ebrietas* (16-20). They are, however, so far from being a concession to loose living that they form part of an ethical discussion the importance of which may be judged from the fact that it occupies precisely the centre of the epistle (12-20). While demonstrating the folly of parsimony, Horace makes the point that a man should not be afraid to spend his money on enjoyment. He should drink, even to the point of *ebrietas*, which is described as an inspiring and liberating power <sup>(3)</sup>.

Indulgence of this kind is proper only on special occasions, and in this respect Horace has timed his banquet well. It begins at sunset on a day preceding a holiday. Torquatus will not be obliged *partem solido demere de die* (*Odes*, i, 1, 20) <sup>(4)</sup>, but having worked till the end of the day, he can put aside his hopes and worries and give himself to the joys of the present, prolonging them far into the night.

cras nato Caesare festus  
dat veniam somnumque dies; impune licebit  
aestivam sermone benigno tendere noctem. (9-11)

This epistle may be regarded as a comment on *Epi.* 4 since it shows how a busy man may secure some hours during which he can follow the precept of Epicurus and take no thought for the morrow. Caesar's birthday has provided the opportunity for this. Behind

(1) R. G. M. Nisbet, *CQ*, n.s. ix (1959), 74.

(2) Although rejected by F. Vollmer, *R.E.* 2. Reihe, i, 1599, the identification of Sabinus with Ovid's friend of that name is worth considering: Horace's mention of a *puella* may be less a biographical trait than a reference to Sabinus as a writer of erotic poetry. (Ovid's friend wrote 'replies' to at least some of the *Heroides*, *Am.* ii, 18, 27.)

(3) For a philosophic parallel see above, p. 21, n. 7. Cf. Pind. fr. 109 Bowra (= 124 a, b Snell); Bacchyl. fr. 20 b Snell; B. A. van Groningen, *Pindare au Banquet* (Leiden, 1960), pp. 84 ff.

(4) Contrast the youthful Horace, *bibulum liquidi media de luce Falerni* (14, 34). Cf. *Odes*, ii, 7, 6 f.

that lies the thought that the peace which makes possible this alternation of work and relaxation is the gift of Caesar (1).

After *Epi.* 3, 4, and 5, which are markedly epistolary in character, Horace has placed one in which only the address to Numicius at the beginning and end is a reminder that it is to be regarded as an epistle. Of Numicius nothing is known, and no precise inferences about him can be drawn from the epistle (2).

*nil admirari*, he is told, is about the one and only quality which can make and keep a man happy (3). The attitude of detachment which had been recommended in *Epi.* 4 appears here in a new and more generalised form. There Horace had turned to Epicurus; here he puts forward a maxim of general currency which in his day could be associated in particular with Democritus (4). Though the treasures of earth and sea are not rejected outright in 5 ff. and nothing is said which would exclude a reasonable concern with them (5), there is clearly a danger of their becoming objects of *admiratio* and causing *pavor molestus*. The preservation of tranquillity is so important that even a most desirable object, the acquisition of virtue, must not be pursued to excess (*ultra quam satis est*, 16) (6). Behind the doctrine of *nil admirari* lies the equally Democritean doctrine of the mean. Considered against the background of the transience of things and the inevitability of death, an impassioned striving for wealth or fame is clearly folly (17-27).

ire tamen restat, Numa quo devenit et Ancus (27)

It is possible to conceive of the epistle's ending grimly at this point. But Horace again does not allow a note of serious commitment to an ideal to persist to the end. There follows, however, not a brief gesture, but a passage thirty-nine lines long (28-66), in which he comments, mostly with tolerant irony, on the varied pursuits

(1) Cf. *Odes*, iii, 14, 13 ff., *hic dies vere mihi festus atras / eximet curas; ego nec tumultum / nec mori per vim metuum tenente / Caesare terras. / i pete unguentum, puer ...*; Garn, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

(2) For an attempt to do this see Heinze, *ad* 65.

(3) For the qualification see Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 141, n. 24.

(4) Cf. Strabo, i, 3, 21, who speaks of ἀθαρμαστία.

(5) For the contrast between the heavenly bodies above and *munera terrae* and *ludicra maris* below cf. Sen. *Epi. mor.* 94, 56 f.

(6) Contrast Perret, *op. cit.*, p. 151.



of mankind, all of them at variance with the dictum of *nil admirari*, and says that if any of them makes a man happy, he should follow it as best he can. There is irony in this, but there is present also an important element in Horace's philosophic position, his awareness of the importance of the individual human nature and his willingness to tolerate it in all its variety. *nil admirari* is an ideal impossible for all to achieve. If a man finds happiness in devoting himself to some object, well and good; let him do it wholeheartedly (1). Even Epicurus had held that for τοὺς φιλοτίμους καὶ φιλοδόξους political life is a necessity (2).

After the declaration that death is inevitable (27), the point is made that in spite of this it is right to seek a remedy for disease. So also the universal wish to be happy (*recte vivere*) (3) is laudable though happiness, like the curing of a disease, is only a transitory good (4). Horace begins with the loftiest of man's approaches to happiness. If virtue alone can bring it, a man should practise self-denial and devote himself to virtue. It would be a mistake to identify *virtus* with *nil admirari* (5). As the austerity of *fortis omissis deliciis* suggests (6), Horace is speaking of the Stoic pursuit of virtue, against which he has already, while recommending *nil admirari*, issued a warning (15 f.) (7). He passes now to four less worthy objects of devotion, discussing with a liveliness which recalls the *Satires* the cult of money (32-48), political success (49-55), food (56-64) and *amor iocique* (65 f.). Towards this second kind of sensual indulgence, what Diogenes of Oenoanda calls ἀφροδαισίων ἐγλελεγμένων ἡδοναί (8), he displays an off-hand permissiveness.

(1) Cf. Plut. π. εὐθ. 473 a.

(2) Fr. 555 Us.

(3) For a different sense of *recte vivere* see 8, 4; 16, 17; cf. also *rectius* at line 67 below.

(4) In this account of the sequence of thought after line 27, ideas which appear to be implicit in the Latin have been made explicit.

(5) This was done by Heinze in his introduction to the epistle (p. 56) and in his commentary (*ad* 30). Cf. A. La Penna, *Orazio e l'ideologia del principato* (Turin, 1963), p. 220, n. 2.

(6) Cf. 1, 17, *virtutis verae custos rigidusque satelles*.

(7) Cf. Stégen, *op. cit.* (above, p. 43, n. 3), p. 29.

(8) The context of this phrase is worth comparing with the whole second part of *Epi.* 6: τί δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὅτι τε μήτε πλοῦτος αὐτὸ δύναται παρασχεῖν μήτε δόξα πολιτικῇ μήτε βασιλείᾳ μήθ' ἀβροδαίτος βίος καὶ τραπεζῶν πολυτέλεια μήτ' ἀφροδαισίων ἐγλελεγμένων ἡδοναὶ μήτ' ἄλλο μὴδέν, φιλοσοφία δὲ περιτομῇ μόνη...; fr. 24, col. ii, 3-iii, 1 Grilli.

The last two lines (67 f.) are a reminder that the piece is an epistle and serve also to draw together its two parts :

vive, vale. si quid novisti rectius istis,  
candidus imperti ; si nil, his utere mecum. (67-68)

The five pursuits of 28-66 are not for Horace, who therefore uses the distancing *istis* in referring to them. The second person reference which *iste* commonly has may be present also, implying that Numicius engages in some of these pursuits or at least regards some of them with sympathy <sup>(1)</sup>. *his*, as often, has connections with the first person and here refers to 'the doctrine of *nil admirari* which I have advanced' <sup>(2)</sup>. But the tone is not that of one who, confident that he is right, is unwilling to learn from another. The element of qualification which *prope* had introduced at line 1 reappears at the end as Horace admits that he is prepared to listen if Numicius knows of some pursuit better than those which have been considered. If he knows of none, he should follow Horace in making *nil admirari* his guiding principle.

Unlike *Epi.* 6, *Epi.* 7 has been given an occasion. Horace had promised Maecenas that he would spend only a few days in the country, but he has not kept his word. He has stayed away and been missed through the whole of August (1 f.). The reason, he explains, is that he has been afraid of falling ill in Rome. Nevertheless he will not necessarily return when the unhealthy season has passed, for if snow comes to the Alban hills (and it almost certainly will), he will winter by the sea, not coming to visit Maecenas until the following spring. It is important not to read the later development of the argument into the opening. Unlike *Epi.* 1, this epistle does not begin by reporting a desire of Maecenas' which Horace will not grant. He does not say that Maecenas has asked him to return, still less that he has in any way threatened him. Nevertheless Horace has proved unreliable, and he has been missed (*desideror*, 2). This raises

(1) Contrast Perret's remarks, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

(2) O. Skutsch, *Hermes*, lxxxviii (1960), 504 f., was right to protest against the opening of Heinze's comment, '*ista und haec gehen auf dasselbe*'. His proposal that in line 67 a comma should be placed before and not after *istis* is ingenious. The transition, however, from singular *quid* to plural *istis* seems, because of their proximity to each other, to be too abrupt for the *Epistles*. Contrast the distance between *illa* and *aliquid* at *Cic. Tusc.* i, 6 ; on the other hand note the abruptness at *Plaut. Poen.* 542.

the question whether he is behaving in a proper way towards his friend. Has he been ungrateful to Maecenas?

He turns therefore to praise the generosity of Maecenas and to discuss his own response to it. First there is an *exemplum ex contrario*: Maecenas is not like the Calabrian host who tried to force his worthless gift on an unwilling guest. The Calabrian is at fault both in being insistent and in offering something of no value. It may be presumed that Maecenas is free from both faults. Horace's comments on the story widen the range of the discussion. He speaks now (20) of the *prodigus et stultus*, who gives what he himself thinks little of. *prodigus* does not describe the Calabrian, but refers rather to the reckless 'generosity' of a spendthrift. He may bestow a gift which, unlike the Calabrian's, is worth having, but his attitude in giving it, a throwing away of something which he values not at all, makes it worthless as a gift and ensures that he meets with no gratitude (20 f.). Opposed to him is the *vir bonus et sapiens*, who says he is at the disposal of the deserving (*dignis ait esse paratus*, 22). This implies that he exercises discrimination in recognising the deserving<sup>(1)</sup> and that he does not force his generosity on them<sup>(2)</sup>. His gifts moreover are in themselves valuable, like real money (*aera*) as opposed to the imitation money used on the stage (*lupina*)<sup>(3)</sup>. From these lines, which are intended to describe Maecenas as benefactor, it is clear that the inferences about him drawn from the story of the Calabrian host were correct. The discussion ends with an undertaking from Horace.

dignum praestabo me etiam pro laude merentis. (24)

By his generosity to Horace, Maecenas has indicated that he believes him to be *dignus*. Horace will reciprocate by showing his worth, not only out of gratitude (*pro benefactis*), but also because of the fame and distinction of his benefactor (*etiam pro laude merentis*)<sup>(4)</sup>, a graceful compliment and particularly welcome to Maecenas if at

(1) Cf. *Sat.* i, 6, 51, *praesertim cautum dignos adsumere* (of Maecenas).

(2) This point has been emphasized by Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

(3) The meaning of *nec tamen* (23) has been well discussed by K. Büchner, *Studien zur römischen Literatur*, iii, *Horaz* (Wiesbaden, 1962), pp. 142 f.

(4) For the meaning of *pro* cf. *Cic. Rosc. Amer.* 33, *quem pro dignitate ne laudare quidem quisquam satis comode posset*; *Suet. Aug.* 57, *pro quibus meritis quantopere dilectus sit*.

the time he was under a cloud because of an indiscretion concerning the conspiracy of Murena <sup>(1)</sup>.

Another reason for Horace's staying away is now, by implication, advanced, one which, unlike his fears for his health during autumn, will be at all times and increasingly valid. At the same time there occurs the only explicit reference in the epistle to Maecenas' wishing that Horace should not leave him. The use, however, of the future tense in *noles* suggests that he is not at present under pressure about this.

quodsi me noles usquam discedere, reddes  
forte latus, nigros angusta fronte capillos,  
reddes dulce loqui, reddes ridere decorum et  
inter vina fugam Cinarae maerere protervae. (25-28)

The youthful strength and spirits which life with Maecenas in Rome demands are Horace's no longer. These lines, in which a sharp sense of loss exists alongside the self-mockery of the unsuccessful lover, are very different from the brief, unregretful first statement of this theme at 1, 4, *non eadem est aetas, non mens*.

Without transition an animal fable follows. Because she ate too much when inside the bin, the little vixen lost her freedom. The only way in which she could regain it was to deny herself the plenty which lay about her and to leave the bin as thin as she was when she entered it. The basic similarity between this fable and the story of Veianius, the retired gladiator of *Epi.* I, has already been observed <sup>(2)</sup>. But there is an important difference. Nothing is said of the material advantages for Veianius in returning to the confines of the training barracks. Here, however, good feeding accompanies and indeed causes (*pleno corpore*, 31) the loss of freedom. There is a suggestion that poverty or at least plain living is the price of freedom <sup>(3)</sup>. The status of the fable is unusual. It appears to be simply part of Horace's discourse, intended to advance his argument. Only when it has ended, is it revealed that it represents a line of argument which might be used to rebuke him:

hac ego si compellor imagine, cuncta resigno. (34)

(1) Suet. *Aug.* 66, 3; see, however, K. J. Reckford, *TAPA*, xc (1959), 198 f. and below, p. 65, n. 2. The structure of lines 20-24 is convincingly discussed by H. Wieland, *ut curat sententia* (Diss. Freiburg i. Br., 1950), pp. 46 f.

(2) Above, p. 34.

(3) Cf. *Epi.* 10, 34 ff. and below, p. 59.

It is not clear whom Horace envisages as challenging him with the fable — it may be some third person or Maecenas himself. But the principle which the fable illustrates is in any case accepted by Horace later in the book <sup>(1)</sup>. And here he is prepared to act on it if it is invoked in connection with his desire to be absent from Rome. Horace had already, in one of the *Odes*, used *resigno* of the return of gifts: *si celeris quatit* (sc. *Fortuna*) / *pennas, resigno quae dedit* (iii, 29, 53 f.). But for the moment he avoids speaking openly of either Maecenas or his gifts. He claims to be sincere in what he has said by denying that he is one of those who, when stuffed with poultry (cf. *pleno corpore*, 31) and presumably unable in consequence to sleep, sing the praises of the sleep enjoyed by humble folk (35), and then touches indirectly on the consequences of *cuncta resignare*:

nec  
otia divitiis Arabum liberrima muto. (35 f.)

In typically Horatian fashion each noun phrase supplements the other <sup>(2)</sup>. He is not prepared to take great riches (which are accompanied by a busy enslavement to social duties) in exchange for absolute freedom from *negotia* (which is accompanied by relative poverty). It is less offensive to speak of rejecting a change from freedom to wealth than of seeking a change from wealth to freedom. Horace chooses the more tactful alternative though it has less relevance to the situation in the epistle. Nevertheless he does not shirk a more precise restatement of *cuncta resigno*. Having reminded Maecenas that in the past his attitude to him has been all that it should have been, he continues:

inspice, si possum donata reponere laetus. (39)

This is an invitation, not a challenge. If Maecenas will look closely, he will discover a new aspect of his respectful friend. He will find that Horace is able to restore the gifts which he has received and to do this with joy because of the greater good which he has thereby chosen. His joy will be that of the *εὐθυμος*, free to live, as will appear, in harmony with his own nature. The feeling that he is obliged, because of Maecenas' gifts, to please him with his company will no longer confine him <sup>(3)</sup>.

(1) See above, p. 50, n. 3.

(2) Cf. line 83 and Heinze *ad* 35 and 83.

(3) As the discussion above, p. 49, showed, there is no need with Fraenkel, *op. cit.*,

That the handing back of a gift can be effected graciously and without causing rancour is shown by the episode in the *Odyssey* where Telemachus declines Menelaus' gift of three horses (iv, 601 ff.). Although the idea of suitability is present in Homer, there is no word in the Greek corresponding to *aptus*, which is the key-word in Horace's version of the incident:

haud male Telemachus, proles patientis Ulixei:  
'non est aptus equis Ithace locus, ut neque planis  
porrectus spatiis nec multae prodigus herbae;  
Atride, magis apta tibi tua dona relinquam'. (40-43)

From this arise a general moral and its particular application:

parvum parva decent: mihi iam non regia Roma,  
sed vacuum Tibur placet aut inbelle Tarentum. (44-45)

The parallel is not, as might have been expected, between Menelaus' gift and Maecenas', but between Menelaus' gift and life in Rome<sup>(1)</sup>. *donata reponere* has disappeared in favour of *Roma discedere*, with which is associated the earlier theme of lost youth (*iam*, 44). Behind this shift lies the fact that the most outstanding example of Maecenas' generosity has been the gift of the *Sabinum*. It would be difficult for Horace to say, '*parvum parva decent*, and so I must now be prepared to give you back the *Sabinum*', a place which he had once called *parva rura* (*Odes*, ii, 16, 37). The absence of the *Sabinum* from line 45 is similarly to be connected with the proximity of the idea of *donata reponere*.

But a little farm in the Sabine country plays an important part in the story, which follows immediately, of the strange relationship between a leading Roman politician, L. Marcius Philippus, and a freedman auctioneer, Vulteius Mena<sup>(2)</sup>. Philippus, returning home

pp. 332 f., to understand the *lupina* of 23 in the light of 25, i.e. as gifts made worthless because an obligation is attached to them. Nevertheless the idea that Horace is under an obligation lies behind 29 ff. This is not to say that the epistle was written in the course of an actual crisis between the friends and with the intention of warning Maecenas. See below, pp. 95 f.

(1) *apta tibi* assists in the transition from the gifts of Maecenas to life in Rome, a setting which suits him, but not Horace.

(2) It is impossible to tell if it is Horace's invention. P. Titinius Mena was the name of the man who is said to have been the first to introduce barbers to Rome (Varro, *R.R.* ii, 11, 10; Plin. *H.N.* vii, 211), but O. Hiltbrunner, *Gymnasium*, lxxvii (1960), 297, is not justified in arguing from this and the fact that Horace's Mena is first discovered in a

tired from work, has his attention caught by the sight of Mena relaxing in an empty barber's shop and cleaning his nails. He sends his slave to find out about him and then tries to have him to dinner, saying that he wishes to question him on the matters about which the slave has reported <sup>(1)</sup>. His efforts are not at first successful, but the following day Philippus, still taking the initiative (66), has his invitation accepted. Mena comes to dinner, talks freely and subsequently becomes a regular caller at the house of Philippus. Soon he is invited to join Philippus on a trip to the country. He is enchanted with it, and Philippus persuades him to buy a farm. The results are disastrous. The dapper, well-shaven city-dweller (50 f.) becomes a countryman, scurfy and unshaven (90), working incessantly and consumed by greed (84 f.). He meets with ruin and finally rushes back in anger to Philippus in Rome. He protests his wretchedness and begs Philippus to restore him to his former life. With the words, *vitae me redde priori* (95), the story ends.

Horace's ostensible purpose in telling it is given in lines 96-8 :

qui semel adspexit, quantum dimissa petitis  
praestent, mature redeat repetatque relicta.  
metiri se quemque suo modulo ac pede verum est.

A man who has got himself into a situation worse than that which he has left should return to his former state. Everyone should measure himself by a standard which derives from himself and is therefore appropriate. Both points are relevant to the earlier part of the epistle <sup>(2)</sup>. Horace's present position (*petita*), where he does not feel himself to be completely free, is worse than that which preceded it (*dimissa*). From 29-39 it is clear that *dimissa* refers to the time when Horace was like the still *tenuis vulpecula* <sup>(3)</sup>, when he had not yet accepted Maecenas' gifts and therefore did not feel under an obligation. Though nothing is here said about *donata reponere*, the implications

barber's shop that the latter is a fictional character. (Hiltbrunner might have referred, though with no more cogency, to another Mena(s), better known in Horace's day, the admiral of Sextus Pompeius who went over to Augustus: *Valerius Messalla tradit neminem unquam libertinorum adhibitum ab eo* [sc. Augusto] *coenae excepto Mena, sed asserto in ingenuitatem post proditam Sexti Pompei classem* [Suet. Aug. 74]).

(1) On the style of this report see G. Williams, *JRS*, xlviii (1958), 24, n. 31.

(2) For an unconvincing denial of this see J. H. Gunning, *Mnemosyne*, ser. iii, vol. x (1942), 312 ff.

(3) Cf. *macra cavum repetes arum* (33) and *mature redeat repetatque relicta* (97).

of *redeat repetatque relicta* are clear. The second point is to be connected with 44 f., *parvum parva decent* ... (1). Horace has measured himself. He knows that he is *parvus*, and he understands what follows from that.

But it is not only these three lines of comment which are connected with the earlier discussion of his relations with Maecenas. The story itself reflects certain aspects of that relationship. Mena belongs to the same level of society as that from which Horace had sprung, and he too obtains a farm in the Sabine country with the help of his friend (2). What was Horace's purpose in suggesting these parallels?

It becomes necessary at this point to consider the actions and motives of Philippus in pursuing Mena. His behaviour can best be assessed by setting it alongside the account which Horace gives in *Sat.* i, 6 of the beginning of his friendship with Maecenas. In the satire Horace is emphatic that his friendship with Maecenas is not a matter of chance:

nulla etenim mihi te fors obtulit: optimus olim  
Vergilius, post hunc Varius dixere quid essem. (54-55)

But it is the chance sight of Mena relaxing in the barber's shop and, in Philippus' own words, his whim (*libet*, 60) which lead to their acquaintance. Horace's approach to the friendship of Maecenas was decorous and dignified. After Virgil and Varius had spoken of him, he appeared before Maecenas, *singultim pauca locutus* (56). Maecenas was equally reticent, but after a long interval he invited Horace to be one of his friends (60 ff.). His choice bears witness to his recognition of Horace's moral qualities (51 f.; 63 f.). That slow, but inevitable progress is not found in the relationship of Mena and Philippus. The great man's action in inviting him to dinner seems so extraordinary to Mena that he cannot at first credit it. He is silent in wonderment and eventually refuses (61 ff.). Philippus does not accept the rebuff and next morning makes a direct approach. Mena now offers excuses for having failed to attend the *salutatio* at Philippus' house earlier that morning and for not seeing and greeting him as he approached. Finally he accepts with embarrassment an invitation to dinner for that evening (3). But this embarrassment

(1) Above, p. 11.

(2) Reckford, *op. cit.* (above, p. 50, n. 1), 205 f.

(3) Cf. Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, p. 338.



does not last for long. Over dinner he talks with a complete lack of reserve, *dicenda tacenda locutus* (72). There is no mention of an interval to allow for mutual assessment. Immediately, it seems, Mena becomes a client and constant companion of Philippus. The great man has pursued Mena successfully, but with scant regard for his own dignity.

His motives have not been clearly set forth by Horace, but the narrative itself allows some inferences to be drawn. When he first catches sight of Mena, Philippus is in some distress (48 f.). Mena seems completely at ease, and the slave's report on him indicates that he is in truth living a contented life. But Philippus will not let him be. He is certainly behaving in an interfering way in wishing to take him from among his *parvi sodales* and seat him at his own table. But it may be suspected that there is more than this to his behaviour. Is he perhaps jealous of Mena's happiness, and does he wish to destroy it? There are certainly elements in the later part of the story which point in that direction. Mena's frequent visits to Philippus are compared to the approaches of a fish towards a hidden hook (73 f.). Then there is the reaction of Philippus to Mena's enthusiasm for the country:

videt ridetque Philippus,  
et sibi dum requiem, dum risus undique quaerit, ... (78-79)

He observes Mena and laughs at his naivety. But now he seeks a rest — clearly he has come to find Mena's company tiring if not tiresome — though he hopes still to find in him some cause for laughter, laughter at Mena's expense. And when Mena at last rushes back to the house where Philippus had once been so anxious to bring him, he is received coldly and unsympathetically:

‘durus’, ait, ‘Vultei, nimis attentusque videris  
esse mihi’. (91 f.)

Both in respect of action and motive an unfavourable verdict on Philippus is demanded. In so far as the story recalls Maecenas as friend and benefactor of a man of humble origin, it must be regarded, like the story of the Calabrian host, as an *exemplum ex contrario*. There the introduction to the story made its function clear; here it is left to the reader to interpret for himself these aspects of the story of Mena and Philippus (1).

(1) Cf. Hiltbrunner, *op. cit.*, 299, n. 14. Wieland, *op. cit.* (above, p. 50, n. 1), pp. 49 f., goes too far in speaking of the story as caricature and comparing the second half of *Epi.* 15.

*Epi.* 7 is so different from the other epistles that it is easy to overlook the features which connect it with other parts of the book. While the end of *Epi.* 1 had something to say of the relations between great man and dependant, *Epi.* 7 is the first major treatment in the book of this theme, to various aspects of which Horace will later return <sup>(1)</sup>. Friendship belongs to the sphere of ethics so that the epistle contributes to the main theme of the book, and, as has been shown, many details in it can be traced to the philosophic tradition which seems to have shaped its standpoint <sup>(2)</sup>. The close connection between the stories of Veianius, the little vixen, and the horse and the stag (10, 34 ff.) has already been observed <sup>(3)</sup>. Lastly the situation of the bailiff in *Epi.* 14 is not unlike Mena's. Each, having longed for the country, has had his wish granted, but has found disappointment, so that he finally asks the person who has made the move possible to restore him to the city.

*Epi.* 8 creates, in relation to *Epi.* 7, an effect something like that which is achieved within other poems of Horace by the placing of a few light-hearted or ironic lines at the end of a largely serious discourse <sup>(4)</sup>. But the contrast here is much sharper. In *Epi.* 8 Horace is not saying merely that he is less than absolutely committed to the ideals of *Epi.* 7; he is utterly contradicting the picture of himself which emerged there. In *Epi.* 7 he was fearful for his health, but seemed morally sound. He believed he knew what was best for himself and was determined to achieve it. But now he is living *nec recte nec suaviter*. He first explains that this is not because he has suffered misfortune as a farmer (4-6). The mention of three kinds of disaster in farming recalls Mena's unhappy experience and implicitly offers as a kind of postponed comment on that story the observation that his own experience of the country has been very different from Mena's. The source of Horace's trouble lies within himself. *mente minus validus quam corpore toto* <sup>(5)</sup>, he is unwilling to

(1) *Epi.* 9; 13; 14; 17; 18.

(2) Above, pp. 11 and 13.

(3) Above, p. 34.

(4) Above, p. 37, n. 5. Cf. also the more explicit gesture in *Odes*, iii, 3, 69 ff.

(5) This may be a deliberate reversal of Lucil. 189 f., *si tam corpus loco validum ac regione maneret / scriptoris, quam vera manet sententia cordi*. M. Puelma Piwonka, *Lucilius und Kalli-*

take good advice and is angry with friends for trying to defend him against lethargy, that old man's disease (*veternus*)<sup>(1)</sup>. There may be here a suggestion that the desire expressed in the previous epistle to withdraw from life in Rome, for which he feels too old, is after all a disease, and that if Maecenas wishes to keep Horace with him (7, 25), his intention is to save him from this torpor. The contrast between the two epistles is most clear in the references to Rome and Tibur. *Romae Tibur amem, ventosus Tibure Romam* (8, 12) undermines the confident statement, *mihi iam non regia Roma, | sed vacuum Tibur placet aut inbelle Tarentum* (7, 44 f.).

Taken together, *Epi.* 7 and 8 raise to the point of contradiction the disparateness of the two aspects of himself which Horace had presented in *Epi.* 1. But while the account of his inconsistency is there given in a setting of determination to improve, *Epi.* 8 conveys a sense of failure. The reader is not expected to choose between the accounts given in *Epi.* 7 and 8 any more than he need choose between accounts of happy and unhappy love in a book of elegies. The two epistles must be read in the order in which they have been placed. Then a picture of a *proficiens*, determined but beset by spiritual weakness, will appear. But even in the unhappy state described in *Epi.* 8, Horace does not forget that he has a duty to the young. His last words convey a warning to Celsus, *ut tu fortunam, sic nos te, Celse, feremus* (17).

This is the second time Horace has issued a warning to Celsus. In *Epi.* 3 his tendency to plagiarism was rebuked. Now he appears as the *scriba*, and not merely the *comes*, of Tiberius and is advised to be modest in his good fortune. This reference to his success enables the epistle to be brought into connection with the category of letters of congratulation. It is indeed possible that the opening address to the Muse, found only here in Horace's epistles, is intended in no very serious way to give an air of occasion to the poem. Yet there is no explicit congratulation, and the only reference to success occurs in a warning against pride. The epistle, while recalling letters of congratulation, is in fact about ethics.

*machos* (Frankfurt a. M., 1949), p. 25, n. 3, refers *quam vera ...* to style, but an ethical interpretation seems preferable. Fiske, *Lucilius and Horace*, p. 432 finds merely "the same nearasthenic tone" in Lucilius as in Horace.

(1) Cf. Col. vii, 5, 3, *veterno consensescere* (used metaphorically of sick sheep). For an instance of a man plunged in lethargy (*senium*) being subjected to a friend's *lenia imperia* see 18, 44-48 and the discussion of E. K. Borthwick, *CQ*, n.s. xvii (1967), 45.

*Epi.* 9 is addressed to Tiberius, who has thus gradually moved from the background of *Epi.* 3 to a more prominent position in *Epi.* 8, where Celsus is shown in a personal relationship with him (2, 14), and finally into the circle of addressees. While *Epi.* 8 had a rather distant connection with letters of congratulation, *Epi.* 9 clearly represents another common type, the *litterae commendaticiae*. But even here the centre of interest is ethical. Although the last line asks Tiberius to enrol Septimius among his friends and vouches for his character, most of the epistle is concerned not with recommending him, but with giving an account of the pressure which he has been putting on Horace to intervene and with the moral problem which has arisen from this <sup>(1)</sup>. The theme, so frequent in Cicero's letters of recommendation, 'I have known so-and-so for many years, and he is one of my best friends', does not appear <sup>(2)</sup>. The epistle is by no means unsmiling, but it would be a mistake to see in it only an amusing and ironical *jeu d'esprit* <sup>(3)</sup>. It deals, however lightly, with a moral problem and one moreover particularly at home in the book of *Epistles* since it involves relations between the great and the more lowly <sup>(4)</sup>. Tiberius is a man of discernment (*legentis honesta Neronis* [4]), and in this respect he exemplifies the *vir bonus et sapiens* of *Epi.* 7, who is *dignis paratus* (22). But *Epi.* 9 looks forward also. *frontis ad urbanae descendi praemia* (11) anticipates the theme, worked out more fully in the next epistle, of the inferior moral standing of the city and of Horace's lack of sympathy with its ways.

Though Horace stresses at the beginning of *Epi.* 10 the point wherein Aristius Fuscus and he are of different mind, the impression left by the opening lines is of a friendship closer and warmer than any to which the earlier epistles have borne witness. Horace does not disparage Fuscus' preference for the city, cosily described as a nest (6), but as he turns to speak of the country, his enthusiasm for it and his sense of its beauty are, for the first time in the book, clearly revealed (6 ff.). He makes a gesture of supporting his preference by philosophic argument (12 ff.), but soon he returns to its delights (15 ff.).

(1) Cf. Cic. *Off.* iii, 43 ff.; *Amic.* 57; 61.

(2) Cf., for example, *Fam.* xiii, 2; 3; 5, 2.

(3) This is Wili's view of the whole piece apart from the last two lines, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

(4) Cf. Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

A passage of moralising about the importance of being able to distinguish between *verum* and *falsum* (26 ff.) <sup>(1)</sup>, which is only loosely attached to the preceding lines <sup>(2)</sup>, leads to the re-appearance of a number of themes from earlier epistles :

siquid mirabere, pones  
 invitus. fuge magna : licet sub paupere tecto  
 reges et regum vita praecurrere amicos. (31-33)

Here a connection between the *nil admirari* of *Epi.* 6 and the *parvum parva decent* of *Epi.* 7 is revealed : *magna* tend to be *mirabilia*. The reference to a 'humble roof', to *reges* and to their friends brings forward a matter relevant to the subject of *donata reponere*. In *Epi.* 7 though admitting that Maecenas had made him *locupletem* (15), Horace does no more than suggest the material consequences of handing back the gifts which he has received <sup>(3)</sup>. But here he speaks openly of *paupertas*, claiming that even in relative poverty it is possible for a man to outstrip in his way of life *reges* and the friends of *reges*. The juxtaposition of this with the advice to flee *magna* points to 7, 44 f. and to Horace's situation in that epistle <sup>(4)</sup>. The connection with *Epi.* 7 is confirmed by the fable of the horse and the stag, which follows immediately (34 ff.) and which matches in its essentials the fable of the little vixen. Here the *ἐπιμύθιον* leaves no doubt that *paupertas*, which has already been contrasted with the lives of *reges* and of their friends, is recommended because of the freedom which it brings :

sic, qui pauperiem veritus potiore metallis  
 libertate caret, dominum vehet inprobis atque  
 serviet aeternum, quia parvo nesciet uti. (39-41)

The ideal to aim at is that of a fitting mean. *conveniet* (42) stands close to *decent* at 7, 44, and the image of the shoe which should be the right size recalls the demand at the end of *Epi.* 7 that a man should measure himself *suo modulo ac pede* (98).

(1) Cf. 1, 11, *quid verum atque decens*.

(2) Lines 12-25 form a 'section' (cf. *natura*, 12 and 24, noted by Heinze). Although the observations in 26 ff. are anticipated by the reference to *mala fastidia* in 25, the epistle does not at this point exhibit a logically developing line of continuous thought. Cf. Garn, *op. cit.*, (above, p. 37, n. 6), pp. 44 ff.

(3) See above, pp. 50 f.

(4) Cf. 7, 37 f., *rexque paterque / audisti coram*.

Fuscus is, most unusually, addressed by name once more <sup>(1)</sup>. No longer characterized as a lover of the city, he is told to be satisfied with his lot and not to let Horace go unchastised (he seems to have been a school-master) <sup>(2)</sup> if he sees him devoting himself too much to gain (again the idea of the mean) and failing to take things easy <sup>(3)</sup>.

In thus asking Fuscus to be a *liber amicus*, Horace recalls the end of *Epi.* 1, where he had rebuked Maecenas for his indifference to his friend's moral well-being. The return of this theme rounds off the first half of the book. The re-appearance also of *verum*, which connects with *quid verum atque decens* (1, 11), the warning against avarice (41, 45 f.), which echoes 2, 46, and the links, already mentioned, with *Epi.* 6 and above all with *Epi.* 7 make of this epistle a kind of recapitulation of much that has gone before. The appearance at the beginning of a variation on a conventional formula of epistolary greeting (1), the indication of an address at the end (48 f.) <sup>(4)</sup>, where the only epistolary tense in the book occurs, emphasize the epistolary form at this important point in the collection.

If the strictest standards of judgement are applied to Horace's championing of the country in *Epi.* 10, it must be described as an attachment to an inessential. Happiness is an inner state and does not depend on the place where a man happens to be. This is the final lesson taught by *Epi.* 11 <sup>(5)</sup>.

It begins as a letter of enquiry to Bullatius, who has been, and perhaps still is, travelling in the East. Horace's questions here, unlike those which opened *Epi.* 3, do not refer to the stages of a route, but it may be noted that he first mentions three Aegean islands and then three cities on the mainland of Asia Minor. Lastly there is a question about the deserted coastal village of Lebedus. Perhaps Bullatius is sick of sea and roads and would like to settle there <sup>(6)</sup>.

(1) The closest parallel is *amice* at 18, 106.

(2) Cf. R. G. M. Nisbet, *CQ*, n.s. ix (1959), 74.

(3) *cessare* (46). Cf. the ideal balance of Mena's life in the city, 7, 57.

(4) Note how the reference to Fuscus' absence recalls the opening theme of his preference for the city.

(5) Cf. 14, 12 f. On the relationship between *Epi.* 10 and 11 see Garn, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

(6) *laudat* (6) must be very close in meaning to *venit in votum* (5; cf. *Sat.* ii, 6, 1); cf. *Sat.* i, 1, 9, where *agricolam laudat* means almost 'says he wishes he were a farmer'.

In a manner unparalleled elsewhere in the *Epistles*, Horace puts an answer into Bullatius' mouth (1):

'scis, Lebedus quid sit: Gabiis desertior atque  
Fidenis vicus; tamen illic vivere vellem  
oblitusque meorum, obliviscendus et illis,  
Neptunum procul e terra spectare furem'. (7-10)

But Horace rejects this romantic yearning for a hidden life in a place which, while providing a welcome temporary refuge, is not to be settled in for good (11 ff.). The scope of his reply widens as he rejects not merely Lebedus, but all that lies beyond the Aegean (15 f.).

The argument is taken further when Horace at lines 17 ff. states by means of four comparisons that even the loveliest parts of the East are actually irksome and oppressive to the man who is *incolumis*. The object of Horace's criticism is not the East itself, but Romans who travel there:

Romae laudetur Samos et Chios et Rhodos absens (2). (21)

The meaning of *incolumis* is difficult to establish. Taken in conjunction with line 20, *dum licet ac vultum servat Fortuna benignum*, it seems to denote one whose status as a citizen is safe (3), but in view of the ethical advice which follows, the meaning 'morally sound' must also be admitted (4). Like Tibullus, Bullatius should live for the present, and he should be without regard for the place where he happens to be (24). *ratio et prudentia* remove care, travel does not (5). Bullatius can achieve happiness in Italy, even in a poor place like Ulubrae, if he does not lack an *aequus animus*. As the recommendation of both Rome and Ulubrae shows, Horace is not concerned with the relative

(1) Cf. Pseudo-Acro, *ad* 7 and 11. In spite of the absence from the book of a precise parallel (16, 31 f. is rather different), this seems better than regarding 7-10 as the expression of a momentary weakness in Horace. The examples in 11-4, which counter 7-10, deal with analogies to Bullatius' situation, viz. that of a man tempted by temporary discomfort to settle in an unsuitable place, while in 15 f., which also counter 7-10, Horace returns to the situation itself (cf. 15 with *odio maris*, 6).

(2) Contrast the use of *laudare* here with that at line 6 (above, p. 60, n. 6) and cf. *Odes* i, 7, 1.

(3) Cf. Heinze *ad loc.* and Villeneuve's remarks in the Budé edition, pp. 20; 87, n. 1. To his examples add *Sat.* i, 4, 98, *incolumis laetor quod vivit in urbe*.

(4) Cf. *Epi.* 16, 16 and below, p. 74.

(5) For the opposition of *animus* and *caelum* or *locus* see E. Skard, *Symbolae Osloenses* xl (1965), 81 f.

merits of town and country. Place is unimportant, and travel therefore at best useless. A Roman should normally seek happiness anywhere in Italy.

Horace has placed at the beginning of the second half of the book an epistle which, besides drawing attention to the concept of *aequus animus* <sup>(1)</sup>, shows a remarkable complexity of inner organization, which sets it apart from the other epistles <sup>(2)</sup>. Lines 18 f. contain four examples of things good in themselves, but made objectionable by circumstances: a riding-cloak in midsummer, running shorts in a cold breeze, the Tiber in the middle of the winter (as a place to swim in) and a stove in August. The chiasmic arrangement by seasons is obvious. The outer pair take up two situations described at lines 11-4. The traveller bespattered with rain and mud (11 f.) would make good use of the riding-cloak, and the man who is chilled (12 f.) would welcome the stove which is such a nuisance in August <sup>(3)</sup>. The inner pair of examples connects with line 4, *cunctane prae Campo et Tiberino flumine sordent?* The running-shorts (*campestre*) echo the Campus, and the Tiber is mentioned at both places. In the light of *campestre ... Tiberis* at 18 f., it is clear that Horace's mention of Campus and Tiber at line 4 is intended to set against the glamour of the islands and cities of the East the happiness which Bullatius has found in physical exercise at Rome <sup>(4)</sup>.

In *Epi.* 12, to Iccius, a central passage dealing with Iccius' interest in philosophy (12-20) is flanked by a moralising opening and a conclusion commending the rich Sicilian landowner, Pompeius Grosphus <sup>(5)</sup>, to his friendship and reporting successes which have recently attended Roman arms and diplomacy.

This is the first of a group of three consecutive epistles addressed to men who are, in different ways, subject to others. Though Iccius works as a steward on the Sicilian estates of Agrippa and has their

(1) Above, p. 20

(2) Perret has drawn attention to the poetic qualities of this epistle, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

(3) Cf. *fueros* (13) with *caminus* (19).

(4) For the juxtaposition of the Campus with swimming in the Tiber, cf. *Odes*, i, 8, 3 ff.; iii, 7, 25 ff.; 12, 7 ff. (implicitly); iv, 1, 38 ff.; *Ov. Ars Am.* iii, 385. The connections between 18 f. and other parts of the epistle disprove Nauck's contention, viewed with favour by Villeneuve, that *campestre ... Tiberis* is an interpolation.

(5) Cf. *Odes*, ii, 16, 33 ff.



produce at his disposal, he is dissatisfied (3). As if echoing his complaint, Horace points out that Iccius cannot, in his situation, be *pauper*, adding that if he enjoys health as well, *divitiae regales* could give him nothing more. There is a link here with the ode which Horace had addressed to him about six years before (i, 29). He had spoken in that poem of Iccius' intention of giving up philosophic studies, *nobilis libros Panaeti Socraticam et domum* (13 f.), in order to join the expedition of Aelius Gallus against the *reges* of Arabia Felix, and had jokingly, yet also with a touch of real criticism, attributed his change of interests to greed. *divitiae regales* had been much on Iccius' mind at that time (1). Near the end of the epistle, Horace returns to Iccius' concern with money when, after mention of the rich Grosphus, he remarks, *vilis amicorum est annona, bonis ubi quid deest* (24) (2).

Against this background of discontent, an excessive interest in money and a previous abandonment of philosophy in favour of soldiering, the central portion of the epistle, a tribute to Iccius' devotion to philosophy and an account of his studies, must in large measure be ironic. This is confirmed by certain details. When Horace says that he is confident Iccius would maintain a simple way of life even if suddenly blessed by Fortune, he offers two reasons, of which the first is that money cannot change Iccius' nature. This must be read in the light of the fact that at *Odes*, i, 29, 10 ff. Iccius was shown to have undergone a most profound change in turning from philosophy to the pursuit of wealth:

quis neget arduis  
pronos relabi posse rivos  
montibus et Tiberim reverti,  
cum tu ... ?

The absurd comparison with Democritus in the epistle (12 ff.) and the flippant conclusion of the passage (3) confirm its ironic nature.

The second reason advanced to explain the impossibility of Iccius' being changed by sudden good fortune is that he believes all other

(1) Cf. *Odes*, i, 29, 1 f., *beatis Arabum gazis*; 3 f., *Sabaeae regibus*.

(2) Note the appropriateness of *annona* in an epistle to a steward, but also its materialistic ring. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* ii, 10, 4 and W. S. Maguinness, *Hermathena*, li (1938), 43 f.; lii (1938), 41.

(3) *Empedocles an Steritium deliret acumen?* (20). For the view which Horace, in satiric mood, could take of Empedocles, see *A.P.* 464 ff.

things are inferior to virtue alone. This sounds like the Stoicism of ἀρετή and σοφία, with which Horace has already in more and less serious fashion expressed his disagreement <sup>(1)</sup>. But the reference to a vegetarian diet at lines 7 f. <sup>(2)</sup> shows that Iccius is no ordinary Stoic. His interests seem to lie rather in the direction of a mixture of Stoicism and Neo-Pythagoreanism such as was fervently propounded about this time by the Roman philosopher, Sextius <sup>(3)</sup>. By the sarcastic mention at line 20 of Empedocles, whose teachings included a considerable element of Pythagoreanism <sup>(4)</sup>, and of Stertinius, whose views are said to lie behind the monstrous sermon based on a Stoic paradox which is preached by Damasippus in *Sat.* ii, 3, Horace seems to have wished to indicate the two sources of this philosophy and to suggest that it was difficult to decide which of them is the crazier. It is all far removed from the moderation and humanity which the *Epistles* embody. Speculation about *sublimia* (15 ff.) plays no part in the *studia* which Horace recommends and has himself been pursuing.

The epistle can, by virtue of lines 21-4, be assigned to the category

(1) 6, 15 f. and 1, 106 ff. respectively.

(2) Cf. line 21.

(3) See H. von Arnim, *R.E.* iv (2. Reihe), 2040 f. For the fervour of his writing see *Sen. Epi. mor.* 64, 2 ff.

(4) Most commentators have referred *concordia discors* also to Empedocles. E. Bignone, however, *Poeti Apollinei* (Bari, 1937), p. 261 ff., has claimed that the doctrine of the harmony of opposites belongs rather to the philosophy of Heraclitus and that its appearance here is a reflection of the doctrine's having been taken over from Heraclitus into middle Stoicism. Although Horace's words fit Heraclitean tension better than the Empedoclean alternation of *Philia* and *Neikos*, they are, when allowance is made for his delight in oxymoron, adequate to the Empedoclean view. (Even Aristotle did not always observe the distinction, *Cael.* 279 b 14 ff.; cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, i [Cambridge, 1962], p. 437.) *SVF* ii, 1169, *Plut. Mor.* 1066 d and Cleanthes, *Hymn to Zeus*, 16 f., cited by Bignone, *op. cit.*, p. 269, n. 1, in support of his view that the Heraclitean doctrine was taken over by Stoicism, are irrelevant in that they are concerned solely with the necessity of moral opposites. *Cic. Nat. D.* ii, 119, *quarum* (sc. the planets) *tantus est concentus ex dissimilibus motibus*, which Bignone also cites, had already been connected with Heraclitus by W. W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa* (Berlin, 1914), pp. 108-12 (cf. *Vorsokr. Heracl.* B 51); yet the suggestion of the music of the spheres does not look like Heraclitean tension. There is nothing specifically Heraclitean in the other philosophic passages which recall Horace's phrase, *Ov. Met.* i, 433; *Manil.* i, 142; *Sen. Q. Nat.* vii, 27, 4; *Lactant. D. Inst.* ii, 9, 17. (On the other hand the political use of the phrase at *Luc. i*, 98 is Heraclitean in spirit.) There seems to be no reason to separate Horace's *concordia discors* from the other Empedoclean and Pythagorean elements in the epistle.

of letters of commendation, but it is clear that neither the introduction of Grosphus nor the reporting of Roman successes, in the course of which the name of Agrippa returns once more, is its main concern. Like almost all the other epistles, it is about philosophy, but it stands alone in being primarily an ironic view of a contemporary philosophic movement.

Although it is true that in general the reader should adopt what may be called a synchronic approach to the *Epistles*, refraining for example from seeking evidence of Lollius' personal development in the two epistles addressed to him, an exception should be made in regard to *Epi.* 12 and 13. *Epi.* 12 concludes with the glory of Roman successes won in 20 and 19 B.C. <sup>(1)</sup> The dramatic date of *Epi.* 13 is 23 B.C., a year of illness and political crisis for Augustus <sup>(2)</sup>. The juxtaposition and contrast of the two periods are not accidental. They are a reminder of the dangers through which the state has safely passed.

While Iccius is something less than a Roman gentleman of independent means, Vinnius, to whom *Epi.* 13 is addressed, is probably a man of the people who has risen to be a centurion in the praetorian guard <sup>(3)</sup>. The situation with which the epistle purports to deal is that Vinnius has left Horace, carrying a copy, probably a pre-publication copy, of *Odes*, i-iii, to Augustus <sup>(4)</sup>. Before his departure Horace had impressed on him the need for tact; now he writes in order to reinforce his words, presumably dispatching the epistle so as to overtake Vinnius before he reaches Augustus.

The jokes about Asina, the undignified nick-name of Vinnius'

(1) Below, p. 87, n. 2.

(2) Cf. line 3. See in general P. Sattler, *Augustus und der Senat* (Göttingen, 1960), pp. 62 ff.; K. M. T. Atkinson, *Historia*, ix (1960), 440 ff.; D. Stockton, *Historia*, xiv (1965), 18 ff.

(3) Cf. R. G. M. Nisbet, *CQ*, n.s. ix (1959), 75 f.; M. J. McGann, *CQ*, n.s. xiii (1963), 258 f.

(4) Lines 16-18 are best understood in the light of the poems' not yet having been published (*a vulgo* is to be supplied with *oratus*): the *vulgus* is anxious to learn anything it can about the poems, and Vinnius, conscious of the speculation surrounding his parcel, may be tempted to delay and talk boastfully of it. Fraenkel's arguments against a pre-publication copy are not decisive, *op. cit.*, pp. 352 ff. The absence of *Sat.* ii, l. 83 f. from his discussion of relations between Horace and Augustus is noteworthy.

father (6-9 ; 19) <sup>(1)</sup>, and the illustrations how the parcel of poems should not be held (12-5) make this the first poem in the book in which *ridiculum* predominates. The change is welcome, for regarded as the successor to the *Satires*, the book of *Epistles* is sadly lacking in cause for laughter. But the bracketing, as it were, of the main part of the epistle by *Augusto* (2) and *Caesaris* (18) underlines the fact that it has something to say about Horace's attitude to Augustus <sup>(3)</sup>. More generally, this epistle is a contribution to the discussion of the conduct of relations between the great and the humble which is carried on in a number of epistles. Finally there is a connection with the theme of *verum atque decens*. The epistle deals with an aspect of *decorum* which would less easily have found a place elsewhere in the book, for it embodies an exhortation to dignity and poise which it would have been difficult for Horace to address even to the youngest of his more sophisticated friends. Behind the epistle lie thoughts like some which Cicero expressed in the *de Officiis*: *decorum illud in omnibus factis dictis, in corporis denique motu et statu cernitur idque positum est in tribus rebus, formositate, ordine, ornatu ad actionem apto ... cavendum autem est ne aut tarditatibus utamur in ingressu mollioribus, ut pomparum ferculis similes esse videamur, aut in festinationibus suscipiamus nimias celebritates, quae cum fiunt, anhelitus moventur, vultus mutantur, ora torquentur ; ex quibus magna significatio fit non adesse constantiam* (i, 126 ; 131) <sup>(4)</sup>.

The social range represented by Horace's correspondents, which was considerably widened by the appearance of Vinnius in *Epi.* 13, is extended still further in *Epi.* 14, which is addressed to an unnamed slave who was bailiff of Horace's *Sabinum*. His position, though on a much lower level, is comparable with that of Iccius <sup>(5)</sup>.

Horace begins by setting up an opposition between the bailiff and himself which is reminiscent of that at the beginning of *Epi.* 10. But while Fuscus appears as a city-lover without hostility to the country, the bailiff is introduced as one who despises that very part of the country where Horace's affections are centred <sup>(6)</sup>. This

(1) Cf. also *peccos* (4), which, as Heinze saw, anticipates the donkey. See also A. E. Housman, *CQ*, xxiv (1930), 11.

(2) Fraenkel, *loc. cit.*

(3) Cf. Plaut. *Poen.* 522 f.

(4) Each is reminded of the produce which he is able to enjoy, 12, 1 ff. ; 14, 41 f.

(5) It is to be noted that in an incidental way the epistle conveys a good deal of in-

theme of opposition, however, seems to be subordinate to another :

certemus, spinas animone ego fortius an tu  
evellas agro, et melior sit Horatius an res. (4-5)

But, as in *Epi.* 2, the intention of making a comparison is not realised, at least not in these terms <sup>(1)</sup>, and the metaphor of *cultura animi* plays no further part in the epistle <sup>(2)</sup>.

Having spoken once more of his devotion to the country and of his impatience to leave Rome, where he is at present detained, Horace surprisingly puts the bailiff and himself on the same level, saying that each, in finding fault with the place where he is, gives evidence of a spiritual malaise :

in culpa est animus, qui se non effugit umquam. (13)

In the epistle to Fuscus he had offered a philosophic basis for his preference for the country (10, 12 ff.). Here he acknowledges the advance which *Epi.* 11 had made over *Epi.* 10 by demanding that a man should be happy wherever he may be. Neither Horace nor his bailiff is what he should be, but in one respect Horace can claim superiority : he is consistent. When the bailiff was in Rome, he had longed for the country. Now that he is there, he misses the delights of the city and finds the work hard. Like Mena, he has been disappointed. Horace, however, is consistent and feels sad every time business drags him to Rome <sup>(3)</sup>.

It is true that there was a time when he also enjoyed the pleasures of the city. But he was young then, and there was *decorum* in his gay life <sup>(4)</sup>. Now he lives simply :

quem tenues decuere togae nitidique capilli,  
quem scis immunem Cinarac placuisse rapaci,

formation about the *Sabinum* (cf. lines 2 f., 22-30, 41 f.). This aspect of it is discussed below, pp. 73 f., in connection with the opening of *Epi.* 16.

(1) Above, p. 38. For an attempt to connect 4 f. with the later development of the epistle see Stégen, *L'unité et la clarté ...*, pp. 75 f. ; 82. See also O. Hiltbrunner, *Gymnasium* lxxiv (1967), 299-312.

(2) Cf. Wili, *op. cit.*, pp. 289 f. He suggests the influence of Cic. *Tusc.* ii, 13 here and at *Epi.* 1, 40. See also below, p. 70 and Hiltbrunner's comment, *op. cit.*, 314.

(3) The situation is the reverse of that at Sat. ii, 7, 22 f., where Davus accuses Horace of inconsistency. For connections between this satire and the book of *Epistles* see below, p. 68, n. 1 ; 70 ; 72 ; 74, nn. 4 and 5, and Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 18 f. and n. 7 ; 21 and n. 12 ; 39, n. 4.

(4) Cf. *Epo.* 13, 4 f.

quem bibulum liquidi media de luce Falerni,  
cena brevis iuvat et prope rivum somnus in herba. (32-35)

Lines 32-4 are reminiscent of the passage in *Epi.* 7 where Horace had sought to excite the sympathy of Maecenas by recalling the lost days of his youth :

reddes

forte latus, nigros angusta fronte capillos,  
reddes dulce loqui, reddes ridere decorum et  
inter vina fugam Cinaræ macerere protervae. (7, 25-8)

The good health and beauty of youth can of course never return, but it is implied that the qualities of mind and heart also which find expression in *dulce loqui* and *ridere decorum* have passed beyond recall. Very different in tone from this *si vieillasse pouvait* is the brisk, unregretful account of his past in the present epistle. Horace speaks first of externals, fine clothes and perfumes for the hair <sup>(1)</sup>. Unlike the gifts of nature mentioned at 7, 25 ff., they are still available to him, but now their use would be indecorous. (His indifference to clothes and hairdressing has already been suggested at 1, 94 ff.) In *Epi.* 7 Horace is shown as unsuccessful with Cinara. Here the bailiff, who knows (the suggestion is that he was in Rome *sub regno Cinaræ*), is reminded that Horace enjoyed her favours though she was grasping and he brought her no gifts. The realistic background to his boast contrasts with the conventional reference to her flightiness (*fugam protervae*) in *Epi.* 7. While wine is there part of the setting for a scene of unhappy love, in *Epi.* 14 it is indulged in for its own sake and to excess <sup>(2)</sup>. Horace here reminds the bailiff that before he embraced a different life, he had enjoyed sensual pleasures like those for which the bailiff now longs (21 ff.), but he has passed over in silence the finer aspects of life in those days, the *dulce loqui* and *ridere decorum* of which he had spoken to Maecenas. These are not matters for discussion with one's bailiff.

The moral superiority of life in the country, already argued in *Epi.* 10, is suggested here by the observation that on the *Sabinum* Horace is not subjected, because of the *commoda* which he enjoys,

(1) Cf. Davus' mention of *odoratum caput*, *Sat.* ii, 7, 55.

(2) For a similar contrast cf. *Odes*, i, 36 and ii, 7 together with the remarks of N. E. Collinge, *The Structure of Horace's Ode.* (Oxford, 1961), pp. 136 f.

to the envy and disparagement which he meets in the city <sup>(1)</sup>. But Horace is not alone in arousing such feelings in Rome. There is a slave in his town-house who envies the bailiff the *commoda* attaching to his work. An exchange would satisfy them both, but Horace will have none of it :

optat ephippia bos piger, optat arare caballus :  
quam scit uterque, libens, censebo, exerceat artem. (43-4)

This final turning away from direct address to an animal comparison is uncharacteristic of the epistle, which is outstanding among the longer pieces for the consistency with which Horace maintains himself *en rapport* with his correspondent. The tone, while never expressive of the warm affection which appears in the closest analogue of this epistle, *Epi.* 10, has up to this point been extremely personal, and there has been no alternation, as in other epistles, between personal address and impersonal moralising. After the hint of hurt feelings at line 2, he strikes in 4 f. a note of disarming and friendly frankness. Master and slave are placed on the same level at 10 ff., and if 14 f. accuse the bailiff of inconsistency, they do it gently. It is not until 21 ff. that the tone becomes censorious, but not for long. There is sympathy and understanding for the hard-worked bailiff at 26 ff., though *pigro* (29) suggests laziness, and at 31 a suggestion of fundamental agreement between master and slave. Next there is a reminder that in Rome the slave had been a witness to Horace's golden days (33 f.), and later a seemingly friendly warning about the envious town-slave (41 f.). Only in those last two lines is there an indication of the reality which would lie behind such a situation as this. Bailiff and town-slave are like animals each trained to do one kind of work <sup>(2)</sup>. Each must do his master's will by practising the skill which he knows. This declaration is scarcely to the point, at least as far as the bailiff is concerned. He has previously been a slave in town, where, since he was promoted by being put in charge of the *Sabinum* <sup>(3)</sup>, he must have been a success. He knows *utramque artem*.

(1) The theme of envy, which is much more prominent in the *Satires* (i, 6, 46 ff.; 10, 78 ff.; ii, 1, 74 ff.; 6, 47 ff.), reappears in a literary context in *Epi.* 19. The envy to which the poet is subjected is a Hellenistic trait; cf. Call. *Epi.* xxi, 4; fr. 1, 17; *Hymn.* ii, 105. In *Epi.* 14 Horace's *commoda* go well beyond the sphere of poetry.

(2) Cf. the comparison in the address to the *puer-liber* (20, 14 ff.).

(3) For the implications of *mediastinus* see Hiltbrunner, *op. cit.* (above, p. 67, n. 1), 304 ff.

The example of the dissatisfied ox and horse might in this book have been expected to lead to a demand that men should live in harmony with their own natures. Good Panaetian doctrine <sup>(1)</sup>, but not suitable to a slave, for whom the guiding principle must be his own skills, as assessed by his master. The final statement, based on Cicero's version of a Greek proverb <sup>(2)</sup>, makes a point which is suited to the servile condition generally, if not to the peculiar situation of the bailiff with his experience of both town and country.

This movement from a general tolerance to a final assertion of Horace's will is, on a farcical level, paralleled in *Sat.* ii, 7, where Davus, having availed himself of his master's invitation, *libertate Decembri ... utere* (4 f.), is finally crushed by the words, *ocius hinc te ni rapis, accedes opera agro nona Sabino* (117 f.). In the exchange between Horace and his slave at *Epi.* 16, 46 ff. the master appears as a tough Samnite, not at all impressed by the other's claims. Toughness, though not maintained to the end, nevertheless plays a considerable part also in the attitude shown in *Epi.* 20 to the downfall of his foolish and discontented *puer-liber* (6-16).

*Epi.* 15, addressed to Vala, begins as a letter of enquiry about Velia and Salernum. Horace is thinking of spending the winter in that part of Italy instead of going, as in the past, to Baiae. There is here a connection, not necessarily a biographical one, but a connection in the texture of the book, with the reference at 7, 10 ff. to spending the winter by the sea. The life which he had then envisaged was to be simple: *et sibi parcat contractusque leget* (7, 11 f.) <sup>(3)</sup>, and Horace's decision not to visit Baiae, which was notorious for its fast living <sup>(4)</sup>, seems in harmony with this. But a desire to avoid luxury is not given as the reason for his wishing to go elsewhere. (The later development of the epistle makes this understandable.)

(1) Heinze believed that line 43 derives from Pind. fr. 220 Bowra (= 234 Snell), which is quoted by Plutarch in the *περὶ εὐθυμίας* to illustrate that doctrine (472 c). If this were correct, it would be yet another link between the *Epistles* and the tradition of *εὐθυμία*. The connection, however, seems to be too tenuous to find a place in the discussion above, pp. 20 ff.

(2) *Tusc.* i, 41, *quam quisque norit artem, in hac se exercent*. Cf. Aristoph. *Vesp.* 1431.

(3) For *contractus* cf. Sen. *Tranq.* 5, 4, cited by Stégen, *Essai sur la composition* ..., p. 87, n. 1.

(4) Cf. Prop. i, 11; Strabo, v, 4, 5; Ov. *Ars Am.* i, 255; Sen. *Ep. mor.* 51; Mart. i, 62.



His explanation, which he offers at great length, is that he is following the cold water therapy of Antonius Musa and has no use for the sulphurous waters of Baiae, where he has in consequence become unpopular. After this he returns in 14 ff. to his questions, asking about the corn supply and the water. From water he turns to wine, and the reader now begins to form a different impression of his plans <sup>(1)</sup>. On his farm any wine will do, but when he visits the seaside, he looks for a wine that will be *generosum et lenē* (18),

quod curas abigat, quod cum spe divite manet  
in venas animumque meum, quod verba ministret,  
quod me Lucanae iuvenem commendet amicae. (19-21)

There is a connection here with the praise of drunkenness at 5, 16 ff., where, however, there was no mention of an *amica*. More important is the contrast with *Epi.* 7. Horace hopes to find in the South that youth (*me iuvenem*) which in *Epi.* 7 had passed beyond recall <sup>(2)</sup>. Wine will give him a flow of talk (*verba ministret*, 20), which, if it falls short of the *dulce loqui* of those golden days in Rome, will still be good enough for provincial society. Love, in *Epi.* 7, was represented by the faithless Cinara and was a thing of the past. Now he has hopes of success with a doubtless less difficult local girl.

Both this passage and that giving an account of his decision to abandon Baiae are parentheses in the monstrous opening sentence which does not find completion until line 25 is reached. It consists of a string of indirect questions. The first group of these (1 f.) asks about the region around Velia and Salernum as a whole; in the second (14 ff.) an element of rivalry between the two places is introduced (14), and this dominates the third group (22 f.). Both the second and the third groups are entirely concerned with food. In the former he enquires only about the necessities of life, corn <sup>(3)</sup> and water, but in the latter, after the revelation of his intentions regarding wine and a Lucanian *amica*, he displays a gourmand's concern about which place produces a greater quantity of certain

(1) For a good discussion of the development of the argument at the beginning of the epistle see Stégen, *op. cit.*, pp. 84 ff.

(2) Cf. the speech of Messalla in Maecenas' dialogue, *Symposium: ut idem umor ministrat faciles oculo, pulchriora reddit omnia et dulcis iuventae reducit bona* (fr. II).

(3) The enquiry is understandable, for around this time there was famine in all Italy (Cass. Dio, liv, 1, 1 ff. [22 B.C.]). *Epi.* 12. 28 f. emphasizes a plenty which has followed scarcity.

delicacies, hare <sup>(1)</sup>, boar <sup>(2)</sup>, fish <sup>(3)</sup>, and sea-urchins <sup>(4)</sup>. His intention is to return home *pinguis Phaeaxque* (24). The similarity to the light-hearted end of *Epi.* 4 is obvious, *me pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute* (15) — *cutem curare* was a Phaeacian activity (2, 29).

But *Epi.* 15 does not end at this point. Horace's final topic is to be not a style of living, but the more fundamental one of consistency. Without transition, a character-sketch, reminiscent of the *Satires* <sup>(5)</sup>, introduces the Lucilian figure of Maenius. The link with what has gone before is that he is a glutton, *quicquid quaesierat ventri donabat avaro* (32). But as the description proceeds, the inconsistency of his moral judgements rather than his gluttony is seen to be at the centre of interest. Unsuccessful in his attempts to cadge a good meal, he eats simply, though heavily, and assails the wickedness of spend-thrifts. But when he has been more successful, he expresses sympathy with those who throw away their wealth on delicious food, as he once had. The reader may well recall the picture which Davus had drawn of Horace at *Sat.* ii, 7, 29 ff. When he is not invited out to dinner, he praises the simple life (*laudas securum holus*, 30), but if a late invitation should arrive from Maecenas, he noisily and excitedly gets ready and rushes off. In *Epi.* 15 Horace confesses that he is like Maenius, or rather that he *is* Maenius (*nimirum hic ego sum*, 42), in the inconsistency of his judgements. When he is not well off, he manfully puts up with *vilia* (cf. line 35) and says that he prefers what is safe and modestly small (*tuta et parvula laudo*, 42). But when he has better luck, he holds that good sense and the good life belong only to the wealthy whose money has been invested for all to see in smart country houses.

Yet it is not enough to speak of inconsistency of moral judgement in Maenius and Horace. Each shows adaptability also, making the best of present circumstances and ever ready to secure and enjoy an improvement in his fortunes. They each anticipate the Aristip-

(1) Cf. *Sat.* ii, 4, 44; 8, 89.

(2) A Lucanian speciality; cf. *Sat.* ii, 3, 234 f.; 8, 6.

(3) For the scarcity of fish in winter cf. *Sat.* ii, 2, 16 f.; 3, 235. For the costliness of certain unspecified fish cf. *Sat.* ii, 2, 120; 4, 37.

(4) Cf. *Sat.* ii, 4, 33; 8, 52.

(5) Cf. *Sat.* i, 3, 3 ff.; ii, 2, 55 ff.; 3, 142 ff.; 168 ff.; 226 ff. The passage culminates in direct speech (39 ff.); cf. *Sat.* i, 2, 69 ff.; ii, 3, 151 ff.; 231 ff.; 6, 115 ff.; *Epi.* i, 7, 91 ff.; ii, 2, 37 ff.; 138 ff. In the book of *Epistles* only *Epi.* 6 and 17 have a flavour of the *Satires* comparable with that in *Epi.* 15.

pus of *Epi.* 17, *templantem maiora, fere praesentibus aequum* (24). The self-portrait in *Epi.* 15 is a reminder of one of the extremes mentioned at 1, 16 ff., the opportunistic hedonism of *mihi res, non me rebus subiungere*. It is no accident that immediately after this epistle, in the moralising of *Epi.* 16, the voice of the *virtutis verae custos rigidusque satelles* can, for the only time in the book, be clearly heard <sup>(1)</sup>.

Turning from the country-houses of the rich, Horace opens *Epi.* 16 by speaking of his own farm <sup>(2)</sup>. The epistle purports at the outset to be an attempt to anticipate some questions about it which he supposes that the addressee, Quinctius, may wish to ask, questions which regard the farm simply as a source of wealth. When Horace then undertakes 'in wordy fashion' (*loquaciter*, 4) to describe its appearance and site, it is to be expected that his description will include answers to those questions. The lines which follow speak in vague terms of a valley running from North to South and enjoying a mild climate, in which, though Horace does not say so, the farm is presumably situated. With equal vagueness he refers to three kinds of produce, none of them valuable crops and none mentioned among the introductory questions <sup>(3)</sup>, and then turns to the shadiness of the place, which is reminiscent of Tarentum. Finally he speaks more definitely, though some vagueness still remains <sup>(4)</sup>, of a cool, clear stream with curative properties. That is all. The description cannot be called *loquax*, especially if compared with the opening of the previous epistle. It does not deal with the farm in the terms in which it was suggested that Quinctius was interested in it, and the specific questions go unanswered.

There is a great difference between this description and the account which emerged incidentally in the course of the epistle to the bailiff. There the *Sabinum* had appeared as a real farm, busy and crowded, with its four families of tenants and its bailiff kept occupied by a host of duties. Of the five kinds of cultivation mentioned in the opening questions of *Epi.* 16, four have already been touched upon in *Epi.* 14. *arvo pascaturum* (16, 2) recalls the information at 14, 26 f. that Horace is having brought under cultivation land which for

(1) Cf. W. S. Maguinness, *Hermathena*, lii (1938), 41.

(2) For a fuller discussion of this poem see M. J. McGann, *CQ*, n.s. x (1960), 205 ff.

(3) McGann, *op. cit.*, 205, nn. 4-7.

(4) At line 12 it is not clear whether the *rius* in fact takes its name from the *fons*.

long has not been worked. *poma* (16, 3) would be among the produce of the *hortus* which is available to the bailiff (14, 42). *prata* (16, 3) is to be connected with the reference in *Epi.* 14 to the building of a dike in order to protect the *apricum pratium* from the rain-swollen stream (29 f.). And the question about vines (16, 3) has already been answered, in the bailiff's complaint *quod angulus iste feret piper et tus ocus uva* (14, 22 f.). In contrast to all the activity alluded to in *Epi.* 14, there is an air of stillness about the farm in *Epi.* 16. Horace gives the impression that there are no other human beings on it and that he shares it only with his *pecus*. More a retreat than a farm <sup>(1)</sup>, it derives from the vagueness of the language in which it is described an aura of otherworldliness so that it is seen not merely as the setting of a simple life, but, when taken in conjunction with the search for the *vir bonus* which follows (41 ff.), as a kind of symbol of a life devoted to wisdom. The concluding lines of the description (15 f.) hint at the moral goodness which may be achieved there (*incolumem*, 16) <sup>(2)</sup>, and by dating the letter to September, offer a connection, not necessarily autobiographical, with 7, 2.

The disapproval of Quinctius' values which was implicit in the description of the *Sabinum* now becomes explicit. From doubts about his true moral state <sup>(3)</sup>, Horace moves to a general consideration of the question *vir bonus est quis?* Several candidates for the title are considered: one is revealed to be a hypocrite; another, who is Horace's slave, refrains from wrongdoing because he fears punishment <sup>(4)</sup>; the last is a sacrilegious rogue, who uses religion as an aid to deception. Vice is slavery <sup>(5)</sup>. Freedom belongs to the truly wise and good man, who is able, if need be, to preserve it by suicide.

The terms *sapiens bonusque* (20), *stulti* (24), *sapiens emendatusque* (30), and *vir bonus et sapiens* (73), the statement that the good hate sin because they love virtue (52), and the passages which recall the paradoxes that all sins are equal (55 f.) and that only the wise man

(1) Cf. *latebrae* (15).

(2) Cf. 11, 17; Garn, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

(3) The opening of this second part of the epistle, *tu recte vivis, si curas esse quod audis* (17) should be compared with *Off.* ii, 43, *quamquam praeclare Socrates hanc viam ad gloriam proximam et quasi compendiarium dicebat esse, si quis id ageret, ut qualis haberi vellet talis esset*; cf. Xen. *Mem.* ii, 6, 39; W. S. Maguinness, *Hermathena*, lii (1938), 42.

(4) For the connection with *Sat.* ii, 7, 72 ff. see Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 18, n. 7.

(5) Here too there is a connection with *Sat.* ii, 7: *o lotiens servus* (70), *conservus* (80).

is free (63 ff.), all these elements give the epistle a strong flavour of the Stoicism of ἀρετή, κατορθώματα and the σοφός and set it apart from the rest of the book, which expresses theless arduous ideals of *decorum*, *carpe diem*, *nil admirari* and *aequus animus*.

*Epi.* 17 is introduced as a letter of advice to a certain Scaeva about the conduct of relations with the great. It implies no motivation other than Horace's desire to instruct (*disce*, 3). He does not, however, plunge directly into precept, but first makes a brief acknowledgement of the worth of a life of withdrawal, in which Scaeva presumably has little interest (6-10), and then devotes slightly more than half the total length of the epistle (11-42) to a defence of the position of a dependant upon the great. This is first argued in terms of the ways of life of Aristippus and Diogenes. Aristippus first appears as the courtier showing deference to kings so that he may live in comfort (13-22). But this aspect of his conduct gives way in what follows to praise of his virtuosity in the art of living. Unlike Diogenes, who could be happy only if allowed to live in the way which he had chosen, Aristippus was adaptable, gracefully the equal of his circumstances whatever they might be (23-32). But with this *ποικιλία* he is very much a Greek, and his qualities will not count greatly with anyone whose ideal is Roman *virtus* (1). Horace therefore moves into a Roman context, speaking firstly of men whose *virtus* is pre-eminent:

res gerere et captos ostendere civibus hostis  
attingit solium Iovis et caelestia temptat. (33-4)

On a lower level, but closely associated with them and, as will appear, also exhibiting *virtus*, are their dependants who have succeeded in pleasing them:

principibus placuisse viris non ultima laus est. (35)

A man who is afraid (37), who is puny in heart or body (40), will not make a success of friendship. For this, *virtus* is required (41) (2), and *virtus* has a right to honour and reward.

(1) Nevertheless he clearly enjoys Horace's approval. For his *εὐθυμία* see above, pp. 22 f. Fraenkel's comment is misleading: 'Horace seems to judge the behaviour of the champion of self-contained *virtus* no less severely than that of the *scurra*', *op.cit.*, p. 322.

(2) Cf. *experiens vir* (42) and *viriliter* (38).

This discussion complements *Epi.* 1 and 7, where Horace had shown how a long-standing relationship might be subjected to strain if a great man's friend felt himself called to a new life. It now becomes clear that those epistles are not to be read as hostile criticism, made in the light of philosophy, of the relationship in general between the great and their dependants. The present passage shows that on the contrary the life of a friend of the great is praiseworthy in terms not only of traditional Roman values, but also of an ideal of human behaviour which derives from Greek philosophy.

The advice for which Scaeva has had to wait for so long now begins (43 ff.). It is concerned not with the difficult art of giving pleasure (cf. 35, 39 ff.), but solely with the gaining of rewards, having as its starting-point the reference to *pretium* in line 42. In itself the advice is unexceptionable, even laudable: a friend should say nothing of his straitened circumstances, he should take a gift modestly and respectfully and should not snatch, and on a journey with his friend he must not complain about discomfort or losses, especially if the losses are not genuine <sup>(1)</sup>. Everything, it is true, is seen as subservient to the end of gaining benefits: *atqui rerum caput hoc erat, hic fons* (45). But at this point that should not cause surprise, for the discussion of friendship had been introduced by a reference to benefits:

si prodesse tuis pauloque benignius ipsum  
te tractare voles, accedes siccus ad unctum. (11-2)

The unpleasantness of 43-51 must not be exaggerated. It is confined to the reason which Horace advances for not asking for a present, namely, that by keeping quiet one may avoid having to share the rich man's largesse with others among his dependants. This certainly comes strangely from the author of *Sat.* i, 9.

‘dispeream, ni  
summoses omnis’. ‘non isto vivimus illic,  
quo tu rere, modo; domus hac nec purior ulla est  
nec magis his aliena malis; nil mi officit, inquam,  
ditior hic aut est quia doctior; est locus uni  
cuique suus’.

(47-52)

(1) *Brundisium comes* (52) recalls the exemplary picture of *amici* accompanying a *dives* in *Sat.* i, 5.

As in the second half of *Epi.* 15, there is in this final part an element of exaggeration and caricature which recalls the *Satires* and makes for lively reading <sup>(1)</sup>. But its function with respect to the earlier part of the epistle is not paralleled in *Epi.* 15. The materialism and selfishness of Horace's advice here must be read as in large measure an undermining of the idealization in moral terms of *maioribus uti* at lines 33 ff., as yet another instance of Horace's reluctance to allow a position of commitment to an ideal to be maintained for long unimpaired.

At the end there is no rounding off, no final address to Scaeva, no concluding remarks from Horace about *maioribus uti*. The reader is left at a considerable distance from that topic, with the harsh reverberations of the last line of the kerb-side scene :

'quaere peregrinum' vicinia rauca reclamation. (62)

There is no parallel to this ending among the other pieces in the book. Its occurrence here is perhaps to be connected with the fact that Horace has not finished with his theme, that *Epi.* 18 is to take the discussion further.

*Epi.* 18 is, like *Epi.* 2, addressed to Lollius. To have more than one epistle addressed to him is an honour which he shares only with Maecenas, and just as the sequence Maecenas, Lollius opens the book, so apart from the epilogue it is closed by the sequence Lollius, Maecenas. In *Epi.* 2, Lollius is a shadowy figure, and the moral exhortations, with the possible exception of the warning against anger, do not give the impression of having been chosen with reference to his character. The vices against which he is warned in *Epi.* 18 are certainly those in which a young man may be tempted to indulge (21 f.), but there is nothing in these lines to suggest that they are particularly relevant to Lollius. There are, however, other parts of the epistle which bring a personality vividly before the reader. At the beginning (1 ff., 15 ff.) Lollius is shown as independent and self-willed and near the end (92 ff.) as, sometimes at least, unsociable, withdrawn and silent. And at 44-64 there is a most remarkable passage of *personalia*, in which Horace emphasizes

(1) But the whole epistle is not to be regarded as 'a veritable satire from first to last' with Horace playing a role analogous with that of Teiresias in *Sat.* ii, 5, as it is described by Perret, *op. cit.*, pp. 132 f.

Lollius' skill in arms (52 ff.) and refers finally to a related topic, his delight in organizing a *naumachia* on his father's estate (60 ff.) (1). It is therefore appropriate that one of the examples given of an unimportant point over which a man of too independent mind is accustomed to dogmatize seems to concern the relative merit of two gladiators (19) (2) and that in the speech of Eutrapelus there is an indication of the end to which a man with Lollius' skill may come if he suffers ruin: *ad imum Thraex erit* (35 f.) (3).

*Epi.* 17 and 18 are more closely connected than any other pair of juxtaposed epistles in the book. In different ways and with different emphasis they treat the same subject of *maioribus uti*. The device of placing a reference to the life of withdrawal near the beginning of *Epi.* 17 and at the end of *Epi.* 18 emphasizes the fact that they should be considered together. In general they complement each other. In *Epi.* 17 the rich man for the most part plays a passive role, whereas *Epi.* 18 does justice to the reciprocity of friendship (4). The concern with material gain, which is so prominent in *Epi.* 17, does not appear in *Epi.* 18 except at 74 f., where *ne dominus ... munere te parvo beet* is no less calculating than anything in *Epi.* 17. The difficulty of friendship is an important theme in *Epi.* 17, being used to support the thesis that the position of friend of the great is both honourable and deserving of reward. The theme of difficulty occurs only in passing in the epistle to Lollius, as a generalisation set among detailed precepts:

dulcis inexpertis cultura potens amici:  
expertus metuet. (86 f.)

*inexpertis* and *expertus* not only correspond, even to the sequence of plural and singular, to ἀπειράτοισιν and ἐμπείρων τις in the passage of Pindar upon which Horace bases this remark (5), but should also be connected with *experiens vir* at 17, 42. Above all, the number and variety of matters upon which Horace touches in the precepts

(1) On the philosophic background to this trait see above, p. 29.

(2) Or are they actors? Cf. Porphyryon and Pseudo-Acro ad loc.

(3) At 66 also a gladiatorial image follows very naturally the reference to a *naumachia* in the lines immediately preceding.

(4) Cf. 18, 24 ff.; 40; 65 f.; 74 f.; 89 ff.

(5) Fr. 99 a Bowra (= 110 Snell).



contained in *Epi.* 18 compensate for the paucity and one-sidedness of those in 17, 43 ff. (1).

Connections in detail include the appearance of travel to Brundisium in both epistles (17, 52 ; 18, 20) and of a *meretrix* as a term of comparison in describing faulty attitudes in friendship (17, 52 ff. ; 18, 3 f.). Besides, the rough ways of the Stoic-Cynic champion of 'pure liberty and true virtue' (18, 8) cannot but be connected with Diogenes in *Epi.* 17 (2). Each is contrasted with an opposing figure, but Horace does not repeat the situation. In the epistle to Scaeva, Aristippus is 'good', Diogenes 'bad', but in *Epi.* 18 the man who is like Diogenes is contrasted with a *scurra*. Both are 'bad', and goodness lies between them (18, 9).

The account of *asperitas* at lines 6-8 is unlikely to have much relevance in its detail to Lollius. Horace is describing an extreme case of that *libertas* to which it is reasonable to suppose that Lollius is prone. But these lines have an important function in the book as a whole. They are a final indication of Horace's disapproval of the would-be *sapiens* (3). And they introduce by implication a clarification of an issue raised by some parts of the book. The supreme importance of philosophy in his life, as he portrays it in the *Epistles*, his regarding details of dress and haircut as unimportant (4), his claim in *Epi.* 7 to *otia liberrima*, and his expressed willingness to return the gifts of Maecenas might be taken as evidence that a certain *asperitas* accompanied this pursuit of wisdom. Already there has been much in the book to show that this is not so, but now in this, the last of the ethical epistles, the pursuit to excess of *libertas* is firmly rejected.

Having done this at the beginning of the epistle, he turns at the end to a consideration of the rôle which philosophy should play in the life of Lollius (96 ff.) and then to an account of his own withdrawn life (104 ff.). Amid all the demands made on him as the friend of a great man, Lollius must not neglect his reading of the philosophers.

(1) A special study of the art of the precept here and in *Sat.* ii, 4, as well as in other, less lengthy passages (e.g. *Sat.* i, 10, 7 ff.), would throw light on Horace's method in the *Ars Poetica*.

(2) For *vera virtus* cf. 1, 17, and for the Cynic aspect of the description cf. *elutrem* at line 18. Cf. also *inconcinna* (18, 6) with *non inconcinuus*, used of Aristippus (17, 29).

(3) Cf. 1, 106 ff. ; 6, 15 f.

(4) Cf. 1, 94 ff. with 18, 7.

This stress on intercourse with great minds recalls a point twice made near the beginning of the book (1, 48 ; 2, 34 f.). The seven lines (97-103) which give an account of the questions which Lollius should address to philosophy are, in their content, in sharp contrast with the syntactically similar passage in *Epi.* 12 describing the philosophic interests of Iccius. While Iccius is concerned about the heavens, the sea and the whole 'discordant harmony of things' (12, 16 ff.), Lollius is to consider only ethical questions. He is to aim at *lenitas* in his life (97). There is a contrast here with the *asperitas* against which he has been warned at the outset, even if the two are not strictly parallel, *lenitas* being here primarily a quality inherent in a man's way of life and experienced by himself and *asperitas* a quality primarily manifested in relations with others and experienced by them. Mention of the disturbances caused by *cupido*, *pavor*, and *spes* (98 ff.) recalls *Epi.* 4, 6, and 16 (1), but at line 100 the question whether virtue springs from *doctrina* or *natura* is new to the book. It is appropriate that this, which is tantamount to a warning against reliance on inborn qualities for the acquisition of virtue, should be addressed to a man of parts, poet, soldier, athlete. Lollius must learn to lessen his cares and be a friend to himself (*tibi amicum*, 101). There is here a suggestion that this is the only *amicitia* which ultimately matters and that *cultura potentis amici* is after all no more than a *res mediocriter utilis*. Lastly Lollius is to consider what gives tranquillity of mind :

quid pure tranquillet, honos an dulce lucellum  
an secretum iter et fallentis semita vitae. (102 f.)

There can be no doubt of the answer to the question as framed. Yet when the main burden of the epistle is considered, it becomes clear that it would be a mistake to read into these words a condemnation of *honos* and *lucellum*. Lollius is to realise the superiority of the hidden life, even if at present he must for the most part pursue less philosophic aims. His attitude is to be not unlike that expressed in *Epi.* 6, where there is no doubt that *nil admirari* is to be preferred, but other ways of life are on the whole viewed with tolerance. In *Epi.* 17 a life of withdrawal and a life of *maioribus uti* seemed to be mutually exclusive, but for Lollius the situation is more complex. He is not advised to embrace the hidden life, but merely to consider the

(1) 4, 12 ; 6, 5-14 ; 16, 65 f.

answers to this as to the other questions. (The whole passage is after all introduced by *inter cuncta*.) Lollius is to bear in mind the superiority of the hidden life, refreshing himself (so we must understand) at that source when he is able and eventually perhaps turning to it completely.

Now Horace speaks emphatically of himself:

me quotiens reficit gelidus Digentia rivus, ... (104)

As the friend of Maecenas and the proprietor of the *Sabinum*, he has combined a life of pleasing the great with one of withdrawal. Now, so the book seems to say, the second is to predominate<sup>(1)</sup>. The *iter* and *semita* of line 103 is revealed to be real as well as metaphorical. For Horace, it is the road which leads to the *Sabinum* along the valley of the cool Digentia and past chilly Mandela. The presence of the place-names and the sharpness of observation in *rugosus frigore pagus* <sup>(2)</sup> offer a strong contrast with the vague, dream-like description at the beginning of *Epi.* 16. 'My experience of the hidden life', he seems to be saying to Lollius, 'is real. It has been gained in real countryside, a few miles beyond Tibur'. From the setting he turns to his feelings. With an affectionate *amice*, unparalleled elsewhere in the book <sup>(3)</sup>, he asks Lollius what he thinks are his feelings and his prayers whenever he returns to the *Sabinum*. The prayer which follows is strange, not addressed to any deity and speaking in the third person of 'the gods' <sup>(4)</sup>. As the apparent equivalence of *sentire* and *precari* suggests, it is more an expression of feeling than a prayer. The words *mihi vivam quod superest aevi* show that his own interests as a *proficiens* in philosophy must come before everything else <sup>(5)</sup>. His comment on the prayer underlines the fact that

(1) Note the pointer to a long stay in the country at 18, 109 f., *provisae frugis in annum copia*.

(2) Perret holds that Horace's view of the country in the *Epistles* is vague and lacking the *traits aigus* of certain of the odes, *op. cit.*, pp. 148 f. The sharpness of the present passage recalls Dante, *Inf.* xxx, 64 ff.: *Li ruscelletti che dei verdi colli / del Casentin discendon giùso in Arno, / facendo i lor canali e freddi e molli ...*

(3) Above, p. 60 and n. 1.

(4) Cf. the use of prayer at the beginning of *Sat.* ii, 6, a passage very close in mood to the end of *Epi.* 18. In the satire, however, Mercury is invoked (5).

(5) Although the close parallel in the *Vita Ambros.* of Pindar, *βούλομαι... ἐμὲντῳ ζῆν, οὐκ ἄλλῳ*, involves patronage, it would probably be a mistake to connect Horace's words in any very precise way with the conflicts of *Epi.* 1 and 7. Cf. *Epi.* 10, 8, where *vivo* has a pregnant force, and 14, 1, where the *Sabinum* gives him back to himself.

the thought of the *Epistles* is non-religious and humanly centred: it is enough, he says, to ask Jupiter for life and wealth, but an *aequus animus* he will provide for himself <sup>(1)</sup>. These are Horace's last words on ethics in the book. Though *quotiens* (104) shows that he has not retired completely, the life of withdrawal is finally confirmed as his choice. The many links with earlier moral discussions in the book and the final appearance of *aequus animus* firmly establish these lines as the end of the investigation *quid verum atque decens*.

As the only epistle concerned exclusively with literary matters, the nineteenth stands apart <sup>(2)</sup>. It seems less like a letter than most of its companions <sup>(3)</sup>, and its position between the summing up of the wisdom of the book and the epilogue gives it a kind of intercalary status. It is distinguished among the epistles also by its many reminders of the *Satires* <sup>(4)</sup>. The scorn expressed at lines 19f. and 39f. recalls that at *Sat.* i, 10, 21 and 90 f. respectively — though it must be noted that the faint-hearted Horace who appears at the end of the epistle is very different from the hardy Oscan warrior of *Sat.* ii, 1, 34-60. The appeal to the authority of Cratinus at the beginning recalls the opening of *Sat.* i, 4, and the formal device of starting at some distance from the first main topic is reminiscent of the openings of the second, third and fourth satires of *Book I*.

Yet in spite of these features which distinguish it from the other epistles, it forms an essential part of the design of the whole book, corresponding, as has been noted <sup>(5)</sup>, to *Epi.* 1, just as *Epi.* 18 corresponds to *Epi.* 2. And in subject-matter also it is connected with *Epi.* 1, for it provides a background in the contemporary literary situation to the decision, announced there, to abandon poetry in favour of philosophy. There are connections with other epistles too. The imitateness of the *servom pecus* (19) recalls the plagiarism

(1) Heinze compares Epicur. *Gnom. Vat.* 65, but the idea occurs widely. Cf. Cic. *Nat. D.* iii, 87 f.; Liv. xxxvii, 45, 11 f.; Sen. *Epi. mor.* 41, 1; Iuv. x, 363.

(2) Becker has claimed that it is ethical, *imitatio* in poetry being only a special instance of *imitatio* 'im ganzen Leben', *op. cit.*, p. 45. The epistle certainly contains ethical elements which help to link it with the rest of the book (lines 12-14; 17; 48-49), but in its general character it stands apart.

(3) The epistolary situation is indicated only at 35 f., a delay for which there is no parallel elsewhere in the book.

(4) Cf. Courbaud, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

(5) Above, p. 77.

of Celsus (3, 15 ff.), and the taunt that Horace is keeping his poems 'for the ears of Jupiter' (43 f.), i.e. Augustus, must be brought into connection with his instructions to Vinnius in *Epi.* 13 to press on to Augustus with the sealed book-rolls, ignoring the interest of the *volgus*.

The first twenty lines, which are concerned with Horace's imitators, provide opportunities for the striking of bellicose, 'satiric' attitudes. At line 20 he leaves the *servom pecus*, and no more is heard of it. The second part of the epistle (21-34), the transition to which is smoothly executed (*servom pecus ... libera vestigia*), is concerned with originality and especially with the originality of his own work, but it has a connection with the first part in that originality is seen largely as creative imitation. Eight lines are devoted to his own *Iambi* and the precedents in Greek for his treatment of Archilochus (23-31), but his more recent and greater achievements in the *Odes* are dismissed in little more than a line (32 f.). The originality of the *Iambi* cannot have been a live issue at this time, but the principle involved in the discussion of the *Iambi* and their model is relevant to the *Odes*. Horace prefers to defend these indirectly <sup>(1)</sup>. It is characteristic of an *εἰρων* to say less about the more important achievement.

The transition from this central part to the conclusion is effected by the Janus-like lines 33 f., where *inmemorata* looks back to the theme of originality and *ingenuis ... teneri* forward to the subject of Horace's readers. Some are 'gentlemen', but others ungratefully disparage his work in public while in private they admire and enjoy it. The two parallel explanations which he offers, each introduced by *non ego*, each two lines long, and each referring to electoral activity <sup>(2)</sup>, are different in tone (37 f., 39 f.). While the first is exaggerated and humorous, there is pride and gravity in the second as Horace contrasts the *grammatici* with *nobiles scriptores*, contemporaries, Virgil

(1) The interpretation of these lines recently advanced by E. Wistrand, *Fondation Hardt, Entretiens x, Archiloque* (Geneva, 1964), pp. 269 ff., contains two implausibilities: his understanding *hunc* (32) to be Archilochus (he does not meet Bentley's appeal to *ordo orationis*) and his referring line 27 'to Horace's whole poetical production without distinction between iambics and lyrics proper' (pp. 277 f.). On the other hand his criticism of Fraenkel's interpretation of *temperare* (28) must be given serious consideration (p. 270 ff.; see also Page's comments, *op. cit.*, pp. 284 f.).

(2) Cf. the references to electioneering at 6, 49 ff. and 13, 15. They may reflect increased political activity after the resignation of the consulship by Augustus in 23 B.C.

of course among them, whom he has defended <sup>(1)</sup>. Horace does not stand alone, either in the standards which he seeks to maintain or in the criticism which he has to suffer.

He gives an example of his failure to canvass for popular support. He refuses to give a reading of his poems in a crowded auditorium. His words are modest,

‘spissis indigna theatris  
scripta pudet recitare et nugis addere pondus’,

but the worst interpretation is put on them. He is confident, his critics say, that only his own poetry is excellent, and he despises the public, thinking only of Augustus. Horace does not fight back. Afraid even to show disdain, he behaves like a wrestler afraid of being scratched, shouting that the venue does not suit and asking for a respite. The epistle ends with two sententious lines about the dread consequences which may follow upon *ludus*.

This is not the Horace of old, *calidus iuventa*. But it is the Horace of *Epi.* 1 — *non eadem est aetas, non mens*, the Horace who saw himself as a retired gladiator <sup>(2)</sup>. His unwillingness to fight back must be connected also with the fact that the charges are not ill-founded. From a sympathetic viewpoint his answer at lines 41 f. may seem typically ironical, but an unfriendly critic may say that it is lacking in frankness. And the words of Horace’s adversary gain in point when compared with statements made earlier in the epistle. *rides* (43) recalls *iocum* (20). *fidis* and *tibi pulcher* (44 and 45) should be connected with *qui sibi fidet* (22). The motif of the bee at 44 has been anticipated at 23, *dux reget examen*. The connection too between *Iovis auri-bus* and *Epi.* 13 has already been noted. It is little wonder if Horace is unwilling to pursue the matter with his adversary. In *Sat.* ii, 3 and 7 he had allowed himself to be seen through another’s critical eyes (303 ff. and *passim*, from line 22, respectively), but on neither occasion with the effect on himself which is described here. His nerve has failed, and he has withdrawn from the field of literary controversy and from literature itself too. For *ludus* (48), no less than at 1, 3 <sup>(3)</sup>, contains a reference to poetry.

(1) Cf. Plessis and Lejay, *ad loc.*

(2) Cf. the lack of pugnacity in *Odes*, iii, 14 (24 B.C.) and the comments of Steele Commager, *The Odes of Horace* (Yale, 1962), pp. 226 f.

(3) Above, pp. 33 and 35.

After the pride which had shone through the words about his own poetry in the central part of the epistle, it would have been difficult for Horace to introduce philosophy as his new preoccupation. In *Epi.* 1, where poetry is spoken of as only a *ludicrum*, the situation was different, but here philosophy would have seemed like a *pis aller*. So the epistle ends in dark colours, too gloomily indeed to be taken altogether seriously. There is surely an exaggeration in *truces inimicitias et funebre bellum* (49). By over-dramatising the situation, Horace hints that his confession of fear was ironical and that in withdrawing from literary polemic and from poetry itself, he has other reasons than fear of criticism.

The epilogue is addressed to the book, which is written to as if it were a young slave from Horace's household who, in spite of a good upbringing, is anxious to leave his master and make the most of his charms in the demi-monde. Only in the words *non ita nutritus* (5) is it perhaps possible to see a reference to the ethical content of the book. In looking forward to the short-lived success which it will enjoy in Rome, Horace thinks exclusively of *delectare* (8 ; 10) and never of *prodesse*. There is a final irony in the fact that the book, which is the bearer of *caelestis sapientia*, should now appear as a disreputable *puer delicatus*.

There is no parallel in earlier, extant poetry to the poet's addressing his book as if it were one of his slaves, nor even to the poet's addressing his book at all. It is not improbable that the address to the book is Hellenistic in origin, but in considering the peculiar form of this poem it is better to keep certain elements in Horace's earlier work in mind than to speculate about lost Hellenistic models. At the end of Book I of the *Satires*, Horace addresses one of his slaves, an amanuensis who is supposed to have been taking down the text of *Sat.* i, 10 and is now told to add it to the other nine and thus complete the book. The last poem in Book I of the *Odes* (i, 38) is addressed to a slave. On a superficial reading Horace is simply telling him to avoid luxury and ostentation in making preparations when his master is about to drink. But there is more to the poem than this. The content of the instructions symbolizes one kind of poetry which the book contains, chaste and without bombast or over-rich ornament, and the poem itself in its modest scale and simple language exemplifies it <sup>(1)</sup>. Elsewhere there are passages which show con-

(1) Cf. Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, pp. 297 ff.

flict between Horace and his slaves — in *Sat.* ii, 7, *Epi.* i, 16, 46 ff. and *Epi.* i, 14, where the *vilicus*, like the young slave-book of the epilogue, is inconsistent and hankers after the flesh-pots of Rome <sup>(1)</sup>. It is possible to see in the epilogue a coming together of two distinct threads existing separately in Horace's earlier work, a concluding address to a slave, which is concerned with the poetry that has gone before, and a clash between master and slave, who may show a predilection for the *lupanar*.

The autobiographical sketch which ends the book (20 ff.) is appropriately concerned with Horace as a person and in particular as a moral person rather than as a poet <sup>(2)</sup>. His rise from a humble origin, which in the epilogues to the second and third books of *Odes* had set off his poetic achievement <sup>(3)</sup>, is here evidence of his *virtutes*:

ut, quantum generi demas, virtutibus addas. (22)

Though they probably include his poetic gifts, these *virtutes* are primarily moral qualities. Line 23 shows how he has risen, *me primis urbis belli placuisse domique*. The similarity to 17, 35, *principibus placuisse viris non ultima laus est*, leaves no doubt that in *placuisse domi* he is thinking primarily of the pleasure which he has given as a friend. Of the readers who enjoy his work he had already spoken at 19, 33 f. The next line (24) is in three parts, two of which can be connected with *Epi.* 7, *corporis exigui* with *parvum parva decent* (7, 44) and *praecanum* with *reddes nigros capillos* (7, 26). The description ends with a confession of irascibility, *irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem* (25), which recalls the special prominence given to *ira* at 2, 59 ff. <sup>(4)</sup>. Lastly there is his age. Horace completed his forty-fourth

(1) Davus too is sensual, *Sat.* ii, 7, 46. The inconsistency of the slave-book is suggested by the first word of the epistle, *Vortumnus*. Cf. *Sat.* ii, 7, 14; *Prop.* iv, 2. Vortumnus' Greek counterpart, Proteus, appears near the beginning of the book, at 1, 90. Vortumnus may be connected also with the theme of passing time, for he presides over *annus vertens*; cf. R. Lucot, *Pallas*, i (1953), 67.

(2) For its connections with the *σφραγίς* see Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, pp. 362 f. and for an example of a Hellenistic *σφραγίς*-poem H. Lloyd-Jones, *JHS*, lxxxiii (1963), 75 ff. and especially 92 f. and 96.

(3) *Odes*, ii, 20, 5 ff.; iii, 30, 10 ff. The image of a bird, which occurs in *Odes*, ii, 20, reappears in the epistle at 21; cf. Garn, *op. cit.* (above, p. 37, n. 6), pp. 76 f. Cf. also *Epi.* ii, 2, 50, *decisis pennis*.

(4) See also Fraenkel's important discussion, *op. cit.*, p. 361.



December in the year A.U.C. 732 (= 21 B.C.) <sup>(1)</sup>. The epilogue cannot have been written, and the book cannot have been published, long after that date <sup>(2)</sup>. *Senectus* is at hand <sup>(3)</sup>. These lines not only convey a piece of biographical information, but are also a final statement of the opening theme, *non eadem est aetas* (1, 4).

(1) For the year of his birth, A. U. C. 688, but 66, not 65, B.C., see G. Radke, *Gymnasium*, lxxi (1964), 82 f.

(2) As Courbaud saw, *op. cit.*, pp. 361 f., December, 21, is a *terminus post quem*, but December, 20, is not a *terminus ante quem*. A date of publication in 19 or even 18 is made likely by the reference to Agrippa's victory in Spain at 12, 26, for Dio, liv, 11, 2-6, dates Agrippa's arrival there to 19; cf. R. Syme, *AJP* lv (1934), 314. Courbaud's psychological arguments, however, for dating certain epistles to 19 are groundless, *op. cit.*, p. 362.

(3) Above, p. 34.



### III

## The Nature of the *Epistles*

With the exception of the epilogue, the epistles of Book I present themselves to the reader as communications addressed by Horace to friends or acquaintances with the purpose either of dealing with situations of a kind which might reasonably call forth a letter or of giving advice to the person addressed. In the preceding chapter the epistles were largely dealt with as communications of these kinds, and no attempt was made to decide whether they are what they seem. The question to be answered now is whether they are real letters. To hold that they are is to believe that before being collected to form a book the individual epistles had been sent by Horace with the intention of fulfilling the purposes which may be elicited from them, to invite Torquatus to dinner (*Epi.* 5), to offer Maecenas an explanation of his absence from Rome (*Epi.* 7), to deal with a dissatisfied bailiff (*Epi.* 14), or, where no specific purpose of this kind is suggested, to influence the addressee by giving him advice (e.g. *Epi.* 2 ; 4 ; 6 ; 17 ; 18). For an epistle to be a real letter it is not enough that Horace should have sent it to its addressee ; it is necessary that he sent it with the intention of producing an effect which he might have achieved also by speaking directly to the addressee or by writing him a letter in prose. To say that the epistles are not real letters is to hold that they were not intended to have consequences in the 'real world', that their statements, their questions, and their advice have no entailments for the persons addressed <sup>(1)</sup>.

The most frequently adopted line of approach to this problem has been by way of internal evidence. In Fraenkel's view, *Epi.* 14, 6 ff., where Horace speaks of being detained in Rome because of Lamia's grief for his dead brother, clearly indicate that the epistle

(1) For the absence of entailment as a characteristic of poetic discourse, see J. M. Cameron, *The Night Battle* (London, 1962), pp. 133 ff.

is "a true letter" (1). Yet the passage can equally well be regarded as an indication of Horace's skill in giving the impression that he is writing a real letter. Becker is right in holding that these lines are no "proof of the nearness to reality of the epistle" (2). It has on the other hand been argued that the presence of certain elements in an epistle preclude its being a real letter. Morris has argued that in *Epi.* 5 the emphasis on the simplicity of the meal, the conventional praise of wine, and the discussion of the host's duties are foreign to a letter of invitation and that they are "intended to give to the Epistle the element of general interest and to guard, as it were, against its being read as an actual letter" (3). But this argument rests on an *a priori* idea of what is not admissible in a real letter written in verse by a poet. In particular it makes no allowance for the possibility that an Horatian epistle may have a "double nature", that while being a real letter with a definite, practical purpose, it may also be written with an eye to the general reader and contain matters "capable of impressing many kinds of men" (4). The *argumentum ex silentio* also makes an appearance in this discussion. In *Epi.* 14 it is not made clear how the bailiff has told Horace of his wish to return to Rome. Becker has argued that this omission points to the epistle's not being Horace's answer to such a request (5). The inference is surprising. If the epistle were what it purports to be, there would be no need to refer to the way in which Horace had learned of the bailiff's wish. The omission points, if anywhere, to the epistle's being a genuine reply — or to Horace's skill in making it seem one.

More promising arguments based on internal evidence have been advanced by Morris with reference to *Epi.* 5, 3, *supremo te sole domi, Torquate, manebo*, and 10, 49, *haec tibi dictabam post fanum putre Vacunae* (6). Both *Epi.* 5 and *Epi.* 10 are highly wrought compositions, and Morris has convincingly argued that the one could not have been composed on the day of the party nor could the other while Horace was visiting the shrine of Vacuna. But it is arguable that

(1) *Op. cit.*, p. 311.

(2) *Op. cit.* (above, p. 42, n. 3), p. 21, n. 13.

(3) *Op. cit.* (above, p. 41, n. 2), p. 93.

(4) Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

(5) *Op. cit.*, p. 22.

(6) *Op. cit.*, pp. 93 f. and 102.

just as Horace, according to the epistle, had for long been planning the party, so he had been at work on a letter of invitation well before the day he had chosen, and that the reference in *Epi.* 10 is to the occasion when, after much preliminary work, he dictated a fair copy. Neither line proves conclusively the fictional nature of these epistles.

There is, however, one epistle which provides the reader with some indication whether it is what it seems to be. This is *Epi.* 13. Horace has instructed Vinnius about his mission, and he has already left, carrying the *carmina* to Augustus. But Horace is still worried and writes a letter to reinforce his warnings. There is no indication of the distance Vinnius must travel, but whatever it may have been, time in this situation is clearly very important: the letter must overtake Vinnius before he reaches Augustus. Yet Horace writes a piece eighteen lines long and showing a degree of elaboration unsurpassed in the book. It is difficult to believe that *Epi.* 13 can have been written in the circumstances from which it purports to arise. This epistle at least does not appear to be a real letter <sup>(1)</sup>.

A more general approach has been by way of a literary classification of the Horatian epistle, sometimes accompanied by an account of its forebears. Fraenkel confines himself to classification. The epistles, he believes, are, in Goethe's sense, occasional poems (*Gelegenheitsgedichte*), "suggested by a given occasion and written for some immediate practical purpose" <sup>(2)</sup>, but they have a double

(1) Although Heinze's introduction to the epistle treats it as fiction, the opening of his paper, *Horazens Buch der Briefe*, seems to accept the reality of the epistolary situation, *Neue Jahr.* xliii (1919), 305 (= *Vom Geist des Römertums* [Leipzig, 1938], p. 236 and Heinze-Burck, iii, p. 367). Fraenkel, for whom a practical purpose is part of the two-fold nature of the Horatian epistle, divines that *Epi.* 13 was a covering note sent with the *carmina* to Augustus and intended for him, not for Vinnius, *op. cit.*, pp. 351 f. But it is important to note that if it fulfilled this purpose, it did so as a poetic fiction, and that in this respect *Epi.* 13 differs from the other epistles discussed by Fraenkel, in all of which he finds a practical purpose which the epistle, as written to its addressee, directly serves.

(2) *Op. cit.*, p. 313. Fraenkel hardly does justice to Goethe's concept of the *Gelegenheitsgedicht*: "Die Welt ist so gross und reich und das Leben so mannigfaltig, dass es an Anlässen zu Gedichten nie fehlen wird. Aber es müssen alle Gelegenheitsgedichte sein, das heisst, die Wirklichkeit muss die Veranlassung und den Stoff dazu hergeben. Allgemein und poetisch wird ein spezieller Fall eben dadurch, dass ihn der Dichter behandelt. Alle meine Gedichte sind Gelegenheitsgedichte, sie sind durch die Wirklichkeit angeregt und haben darin Grund und Boden. Von Gedichten, aus der Luft gegriffen, halte ich nichts", J. P. Eckermann, *Gespräche mit Goethe in den letzten Jahren seines Lebens*, I. Teil, 18. September 1823.

nature, for they also convey "something that is not the narrow concern of a particular individual in a particular situation but is capable of impressing many kinds of men" (1). For Morris on the other hand they are poetic compositions, like satires or odes. They contain traditional elements and should not be subjected to literal and biographical interpretations (2). Assuming that the event with which an epistle purports to deal has a correlative in real life, he holds that "the relation between the event and the poem ... will not essentially be different in the Epistles from what it was in the Satires and the Odes, a relation real but not immediate" (3). The epistles, he believes, form part of a tradition which includes Lucilius, Catullus 68, parts of the New Testament, and the element of personal address in Cicero's prose works and in long didactic poems like the *De Rerum Natura* and the *Ars Poetica* (4).

Neither account has any real claim to be believed. Both are mere assertions, unsupported by evidence. What is needed is an approach which eschews classificatory statements and avoids external comparisons on the ground that they beg the question, an approach which attempts to understand the nature of the epistles from the epistles themselves, based therefore on internal evidence, but internal evidence of a kind different from that which has been shown to produce such meagre results.

The preceding chapter has provided this evidence. It was shown there that the book exhibits a complex set of reciprocal relationships, that both in juxtaposition and when separated, the epistles supple-

(1) *Op. cit.*, pp. 313 f. Cf. Perret's view, *op. cit.*, pp. 140 f., that the poetic epistle, developed, he believes, as a form before Horace, represents a blending of the tradition of composing and circulating epigrams and versified notes arising from the circumstances of everyday life with the tradition of the doctrinal letter, such as that of Epicurus to Herodotus. This looks like a statement in terms of literary history of Fraenkel's theory of the epistles' double nature, but Perret nowhere states this as his view of them. Although he says that the original intention in the writing of an epistle is more important than whether it was sent or not, he does not face the question whether the epistles were written with the intention of fulfilling the purposes which are implied in them (cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 144 f.). He contrasts *Epi.* 8 with *Epi.* 6, calling it, "au sens que nous définissons ici, un vraie lettre" (p. 142), but this seems to mean no more than that "la personne même du poète" and not a set of moral ideas forms the centre of gravity of the epistle.

(2) *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

(3) *Op. cit.*, p. 96.

(4) *Op. cit.*, p. 83.

ment, contrast with, and comment on one another. Fraenkel's description of a single epistle as "a self-contained poem, complete in itself" (1) is true only to a limited extent. Having read an epistle, the reader will grasp a meaning, but it will not be the full meaning, which will be elicited only when the epistle is taken in conjunction with others and is seen as part of the whole (2). The qualities of being self-contained and complete in itself belong to the book rather than to the single epistle. It is necessary to ask whether this, "the most harmonious of Horace's books" (3), a creation of complex unity, could have come into being through the assembly by him of a number of letters in verse "spontaneously written" (4) in order to deal with situations which arose in his life. Even when allowance has been made for the possibility that the epistles which form the book might be a selection from a larger number of writings of this kind and that Horace, being preoccupied with ethical questions at this time, wrote many letters to friends and acquaintances which showed this concern, thus giving to the letters a general interest extending beyond the particular situation from which they supposedly originate, it still remains difficult to believe that the manifold and subtle relationships existing between different parts of the book could have arisen merely through the poet's skill in selecting from and arranging his correspondence.

The book is an aesthetic object, brought into being, no less than the single poem, by the poet's powers of organization. It is probable that most, if not all, of the epistles were composed after the project of a book of hexameter poems in epistolary form and with an ethical preoccupation had been conceived. It is unlikely that any which may have been written earlier escaped re-working in the light of that project. The processes of drafting (in most cases at least), of working over, and of polishing were not carried out for each epistle in isolation, but took account of the relationships with other parts of the book, whether existing or planned, which came into being when one part took shape. As the book neared completion, it must have been worked over as a whole, with adjustments being

(1) *Op. cit.*, p. 314.

(2) Contrast Will's view, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

(3) Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

(4) The phrase is Fraenkel's, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

made simultaneously in different parts. The epistles themselves suggest that in this or some very similar way the book took shape <sup>(1)</sup>. The writings which Horace gave to the world were not real letters intended to have their purported effect in the real world, but poems cast in the form of letters.

This account of the genesis of the book throws no light on the relationship between epistolary situations and events of real life. About this, as about the question whether all the addressees are real persons, it is right in the first place to admit ignorance. It may be suspected that this relationship varies in different epistles. It would be surprising if Horace had not in some way been involved in an introduction of Septimius to Tiberius and if Vinnius had not played some part in the presentation by Horace of a copy of *Odes*, i-iii, to Augustus. Whether Horace ever applied to Vala for information about living conditions in the South seems more uncertain. In epistles of admonition it is likely that the advice offered is often appropriate to the characters and situations of the addressees, but this is not to say that Horace intended that they should be guided in their way of life by his advice <sup>(2)</sup>.

It is not to be forgotten that the public for whom Horace published his book for the most part would not have been well informed about the details of life in the circles to which Horace and his addressees belonged. If, as has been suggested, there was an analogue in life to the epistolary situation of *Epi.* 9, those who knew about it, Tiberius and Septimius above all, would find a special pleasure in observing this transmutation of social life into ethical poetry and would perhaps discover nuances which their contemporaries living outside this circle would overlook. But by publishing the epistle Horace was directing his writing primarily to a general, and not a specially informed, public. If the state of our knowledge were as good as theirs, we should have no reason to be dissatisfied. In fact it is considerably worse, and we must make every effort to improve it by discovering common knowledge, that, for example, Vinnius was outstandingly strong. Facts of this kind, which were generally known among the

(1) Fraenkel, however, expressly denies "any comprehensive planning" of *Epi.* 17 and 18 when discussing their "many points of contact", *op. cit.*, p. 322. Cf. G. Luck, *Das Altertum*, vii (1961), 78.

(2) Cf. G. Williams, *JRS*, liv (1964), 196.



public for whom the book was published <sup>(1)</sup>, should be pursued, but it would be a mistake to suppose that we are at a disadvantage in approaching the epistles because we know so little about the private lives of Horace and his friends.

Nowhere in the *Epistles* is Horace's subject actual private life. *Epi.* 7 is not the text of a communication addressed by Horace to Maecenas in the course of a crisis in their relations and giving a serious warning which "may have made Maecenas wince" <sup>(2)</sup>. The epistolary situation is not to be taken even as the reflection of a crisis in which Horace successfully threatened Maecenas that he would return his gifts and end their friendship if he were not allowed his *otia liberrima*. Horace could not with decency have published the epistle if readers were likely to regard it as a source of information about his and Maecenas' private affairs — especially at a period when Maecenas' influence in the state may have declined <sup>(3)</sup>. But Horace's readers were used to the autobiographical convention in poetry, and they knew that it was often associated with fictional material <sup>(4)</sup>. It was clear to them, for example, that in Horace's amatory lyrics they were not being presented with an account of the poet's love affairs. In the book of *Epistles* they found an ethical poem, in which the epistolary form led to the presentation of moral matters largely in personal terms, whether of the poet's own striving as a *proficiens* or of his attempts to help his friends towards wisdom. One of the leading ethical themes in the book is the conduct of relations between great man and humble dependant; another is the superiority, especially for a man growing old, of life in the country to life in Rome. In *Epi.* 7 these themes come together. It is a discussion, cast in epistolary form, of the issues which can arise when an aging dependant is drawn away from the side of his great friend and seeks the peace of the countryside. The rôle of dependant is taken by Horace, and, naturally, that of his friend is given to Maecenas. But they are rôles, and though the actual friendship between the two forms the background to the discussion, there is no justification for believing that Horace has revealed a difficult situation existing

(1) The point has been made with reference to Vinnius by R. G. M. Nisbet, *CQ*, n.s. ix (1959), 75.

(2) Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

(3) Above, p. 50, n. 1.

(4) Cf. G. Williams, *JRS*, lli (1962), 40.

between Maecenas and himself. *cuncta resigno* has no more connection with a real world of plans and intentions than has another declaration addressed to Maecenas:

nil cupientium  
nudus castra peto et transfuga divitum  
partis linquere gestio. (Odes, iii, 16, 22 ff.)

But should not this distinction between the poet as man and his poetry be extended to the whole ethical content of the book and to the self-portrait which it presents? To do this would accord well with the modern critical doctrine of the poetic mask <sup>(1)</sup>, but there is danger in an indiscriminate use of this valuable insight. It would be hypercritical and doctrinaire to hold that it is uncertain whether Horace really believed that the wisdom of the *Epistles* was a good guide to happiness <sup>(2)</sup>. But did this belief affect his life as much as the book suggests? The self-portrait which it presents is clearly selective. To the exclusion of almost everything else Horace is shown as a *proficiens* in philosophy. But if this limitation is ignored, is the portrait true? It is impossible to say <sup>(3)</sup>. Athenodorus' ideal picture of useful *otium* in the country may shake the reader's confidence in its veracity. On the other hand Horace's choice of subject matter is probably in some degree a reflection of his interests and desires <sup>(4)</sup>. Besides life has been known to imitate art, and the devotion of his mind to ethics as well as to poetry during the period of composition is unlikely to have left his life unaffected.

In any case the book is not to be read as a spiritual autobiography, whether genuine or fictional. There is no basis for Courbaud's assigning epistles to various stages in a conversion to Stoicism <sup>(5)</sup>.

(1) Cf. in general G. T. Wright, *The Poet in the Poem* (Berkeley, 1962). For the application of this approach to the satires of Horace see W. S. Anderson, *Critical Essays on Roman Literature, Satire* (ed. J. P. Sullivan) (London, 1963), pp. 16 ff. In the field of Archilochus and early Greek song generally, related ideas have been put forward by K. J. Dover, whose starting point is the song of modern preliterate cultures, *Fondation Hardt, Entretiens x, Archiloque* (Geneva, 1964), pp. 199 ff.

(2) Cf., with reference to Lucretius, N. Rudd, *Phoenix*, xviii (1964), 219.

(3) For a classification of the uses of the first person singular in the *Epistles* and for the rôle of 'the Sabine farm circle of ideas' see G. Williams, *JRS*, liv (1964), 195. Cf. his tantalizing reference to Catullus and Propertius, *JRS*, lii (1962), 40.

(4) Cf. Rudd, *op. cit.*, 218, on Catullus, Martial and others choosing to write indecent poetry.

(5) E.g., *op. cit.*, pp. 355 ff.

The book must on the contrary be viewed 'synchronically' (1), as setting forth various facets of its main theme (2). In this respect it might best be compared with a book of elegies by Propertius in which the poet treats various aspects of love, but can hardly be said to tell a story (3).

The comparison is suggestive. Works of art are unpredictable, but it is often possible, when they have come into existence, to see how fitting it was that they should have been produced at a certain stage in the history of the art or in the career of the artist. The literary world in which the *Epistles* appeared was, in poetry, dominated less by those moral and patriotic ideals which are usually thought of as typical of the age of Augustus than by the erotic preoccupations of the elegists (4). The book of *Epistles* is both an imitation of, and a reaction against, this dominant genre.

How far Horace's choice of epistolary form was indebted to the example of elegy is a matter of doubt (5). But in the number and average length of the poems which make it up, the book of *Epistles* bears a striking resemblance to Propertius, i and iii. More important than this is the similar kind of unity, resulting from the poet's having a single preoccupation, with love in Propertius, with ethics in Horace. In consequence the autobiographical impression which each genre creates is extremely partial: Propertius appears almost exclusively as lover and *praeceptor amoris*, Horace as a *proficiens* in wisdom and a helper of others to the same goal. The association

(1) The only clear exception to this is the juxtaposition of *Epi.* 12 and 13; see above, p. 65.

(2) To use Becker's terms, the *Epistles* form a space, not a line, *Hermes*, lxxxiii (1955), 322.

(3) Cf. A. W. Allen, *Critical Essays on Roman Literature, Elegy and Lyric* (ed. J. P. Sullivan), (London, 1962), p. 117; N. Rudd, *loc. cit.*

(4) Having published the *Georgics* at the beginning of the decade which preceded the appearance of the *Epistles*, Virgil had since been silent. The three books of *Odes* were published in 23, but seemingly without great success. (The recent suggestion made by G. Williams about one of the reasons for this is relevant to the present discussion, *JRS*, lii [1962], 45.) The tone of these years in poetry was set rather by Propertius i-iii and Tibullus i. Cf. C. O. Brink, *Latin Studies and the Humanities* (Cambridge, n.d.), pp. 15 ff.

(5) On the epistolary form in elegy cf. F. Leo, *GGA* (1901), 323; W. Abel, *Die Anredeformen bei den röm. Elegikern* (Diss. Berlin, 1930), p. 124; L. Winniczuk, *Ovid's Elegie u. die Epistolographische Theorie in Publius Ovidius Naso*, *Biblioteca Antica, Studii ii* (Bucarest, 1957), pp. 39-70 and p. 51 especially.

of *laudes ruris* with ethics in the *Epistles* may be compared with the rôle of the countryside in Tibullus.

But while the book of *Epistles* recalls in these ways the work of the elegists, it gives expression at the same time to a rejection of the elegists' main concern. Love is one of the *ludicra* which Horace is laying aside. Thus there are no epistles to Lalage, Glycera, or Cinara, and there is nothing to indicate that there will be a Damalis at the party for Torquatus <sup>(1)</sup>. Horace's affair with Cinara belongs to a past of which he is not ashamed, but which it would be shameful to prolong (14, 32-6). He has reached a stage which for the elegists lies in the future :

iam subrepet iners aetas, nec amare decebit,  
dicere nec cano blanditias capite.  
nunc levis est tractanda venus, dum frangere postes  
non pudet et rixas inseruisse iuvat. (Tib. i, 1, 71-4)

Like Horace (14, 32 and 36), Tibullus thinks of *decorum* and *pudor* in this connection. Propertius has planned how he will spend his time when there will be no more loving. He will turn to philosophy, but his interests will be closer to Iccius' (12, 16 ff.) than to Horace's <sup>(2)</sup> :

atque ubi iam Venerem gravis interceperit aetas,  
sparsarit et nigras alba senecta cornas,  
tum mihi naturae libeat perdiscere mores,  
quis deus hanc mundi temperet arte domum, ...  
(Prop. iii, 5, 23-46)

In this elegy of Propertius there is nothing to suggest that poetry will survive love or that his philosophic studies will provide him with material for poetry. The same would seem to be true of Virgil's reported intention of turning to philosophy after the completion of the *Aeneid* <sup>(3)</sup>. But Horace makes poetry out of the theme of conversion to philosophy, without, however, saying that he is writing a philosophic poem. On the contrary, he suggests a basic dichotomy between poetry and philosophy :

(1) The only exception to this turning away from love is the reference to the *Lucana amica* at 15, 21. But a passing affair with such a girl would for Horace be very different from falling under the sway of one of the fascinating and sophisticated women of Rome.

(2) In *A.P.* v, 112 Philodemus looks forward more briefly to *λοιπότερ φρόντισις*.

(3) Donat. *Vit. Verg.* 35, *ut reliqua vita tantum philosophiae vacaret*.

nunc itaque et versus et cetera ludicra pono :  
quid verum atque decens, curo et rogo et omnis in hoc sum.

(1, 10 f.)

This creates at the outset a fundamental ambiguity about the status of the book. Is it a *ludicrum* in spite of its material, or is it a contribution to *sapientia* in spite of being *versus*? There is a truly Horatian irony in this.

In harmony with the situation at the beginning of the book, the poet's conversion to philosophy, Horace nowhere gives the impression that philosophy has previously been of any great moment in his life or poetry. Of his life we cannot speak with confidence, but it is certainly true not only that philosophy does in general play an important rôle in his earlier poetry, but also that characteristic aspects of the wisdom of the *Epistles* had found expression there — for example, in odes such as ii, 3; 16; iii, 1; 29 (1). In the second book of the *Satires*, Ofellus, the *abnormis sapiens* who praises the simple life and the mean and who recommends hunting as good sauce (2), is in some measure a rustic precursor of the Horace of the *Epistles*, though in spite of his admiration for the mean he lacks the balanced and tolerant attitude which is expressed in the *Epistles* (3). And the fable of the town mouse and the country mouse in *Sat.* ii, 6 is in essentials an anticipation of the story of Mena and Philippus, which is fully integrated with the ethical teaching of the *Epistles*. Earlier still, in the first book of *Satires*, the themes of consistency, the mean, and the simple life make their appearance (4). Horace's concentration on philosophy in the *Epistles* is the culmination of his long involvement in poetry with ethics. When he came to write the *Epistles*, he gave expression to certain ethical ideas which had formed part of the multifarious philosophical discussion of his earlier work (5).

(1) Cf. Garn, *op. cit.*, (above, p. 37, n. 6), p. 4.

(2) Simple life : *Sat.* ii, 2, *passim*; the mean : 53 ff.; 63 ff.; hunting : 9 (cf. 20 and *Epi.* 18, 48).

(3) Cf. W. S. Anderson, *op. cit.* (above, p. 96, n. 1), p. 32.

(4) Consistency : *Sat.* i, 1, 1-22; 3, 1 ff.; the mean : 1, 106 f.; 2, 4-30; 47 f.; simple life : 1, 59 f.; 74 f.

(5) The concept of *decorum*, though not completely new, did not play an important part in his earlier work and nowhere appears as a generally valid principle of behaviour. It is absent from the *Satires* except in the mannered discourse of Catus (ii, 4, 26; 65). In the *Epodes* and *Odes decere* and *decorum* are used with reference to age (*Epo.* 13, 5; *Odes*, iii, 15, 8; 14; cf. Garn, *op. cit.*, p. 6), manly behaviour (*Epo.* 1, 9; *Odes*, iii, 2, 13), po-

In devoting a whole book to their presentation, Horace did something which he had not tried before. It is the literary concept of a book devoted to ethics which is new in Horace, not the ethics themselves.

Their pre-dominance does not make of the *Epistles* a didactic poem. What Horace has created is a self-contained world of the imagination in which ethical principles are paramount. It is for us to enter and explore this world, experiencing its texture and finally grasping it in all its complex harmony. The principles are integral to this final and total experience of the poem, in which we apprehend them not as precept directed to us in our everyday lives, but as a vision of morality transfigured by the poetic imagination.

litics (*Odes*, iii, 29, 25), the celebration of Spring's arrival (*Odes*, i, 4, 9 ; 11), and the Muses' honouring Lamia (*Odes*, i, 26, 12).

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